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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the formation of the Irish co-operative 
movement in the final decade of the nineteenth century and traces its 
progress through to the outbreak of the Great War. Co-operative 
organisation is first viewed as a form of agricultural innovation and 
its adoption and diffusion patterns explored. The reactions of various 
social groupings - landlords, clergymen, tenant farmers, nationalist 
politicians, traders - to the new movement are then discussed in some 
detail. On the basis of this discussion some tentative generalisa- 
tions regarding the rural social structure are developed. The econo- 
mic role of the Roman Catholic clergy, the distribution of political 
power in rural Ireland, and the emergence of interest group politics 
are also treated. Other features examined relate to the economic per- 
formance of the retailing sector, the apparent multiplicity of traders 
in the rural economy, and the supply of agricultural credit - all 
issues that occupied the attention of leading co-operators. There is 
also a considerable emphasis on the discussion of methodological 
issues. 
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"Study problems in preference to periods" - Lord Acton. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study has a dual focus: (a) the early progress of the co- 
operative movement is traced (b) co-operative development is used as 
a medium through which rural society may be viewed and analysed. Per- 
haps the first, point that should be emphasised is that this is not a 
history of agricultural co-operation in Ireland. A number of such 
general. studies exist already (see bibliography) so there seemed to 
be no special value in producing further work along those lines. 
Analytical studies of Irish co-operation are, by contrast, compara- 
tively rare. Much more remains to be done on this front, but it is 
hoped that the cluster of sub-studies presented here goes some way 
towards remedying the deficiency. 
In its formative period the Irish co-operative movement had a 
strongly disruptive potential, particularly in rural Ireland. This 
in itself is unremarkable, what is significant though from the point 
of view of our second level of analysis is the distinctive character 
of the alliances and tensions it engendered. By cutting across 
groups' existing patterns of conflict and solidarity, co-operation 
is instrumental in revealing some of the underlying structures of 
rural society. In this perspective,, for instance, social relation- 
ships enveloping landlords, tenant farmers, traders, and clergy 
emerge in a quite interesting light. 
There is a further sense in which the study of co-operation is 
especially fruitful. The co-operative pioneers commented on a wide 
range of themes that relate to rural economy and society. Their 
ideas, treated as hypotheses, are valuable for historians, economists 
and sociologists. (The writings of Horace Plunkett in particular 
deserve a far better fate than that of providing occasional illustra- 
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tive material for political and social historians. ) However, to deal 
adequately with even the major lines of thought unloosed by these co- 
operators would require a very considerable research input over a long 
period of time. Since in the long term even economic historians are 
dead I have eschewed any idea of a comprehensive treatment of the 
various issues raised. Such an. attempt, within the confines of this 
thesis, would. have necessarily degenerated into superficial comment. 
I have, therefore, contented myself with selecting, and exploring in 
some detail, -a number of hypotheses that appeared significant not only 
in the context of co-operative history, but also in the context of gene- 
ral historiography or social scientific enquiry. Thus, for example, 
Horace Plunkett's view of the impact of the Roman Catholic Church on 
Irish economic development is considered in some detail, in part 
because this fuses into a major intellectual debate that is still far 
from being resolved. * 
This example illustrates a further point regarding presentation. 
I have attempted in each chapter (with the exception of the first) to 
give a rounded treatment of particular issues and themes, thus deviat- 
ing from the more conventional-pattern of a historical narrative 
unfolding in chronological sequence. There is necessarily some tension 
* This treatment is also useful for a rather different reason. In 
chapter 5I argue that the response of the R. C. clergy to the co- 
operative movement was not quite so enthusiastic or unambiguous as 
had been suggested in the writings of leading co-operators. There 
was some danger that these findings might have been generalised to 
fit into a pre-existing stream of thought that emphasised the nega- 
tive implications of the Church for economic growth. The more 
general chapter on Church and economy (Chapter 6) hopefully dispels 
such notions. 
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between this approach and the further requirement of furnishing an 
intelligible historical framework. As a primarily analytical orien- 
tation can only bear the weight of a limited amount of descriptive 
material (otherwise it collapses into incoherence) I have provided 
a general introduction in Chapter I to the course of Irish co- 
operation over the period 1890-1914. Hopefully this acts as a his- 
torical backcloth against which the contents of later chapters are 
rendered more meaningful. 
A not unimportant objective of this study was to explore the 
usefulness of theory in the reconstruction and interpretation of the 
past. A number of techniques, principally from economics but also 
from sociology, have been used in the course of this work. An inter- 
disciplinary approach seemed especially appropriate to the study of 
a multi-faceted phenomenon such as the co-operative movement. While 
the application of these techniques imparts a leaden quality to the 
writing at particular points it is felt that the stylistic losses are 
compensated for by gains in other directions. It is hardly necessary 
to argue the case for an explicit methodology but a more specific 
point in relation to the historian may be worth adding. There is a 
strong case to be made for greater interest and participation by 
historians in the development of social theories. This would help 
combat some of the worst excesses of ahistorical methods. It could 
also lead to the development and refinement of some existing models, 
and there is some reason to believe social scientists would welcome 
such contributions. The latter point may be illustrated by reference 
to Chapter 3 of this thesis. Much to my surprise, the critique of an 
innovation decision making model contained there stimulated a stronger 
response than any other paper I have published. (Chapter 3 contains 
3 
a modified version of a previously published paper entitled 'Evalua- 
tion of a Model Building Approach to the Adoption of Agricultural 
Innovations', Journal of Agricultural Economics, XXVIII, 1977,55-61. 
Other published papers that draw on material from this thesis are 
'A Sceptical View on the Reincarnation of the Irish "Gombeenman"', 
Economic and Social Review, VIII,. (1977), 213-222 and 'Adoption of a 
Group Innovation in Irish Agriculture 1890-1914: an exercise in 
applied-history'., Oxford Agrarian Studies, VI (1977), 57-70. ) 
Finally, I should perhaps point out that thesis regulations at 
the, University of York do not permit footnote references at the bot- 
tom, of a page. This is quite a burden in the context of historical 
writing and I can only regret the inconvenience caused to possible 
readers. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN. OVERVIEW' OF' THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF IRISH CO-OPERATION 1890-1914 
HORACE PLUNKETT 
Ireland at mid-century had hardly begun to recover from the 
massive tragedy of the Great Famine. Death and emigration had 
gouged out large portions of the population, especially among the 
poorer sections of rural society. In-terms of population levels, 
the-country was now set on a course of long term population decline. 
The: main political legacy of the Famine lay years ahead, but in the 
rural economy major changes were clearly visible. Decimation of the 
cottiers and labourers had altered-the social balance in favour of 
landholders while the partly related processes of farm consolidation 
and expansion of cattle numbers were well under way. 
Post-Famine reconstruction was aided over the following two 
decades or so by generally favorable price trends for agricultural 
commodities. Into this period of relative prosperity were fitted 
the childhood and early years of the father of Irish co-operation - 
Horace Curzon Plunkett. " Horace, the third son of the sixteenth Baron 
Dunsany, was born in the Gloucestershire Cotswolds in 1854.1 Of 
ancient Anglo-Irish stock, the Plunketts had their family seat at 
Dunsany Castle in county Meath. It was here that the young Plunkett 
spent some of the early years of his life. Following a rather melan- 
choly childhood - Horace's mother died when he was four years old, 
by the time he was twelve a brother and a sister had also died he 
passed through the elite institutions of Eton and Oxford to emerge 
in 1877 with an honours degree in history. In the following year 
the young graduate took an important step, one which prefigured 
later developments. He formed the Dunsany Co-operative Society on 
the family estate. This store, dealing in groceries and provisions, 
5 
was owned and controlled by his father's tenants. Though conform- 
ing only roughly to the Rochdale model of a co-operative society 
it was nevertheless the prototype which Plunkett later drew upon 
when floating his ideas for radical reorganisation of the distri- 
bution system in rural Ireland. 
2 
Threatened with tuberculosis, the disease which had previously 
struck down his mother, brother and sister, Plunkett was advised to 
leave the damp lowlands of Meath and spend the greater part of the 
year in a drier climate. In mid 1879, as the dark clouds of agra- 
rian trouble began to take shape in the west of the country, Plun- 
kett set off for the United States of America. Fairly recently 
settled territories such as Wyoming were then enjoying boom condi- 
tions for cattle-raising, and it was here that the adventurous young 
emigrant, in conjunction with a number of partners, established him- 
self in cattle ranching. Over the following decade Plunkett combi- 
ned ranching in the Rocky Mountains and other American business ven- 
tures with frequent trips to Ireland. 
3 The declining Baron Dunsany 
leaned heavily upon the business abilities of his son in sorting out 
the scattered family interests in estates, coal mining, shipping, 
and boat building. Family circumstances, particularly the plight 
of his dying father, induced him eventually to abandon an active 
business career in the New World, though he was to retain some invest- 
ments and a life-long interest in the U. S. A. Having reluctantly 
taken this step, the year 1888 found Plunkett more or less perman- 
ently grounded in Ireland. A restless, vigorous individual, posses- 
sed of a social idealism originally kindled at Oxford, he now sought 
to transfer these creative energies into Irish public life. 
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In the autumn of 1888 Plunkett published an article entitled "Co- 
operative Stores for Ireland" .4 Arguing that high prices paid for farm 
and household supplies contributed strongly to the problem of rural 
poverty, he advocated the formation of co-operative stores along'the lines 
of the Dunsany Society. Greater efficiency in distribution and the 
retention of retail margins by the members of such societies would boost 
the purchasing power of rural incomes. Having articulated these newly 
crystallised views in public for the first time, Plunkett became rapidly 
more enthusiastic about the ameliorative value of co-operative organisation. 
At this time also the Co-operative Union - the ideological nucleus 
of the British co-operative movement - was developing an interest in the 
virgin territories of the neighbouring island. 
5 In November 1888 
J. C. Gray of the Co-operative Union crossed to Ireland and had a close 
look at co-operative prospects. In the course of this visit he travelled 
to Dunsany and discussed with Plunkett the best means of introducing 
the system to Ireland. 
6 Later in the same month the latter attended a 
quarterly meeting of the Co-operative Board in Manchester and had 
further discussions with Gray and other leading British co-operators. 
7 
These links with the British movement were formalised a year later when 
7 
at the Co-operative Congress at Ipswich an Irish Section was set up to 
$ 
promote the new system in Ireland. 
In 1889 the co-operative crusade was begun in earnest. Though 
Plunkett's base was at Dunsany, about twenty miles north of Dublin, 
the early propaganda activity was concentrated in the southern coun- 
ties of Ireland. He later commented that the reason for selecting the 
Munster region was his (Plunkett's) belief that if co-operative sche- 
mes could be made to work there this would constitute a far more impres- 
sive vindication of their intrinsic worth than success in the more 
prosperous eastern counties. 
9 
Whether or not there was such a pre- 
conceived strategy it is clear that 
Plunkett's personal network of contacts in the south greatly facilitated 
his work there. Mary Ponsonby, his widowed sister, lived at Kilcooley 
Abbey in Co. Tipperary. Alexis Roche, brother of Lord Fermoy and 
Plunkett's business partner in American enterprises, had a residence at 
Old Court, Co. Waterford. More important still, Lord Monteagle who 
quickly channelled his philanthropic energies into co-operative work, 
had an estate at Foynes, Co. Limerick on which Plunkett and he sought 
to interest the stronger tenants in co-operation. These three "Big 
Houses" became for some time the foci of the new movement. 
10 Thus in 
May 1889 we find Plunkett driving out from Kilcooley seeking to interest ' 
local priests and farmers in co-operation. 
11 An attempt to establish a 
creamery close to the Ponsonby demesne at Kilcooley is an early failtr e. 
l` 
In July he is riding with Alexis Roche about the Doneraile area "seeing 
influential neighbours and talking over the possibility of starting a 
co-operative movement in the district". 
13 It was Roche, incidentally, 
who introduced Plunkett to a raw young sub-agent to Lord Castletown by 
the name of R. A. Anderson. One of the earliest recruits into the 
movement, Anderson, by dint of his great strength and drive, was to 
carry the co-operative message into some of the remotest corners and 
into virtually every county in Ireland. Shrugging off bad weather, 
8 
rough travelling conditions, and sometimes physical assault, he bore 
the brunt of the early organising work) 
The first society, a co-operative store, was formed in Anderson's 
home village of Doneraile. Some time afterwards, with the help of Lord 
Monteagle who "secured the presence of the parish priest and all the 
prominent farmers", a co-operative creamery was established at 
Ballyhahill, close to Monteagle's residence. 
15 
This society was officially 
registered in October 1890. The very first co-operative creamery in 
Ireland had been formed the previous year at Drumcollogher, county 
Limerick by W. L. Stokes, a butter buyer for the English Co-operative 
Wholesale Society', and by Robert Gibson, a butter merchant in Limerick. 
16 
These two then linked up for some time with Plunkett and Anderson in 
promoting co-operative societies. 
It is important to note that the original aim of promoting store 
societies had now been broadened to include creamery societies. 
17 Thus 
early in 1890 two very different, sometimes antagonistic forms of co- 
operation - consumer and producer societies - were being advocated. 
This requires some explanation, particularly as the major emphasis was 
shifting swiftly towards creamery societies. The Irish dairying industry 
had been experiencing depressed market conditions over a prolonged 
period. The price of butter had fallen by almost 40% over the period 
1875-90.18 This was in part due to increased supplies of butter on the 
British market, the traditional outlet for Irish dairy produce. In the 
early 1870s when butter prices were buoyant, Ireland was still the 
principal outside supplier. Exports to Britain averaged about 600,000 
cwts. between 1870 and 1875, over one-third of total butter imports into 
the United Kingdom in those years. 
19 Butter imports into the U. K. 
doubled between 1870 and 1880, registered some decline in the following 
decade, but by the turn of the century had shown a volume increase of 
a further 45% over the level in 1880. In addition, substitutes such as 
9 
margarine were further intensifying competitive pressures at the lower 
end of the market. 
20 The growth of butter imports from Ireland's 
major competitors is summarised in Table I. Most interesting, perhaps, 
is the rapid rise to prominence of Denmark, signifying a major reorien- 
tation of its agricultural sector. The emergence of Australasia at a 
somewhat later date as another major supply area is also worthy of 
note, reflecting, as it does further integration of the world market 
in butter as a result of developments in transport and refrigeration 
techniques. 
Table I. Major sources of butter imports into the United Kingdom 
1870-1910, with quantities expressed in cwts. * 
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 
Sweden 10,043 71,335 224,235 196,041 345,684 
Denmark 127,013 300,157 824,749 1,486,342 1,726,091 
Germany 162,146 117,767 104,450 36,042 3,308 
Holland 406,795 810,519 156,069 282,805 3,481 
France 289,692 531,649 525,105 322,048 361,249 
U. S. A. 16,915 277,790 84,553 56,046 756 
Australasia 3,145 4,595 40,498 517,028 1,030,640 
Russia 13,955 13,955 8,366 209,738 584,040 
Total 1,159,210 2,326,305 2,027,717 3,378,516 4,325,539 
Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign 
Countries and British Possessions (BPP, relevant years). The 
totals for 1870 and 1880 include some margarine imports. 
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But increased supplies, butter substitutes, butter-margarine mix- 
tures were not the only factors depressing the price of Irish butter, 
and in consequence the income of dairy farmers. More damaging in the 
longer term for a country not-prepared to make the necessary adjustments 
were the qualitative changes taking place both on the side of supply 
* Selected countries only. 
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and that of demand. Even prior tote invention of the centrifugal 
separator in 1878 (which was to open the way to creamery produced butter), 
fresh factory-blended butter from continental Europe was flowing onto 
the British market. 
21 This lightly salted butter met a brisk consumer 
response; a taste for such butter, to the detriment of the heavily 
salted firkin-butter from Ireland, began to develop, though, as is to 
be expected there were regional lags and variations in the changing 
pattern of consumer demand. By the early 1880s, however, it was claimed 
that heavily salted butter of the firkin type was hardly saleable in the 
massive London market. 
22 The rapid diffusion of the creamery system, 
in Denmark in particular, posed further problems. Butter production 
could now be transferred from farm level to a much smaller number of 
centres where factory-style manufacture was possible. This cost- 
reducing innovation also produced a butter of more even quality, a 
uniformity of produce appreciated by distributors catering for a mass 
market. By contrast, in Ireland where the home butter-making system 
prevailed there was "nothing uniform about the produce, and in a 
hundred farms in every parish a hundred flavours originated". 
23 
In the 1880s the Irish dairying industry was beginning to slowly 
and painfully adjust to changed conditions in its trading environment. 
Fresh butter marts began to appear in some of the small towns, diverting 
supplies from other markets based on the firkin-butter trade, and 
feeding into butter blending factories. 24 In these "factories" lumps 
of home made butter were washed, salted, and blended together, giving a 
reasonably acceptable if not quality product. 
25 In addition creameries, 
using the Scandinavian technique of separating cream from whole milk by 
means of a centrifugal separator, were slowly intruding upon the 
traditional dairying scene. The first instance of centralised churning 
of cream into butter is said to have been at Hospital in county Limerick 
in 1884.26 This establishment, rather misleadingly called a creamery, 
II 
was promoted by a vigorous dairying enthusiast, the Rev. Canon Bagot. 
A short time later this Church of Ireland clergyman was instrumental in 
getting a further "creamery" under way at Galbally, also in the county 
Limerick. 27 Under this system farmers continued to skim the cream from 
the whole milk on the farm. The cream was then transported to the 
"creamery" where each farmer's cream was churned separately, and finally 
the different lots of butter were blended together. According to Stokes, 
whose position as a butter merchant compels respect for his judgment 
in this matter, the end result was a second-rate butter. These and a 
similar venture at Kenmare proved failures. 
28 After 1886 some private 
businessmen, particularly those involved in the butter export trade 
(such as Dowdall Bros. of Cork for example) and also small groups of 
farmers, began to set up creameries based on the system of centrifugal 
separation. 
29 
As the final decade of the century opened, the limited 
extent of these changes, if not evident then, is certainly apparent 
in retrospect. In 1891 there were 152 "dairy factories" of varying 
degrees of sophistication operating in the country; within a few short 
years this number had increased very substantially to reach a level of 
255 (in 1895)*. But the latter figure was still less than one-third 
of the level actually achieved a decade later when suitable dairying 
districts were practically saturated with creameries (see appendix). 
Agricultural Statistics of Ireland for the year 1891 (BPP, 1892, 
LXXVIII), p. 306; Agricultural Statistics 1895 (BPP, 1896, XCII), 
p. 331. (The totals for numbers of plants include a few condensed 
milk factories). 
ý 
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FROM CO-OPERATION TO A DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
By 1890 a major acceleration in the rate of dairy reorganisation 
was overdue. Plunkett, who initially had no thought of applying the 
co-operative principle to the dairying industry, perceived the 
opportunity and reoriented his tiny campaign accordingly. 
30 The 
following five years or so embrace the period of early, robustious, 
and largely unsystematic attempts at propagating the co-operative 
system. This formative period is of such importance both in terms 
of farmers' reaction to the co-operative innovation and the wider 
implications of this behaviour, that these issues are subjected to 
detailed treatment in the following chapter. For the moment it is 
sufficient to note that chiefly as a result of the field activities of 
Anderson, now a full-time organiser financed by the Co-operative Union, 
the movement was making good progress. In 1890 there was one co- 
operative creamery in Ireland. In the following year the number had 
risen to 17. In 1892 there existed 25 and in 1893 some 30 such 
societies. 
31 
Plunkett had been conscious from the outset of the need for a 
permanent organisational and ideological structure at national level 
to guide and co-ordinate developments at local level. 
32 On the 18 
April 1894 he convened in Dublin a meeting that was to inaugurate the 
Irish Agricultural Organisation Society. Attended by about 250 people 
from various walks of Irish life, it was successful in fusing nationalist 
and unionist, Protestant and Roman Catholic into an association 
dedicated "to work together for what they believe (dJ to be the welfare 
of the agricultural classes". 
33 A further meeting was held on the 10 May 
to arrange the election of a committee for the new body. 
34 
A small but 
potentially serious crisis emerged on the morning of the meeting. One 
rabid unionist objected that if the various individuals who had been 
13 
nominated were elected to the committee then the nationalists would 
have a majority of one. The problem was smoothed over by the 
magnanimous gesture of one of the candidates who readily agreed to 
efface himself, thus ensuring a delicate political equilibrium, 
35 
Plunkett became first president of the society, while Anderson was 
appointed chief organiser and secretary at a salary of 1400 per annum. 
36 
The committee contained, among others, two prominent Roman Catholic 
clergymen, Dr. O'Donnell the Bishop of Raphoe, and the Rev. T. A. Finlay. 
O'Donnell was also a member of the Congested Districts Board, as indeed 
was Plunkett. Finlay, a tough outspoken Jesuit, had discussed 
agricultural co-operation with Plunkett early in 1892,37 and not long 
afterwards was actively involved in promoting the system in Ireland. 
Having previously studied co-operation in Germany and France, he was to 
make an outstanding contribution to the movement in Ireland. When a 
co-operative newspaper, the Irish Homestead, was started the following 
year Finlay became its first editor. For more than a quarter century 
he acted as vice-president of the I. A. O. S. 
Plunkett, though he regarded co-operation or self-help as furnishing 
the fundamental building blocks for agricultural prosperity (and 
ultimately the creation of a vibrant rural social order), nevertheless 
insisted that the state had also an important role to play. 
38 The two 
were essentially complementary, each enhancing the effectiveness of the 
other. Following the successful launching of the I. A. O. S., Plunkett 
now sought to implement further stages of his thinking. The chosen 
instrument was an all-party conference composed of leading representatives 
from the nationalist and unionist camps. This proposal, issued through 
the medium of a letter to the newspapers, elicited a remarkably favourable 
reaction39 (and thus deprived some future historian, gifted with perfect 
hindsight, of the measured judgment that such a naive suggestion was 
foredoomed, being one more instance of Plunkett's impracticality). 
40 
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Though Justin M'Carthy, leader of the main body of nationalist M. P. 's 
condemned the proposal, claiming it was designed to seek a substitute 
for Home Rule, 41 the committee managed to get off the ground during the 
parliamentary recess in the autumn of 1895. Fortunately a sufficient 
number of nationalists and unionists participated in the work of the 
committee to confer on it a status that elevated its proceedings above 
the level, of narrow party politics. John Redmond M. P. and the Parnellite 
wing of the nationalist movement were co-operative, as were a number of 
prominent unionists, while the rejection of the all-party committee idea 
by such intransigent unionists as Colonel Saunderson M. P. represented a 
constructive contribution from that quarter. In less than a year the 
committee, popularly known as the Recess Committee, brought in a 
unanimous report . 
42 
Basing its proposals on a study of policy measures 
and agricultural developments in a number of European countries, it 
recommended: creation of a department of agriculture, assisted by an 
appointed agricultural board and a more broadly based advisory council; 
a new emphasis on technical education; direct state intervention in 
areas of industry and fishing. The report also endorsed the value of 
the principle of self-help and voluntary organisation, and envisaged 
a complementary relationship between state agencies and organised self- 
help groups. 
The report was favourably received in official and popular circles 
but it was not until 1899 that a major part of its recommendations was 
embodied in legislation. 43 A new Department of Agriculture and 
Technical Instruction was inaugurated and Plunkett became its first vice- 
president (effectively head of the department) in November of that year. 
The new institution took over some of the functions which, in the absence 
of an appropriate state body, had been performed by the I. A. O. S. 
44 The 
dissemination of technical information to farmers is a case in point. 
Even at this early stage tensions began to develop between the two 
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agencies. 
45 Claims of overlapping between the work of the I. A. O. S. and 
the Department bred mutual suspicion, while such demarcation disputes 
were accentuated by personality clashes. Anderson and Professor Campbell, 
assistant-secretary of D. A. T. I., for instance, were not even on speaking 
terms at times. 
46 Clearly these skirmishes did not help the work of 
either agency but, while Plunkett spanned the spheres of self-help and 
state aid, serious conflict was unlikely. 
A major controversy did erupt in 1904, but this focused mainly 
on Plunkett himself. The row centred on a book by Sir Horace (he had 
been knighted the previous year) entitled Ireland in the New Century. 
Though it was mainly concerned with analysing the factors contributing 
to underidevelopment in Ireland and outlining remedial measures, the 
book also contained a chapter entitled "The Influence of Religion upon 
Secular Life in Ireland". Plunkett was firmly of the. view that 
strengthening the national character was a necessary precondition for 
economic and cultural progress. One of the major formative influences 
on Irish character (the others singled out for extended treatment were 
the political parties and the educational system) was the Roman Catholic 
Church. Plunkett examined critically the activities of the church, its 
vast building programmes, and in particular its effect on Irish 
character. He concluded: "I still think that, with their unquestioned 
authority in religion, and their almost equally undisputed influence in 
education, the Roman Catholic clergy cannot be exonerated from some 
responsibility in regard to Irish character as we find it to-day". 
47 
The tone and argument of the offending chapter display considerable 
fair-mindedness48 (especially when contrasted with the politico-religious 
writings of the time), while the book itself represents an important 
intellectual achievement. Such qualities, however, could not be expected 
to guarantee the work a dispassionate reading from the prickly 
custodians of Catholic and nationalist sentiment. Clergymen and 
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politicians, sometimes on the basis of second-hand accounts, rushed 
to decry Plunkett's picture of selected aspects of Irish Catholic 
life. 49 George Russell in the co-operative paper, the Irish Homestead, 
waged a lonely struggle for a calmer discussion of the contentious 
issues, but to little avail. 
50 The controversy rolled on into the 
summer and early autumn of 1904 before finally fading from public 
debate. R. A. Anderson had been surely correct in advising Plunkett 
in advance to drop the controversial chapter. 
51 The whole episode 
left behind residues of ill-feeling and distrust which might be later 
exploited by hostile critics of the rural reform movement when suitable 
opportunities arose. 
Early in October, in the immediate aftermath of the book controversy, 
a stinging attack on co-operation was unloosed by the nationalist leader, 
John Redmond M. P. Redmond, "it will be remembered, had participated 
in 
the deliberations of the Recess Committee and had also been a member 
of the committee of the I. A. O. S. during the first few years of its 
existence. 
52 
It is not clear when he became actively opposed to the 
co-operative movement. He had early been made aware of the ripples 
of discord co-operative developments could set up in his home 
constituency. 
53 
It is probable though that after the reunification 
of the Parnellite and anti-Parnellite groups of nationalists in 1900, 
he imbibed in greater measure some of John Dillon's notorious hostility 
to forms of "constructive unionism" such as Plunkett earnestly sought 
to promote. 
5 In any case, the terms of his attack were sweeping: 
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... Sir Horace Plunkett's recent book, full as it is of undisguised 
contempt for the Irish race, makes it plain to me that the real object 
of the movement in question is to undermine the National Party and 
divert the minds of our people from Home Rule, which is the only 
thing which can ever lead to a real revival of Irish industries. 
This, in essence, was the formal view of the nationalist party on 
agricultural co-operation. Such growing criticism of the co-operative 
movement in general, and Plunkett in particular, boded ill for the 
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future. A major convulsion in the body politic was imminent, as more 
than a, quarter century of largely Conservative rule was drawing to a close. 
In spite of the opposition of politicians and vested interests 
the co-operative movement had, however, grown vigorously. In the 
decade 1895-1905 creamery societies had expanded seven fold, reaching 
a total of 275 by 1905.56 Agricultural societies for the group purchase 
of farm inputs attained an impressive total of 151 in the same year. 
57 
However, this figure tends to inflate their significance given that the 
turnover of many of these societies was low, fixed assets slight, and 
their activity intermittent. Quite remarkable progress had been made 
in the promotion of credit societies. Having sought expert advice on 
how co-operative credit systems worked in other countries, the I. A. O. S. 
decided to experiment with this type of society at Doneraile. 
58 The 
model used was the German Raiffeisen system based on the unlimited 
liability of the members. 
59 The Doneraile Society commenced in 1895, 
and in the following year two further societies were established, one 
at Kyle, near Roscrea, and the other on the bleak penninsula of 
Belmullet in the west of Ireland. 
60 In 1897 the poet, writer, and 
mystic George Russell was recruited as a co-operative organiser, and 
in November of that year was despatched to the west to promote credit 
societies. 
61 
His success was striking. Within a few months he 
succeeded in starting societies in six places in county Mayo and at 
Carna, Rossmuck, and Spiddal in the neighbouring county of Galway. 
62 
The I. A. O. S. were delighted: "We attach very great importance to the 
introduction of the Raiffeisen system into Ireland, and are inclined to 
put it in the forefront of our propaganda". 
63 Credit societies now 
constituted the fastest growing section of the movement, 33 further 
societies being added in the following (financial) year. 
64 Because of 
the kind of areas in which these societies were taking root, principally 
the poorer districts of the mid and north-west, it was also deemed 
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necessary to appoint an Irish speaking organiser who might explain 
"the principles of these Banks in districts where English is little 
spoken orýunderstood". 
65 By 1905, when A. E. was becoming principally 
occupied with work for the Irish Homestead, there were 232 credit 
societies, not far short of the number of co-operative creameries in 
the country. 
66 
THE I. A. O. S. 
The I. A. O. S. had been struggling financially since its inception 
in 1894. The inaugural meeting had generated sufficient funds to launch 
a permanent organisation but, as the number of co-operative societies 
increased and the range of activities broadened, the I. A. O. S. found 
itself experiencing severe and recurrent financial crises. Within a 
few years the central body was on the point of bankruptcy, being saved 
by a gift of 15,000 in 1897 from Sir Henry Cochrane, a Dublin manufacturer. 
67 
Two years later the situation had become so unsatisfactory that it was 
resolved that no assistance would be given to co-operative societies 
that had not affiliated to the parent body and paid the appropriate fee. 
Moderate fees, proportional to the turnover of societies (10s. per 11,000 
turnover in the case of creameries), were fixed. It is not without 
significance that a number of societies refused to affiliate as a result 
of these terms. 
68 
A body designed to promote self-help and self- 
reliance again found itself forced to lean heavily on the charity of a 
number of wealthy individuals. The irony of this situation was not 
lost on the leading co-operators. 
With the coming of D. A. T. I. the financial position of the I. A. O. S. 
improved. Prior to the founding of D. A. T. I. the I. A. O. S had attempted 
to provide a wide range of technical and educational services in 
addition to its primary responsibility of organising co-operatives. 
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Such activities, falling more naturally within the domain of the new 
department., were gradually shed by the I. A. O. S., thus lightening 
its financial burden. Where particular functions could not 
be transferred immediately, D. A. T. I. bore the cost of their continued 
operation. 
69 As well as this, Plunkett anonymously donated his salary 
as vice-president of D. A. T. I. to the I. A. O. S. while Lord Dunsany 
added a further substantial contribution. 
70 Unfortunately this 
philanthropy was not matched by contributions from the constituent units 
of the movement, the co-operative societies. While in 1902 the turnover 
of societies exceeded fl million, fees from affiliated societies totalled 
a mere 1623.71 , The I. A. O. S. estimated 
it required an income of 15,000 
per annum, quite apart from state aid, to function effectively in this 
period. 
72 
In 1904 a major reorganisation and democratisation of the I. A. O. S. 
was effected. The affiliated societies could now elect the bulk of the 
members of the committee. 
73 As originally envisaged, the transition 
from a philanthropic body to one representative of the various co- 
operative societies would be made within five years of the establishment 
of the I. A. O. S. 
74 Because of grass roots apathy on the issue paternalistic 
control had to be extended for the first decade of the life of the I. A. O. S. 
The prospect of fuller participation by the societies in the policy- 
making and control of the I. A. O. S. did not evoke an enthusiastic 
financial response. Though a proposal to limit the affiliation fee Paid 
by any one society to a maximum of 15, irrespective of turnover, was 
defeated, it was abundantly clear that the societies were not prepared 
to pay anything like the full cost of maintaining the parent body. 
75 
A sub-committee of the I. A. O. S. under WE. Holmes, a Roscommon land- 
agent, succeeded in collecting some 17,750, but despite these voluntary 
donations it was felt necessary to approach D. A. T. I. for financial aid 
in 1905.76 After some initial reluctance this request was acceded to, 
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though on the stringent condition that "non-controversial co-operation" 
only was promoted. 
77 It may be remarked that since its foundation the 
I. A. O. S. had manifested a keen sensitivity (if not always tact) to the 
opposition of vested interests and the idea of consumer co-operative 
stores - the most controversial form of co-operation - had found no 
place in the organisation's programme. Ardent co-operators like 
Anderson had resented this restraint: 
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... however much we might curtail our programme, we were hated and feared by a large section of the traders, who always perceived the 
danger of the co-operative store lurking in the shadow of the creameries 
and the credit societies. They could not have hated us any more if we 
had gone out boldly on a whole-hog co-operative campaign. 
Reliance on public money, with its concomitant of close supervision of 
I. A. O. S. expenditure and activities had a further inhibiting effect. 
Despite the costs implicit in such a state of affairs, the I. A. O. S. was 
again forced to seek a somewhat larger grant from the Department in 1906. 
Agricultural politics now burst into life around the issue; 
79 
the grant 
was eventually conceded but the triumph was shortlived. The balance of 
power within the Department's decision-making machinery, already 
delicately poised on this issue, was about to tilt decisively against 
the co-operators and their sympathisers. 
Plunkett's position as vice-president of D. A. T. I., falling as it 
did within the sphere of political appointments, became extremely 
vulnerable in the wake of the massive Liberal victory of 1906. Irish 
nationalist M. P. s clamoured for a purge. 
80 
At first indecisive 
(Plunkett as procreator and mid-wife of D. A. T. I. presumably merited 
more than swift ejection and a curt valediction), the new administration 
finally sought Plunkett's resignation in the spring of 1907.81 His 
successor was T. W. Russell M. P., a strong advocate of tenant right, a 
vigorous critic of landlordism, and an implacable foe of co-operation. 
82 
Russell resolved to break all ties linking D. A. T. I. and the I. A. O. S., 
and indeed from this time onward to the end of our period pre-existing 
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frictions between the two institutions were escalated into confrontations 
of a bitter and prolonged kind. These conflicts are considered more 
fully later as such rancorous encounters illustrate the kind of political 
constraints that helped shape Irish co-operation. 
The loss of a subsidy from D. A. T. I. threw the I. A. O. S. back on its 
own resources. Shock and anger induced a brief upsurge of co-operative 
enthusiasm, a new spirit of independence. Some co-operators such as 
A. E. and Fr. Finlay spoke in public of the purifying effect of the 
83 break. However by 1909 the I. A. O. S. was in severe financial difficulties; 
private charity was again mobilised to bridge the expenditure-revenue 
gap. 
84 While in the following years leading up to the Great War 
contributions from the affiliated societies showed an appreciable 
upward trend, such contributions still covered only 20% of expenditure 
in 1914.85 
It would be mistaken though to attempt to infer the progress of the 
local societies from the crisis pathway traced by the parent body. This 
K' 
progress at the level of creamery, credit, and agricultural societies 
is now briefly reviewed. 
THE CREAMERIES 
The development of the co-operative creamery system since the 
foundation of the I. A. O. S. is summarised in the following table. The 
spatial pattern to creamery development is indicated by Figures 1 and 2. 
Data in these and subsequent tables and figures mapping out the 
quantitative features of co-operative diffusion are derived from the 
annual reports of the I. A. O. S. (relevant years). 
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Figure 1. 'Spatial distribution of co-operative creameries formed prior to 
to the establishment of the I. A. O. S. 
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Figure 2. The number of co-operative creameries in each county in 1914. 
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Table 3. The development of the co-operative creamery system 1894-1914 
Year Number Members Paid-up Loan ' Turnover 
share capital 
capital 
££E 
1894 30 1641 15468 6061 151852 
1899 171 26577 74223 46262 728000 
1904 217 42432 112296 112070 1089620 
1909 301 44213 138254 111365 1841400 
1914 350 47086 149755 133210 2731628 
Lest it be thought that the dairying industry in Ireland had been 
totally transformed along co-operative lines, it is necessary to 
emphasise the existence of a strong proprietary sector (see appendix) 
and also the persistence of home butter making in areas where the milch- 
cow density was insufficient to support a creamery as such. Anderson 
estimated that a minimum of 500 cows within two and a half miles of a 
creamery was necessary to make the new system of butter production viable 
86 
Dairying areas, such as west Cork and Clare, having low milch cow densi- 
ties were unable to profitably adopt the creamery innovation. 
87 
Table 4. The number of dairy factories and their ownership form in 1895 
ownership Form 
Number of Co-operative 
Factories Proprietary Joint Stock Farmers 
Leinster 39 
Munster 205 
Ulster 8 
Connaught 3 
Ireland 255 
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85 
7 
2 
119 
2 12 
70 50 
1- 
1- 
74 62 
Source: Agricultural Statistics of Ireland for the year 1895 (BPP, 1896 
XCII), p. 331. 
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The I. A. O. S. had waged a bitter fight against private enterprise 
creameries, and it is probable that the pace of creamery development 
owed something to competition between the rival forms of organisation. 
Certainly Anderson kept a keen eye on the opposition, as a letter of 
his to the president of the Kilmactranny society bears out. Requesting 
a list of areas in which Lonsdales (a private creamery group) were 
considering starting creameries, Anderson intended to launch a pre- 
emptive strike by organising farmers' meetings in the same areas. 
88 
A special leaflet "Home Rule in the Dairy" was distributed to convince 
farmers of the benefit of controlling dairy processing themselves rather 
than leaving it in the hands of outsiders. Complaining that out of a 
total of about 250 creameries in Munster in 1898 only 64 were co- 
operatives (the remainder being owned by an assortment of individuals, 
joint-stock companies, firms of provision dealers and butter merchants, 
and the English Co-operative Wholesale Society), the I. A. O. S. suggested 
that the suppliers to such proprietory concerns should form themselves 
into co-operative societies to negotiate price and other conditions of 
supply. 
89 
This was quite a sensible proposal, at least as viewed from 
the side of the unorganised farmers, given the possibilities of 
monopsonistic practices inherent in the milk-processing business. Some 
contemporaries claimed that the I. A. O. S. was creating an "atmosphere 
of terror", 
90 but the charge has an apologetic ring to it. The scramble 
for milk districts and competition for milk supplies while resulting 
in excess processing capacity in some areas, -- also ensured that 
farmers benefited from the bidding up of milk prices. These pressures 
also prevented management performance slipping too much. 
A cross-current in the struggle between co-operatives and private 
creameries is furnished by the action of the Co-operative Wholesale 
Society (C. W. S. ) which had begun to "invade" the Irish dairying area 
in 1895.92 A few years earlier, at the Co-operative Congress at Lincoln 
91 
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in 1891, the chairman of the C. W. S. had signalled the intention of 
building creameries in Ireland, thus extending consumer co-operative 
control backwards to the source of supply for part of its butter 
requirements. 
93 Plunkett and Anderson, who sought an indigenous 
producer controlled system of co-operation for agricultural produce, 
vehemently fought the proposal. At the 1895 Co-operative Congress the 
issue blazed into prominence again. 
94 Some English co-operators were 
opposed on principle to the expansionist plans of the C. W. S. but these 
constituted a minority. 
95 The previous year Castlemahon creamery, 
which was owned co-operatively but operated on very unco-operative 
lines, had been temporarily rented to the C. W. S. as a way out of its 
difficulties. After a year on this system the management committee, 
still paralysed by political dissension, decided to dissolve the 
society. The creamery was sold to the C. W. S. for 1850.96 
The C. W. S. then expanded its activities rapidly, establishing a 
chain of creameries in the Munster counties. 
97 
According to W. L. Stokes, 
originally one of Plunkett's band of co-operative organisers but now one 
of the chief architects of the C. W. S. plans, it was decided that "in 
the erection of those Creameries no expense should be spared, and that, 
so far as practicable, they should be models in every respect of the 
word ... "98 These sentiments must have later haunted Stokes and the 
C. W. S. officials involved in the Irish venture. The investment was 
badly conceived, the creameries appear to have been poorly managed and 
supervised, and the end result was a resounding failure. 
99 Eventually 
the company decided to cut its losses and after a conciliatory conference 
with the I. A. O. S. in January 1909 the C. W. S. agreed to gradually transfer 
its creameries to farmer control. 
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Before extricating itself from its 
entanglements in the Irish creamery business the C. W. S. was estimated 
to have lost in excess of £100,000.101 
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CREDIT SOCIETIES 
The "Gombeenman", usually a trader combining retailing and 
allegedly usurious moneylending practices, occupies a hallowed place 
in the demonology of co-operators. Rural reformers regarded the co- 
operative credit society as their major instrument in combatting this 
economic abuse. As the secretary of the Doneraile Society put it: 
102 
The 'Gombeen' man's trade has fallen off very perceptibly since the bank 
started, the borrowers repeatedly bearing testimony to the advantages 
of the bank over the 'usurer', many of them saying 'tis money for 
nothing'. I may also say that none of our borrowers could be 
accommodated in the local joint stock bank, as they had little or no 
bankable security to offer. 
After the success of the pioneering society at Doneraile and George 
Russell's effective proselytising in the west of Ireland in the closing 
years of the century, this component of agricultural co-operation seemed 
set to overshadow developments in the creamery sector. The apparent 
potential of credit societies fired the leading co-operators' imagination.. 
Quoting the report of Fr. Gleeson, of Kyle Society, Plunkett stated: 
103 
'The bank at Kyle, which had now been two years working, was an untold 
blessing to his poor people. It enabled them to have the blessings of 
cheap credit, and cheap credit under conditions which fostered their 
spirit of-industry and thrift. It not only kept the money of the 
country in the country, but the money of the locality in the locality, 
where it fructified in developing agriculture and industry. ' 
Indeed Plunkett was later to say that if they were back in 1889 and 
the co-operative movement was being launched all over again, they would 
first concentrate on credit societies. 
104 i 
Table 5. The development of the co-operative credit system 1897-1915 
Loan Amount of Number Reserve Year Number Members 
capital 
Deposits loan of loans fund 
3- 278 -- 388 - 1897 
145 5597 13,957 - 15,447 3241 - 1902 
261 14875 31,620 17,098 53,112 9046 2,671 1907 
234 20044 31,738 30,468 58,244 8522 4,492 1912 
225 20260 15,602 37,182 48,197 6301 4,830 1915 
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As table 5 shows in the first decade or so during which credit 
societies were being propagated a phenomenal growth rate was achieved. 
This expansion was greatly facilitated by the willingness of the joint- 
stock banks, after some initial reserve, to advance loans to societies 
and also by the policies of D. A. T. I. and the Congested Districts Board 
in providing loan capital. 
105 But then, after initial success in 
growth terms, stagnation and eventually decline set in. It is also 
clear from Figure 3 that credit societies were largely imprisoned 
within a particular regional context. From about 1905 onwards there 
are increasing criticisms from the I. A. O. S. of lack of punctuality in 
repaying loans, and a tendency to renew loans too easily. 
106 Greater 
supervision of the societies by the central co-operative body was clearly 
necessary. It is hardly surprising though that the I. A. O. S., short of 
funds, deprived of state aid, and circumscribed by an official 
environment that exuded hostility to its activities, should fail either 
to adequately supervise existing societies or promote new ones. Indeed 
in 1909-10 forty-one credit societies were dissolved, marking a high 
point in the policy of retrenchment forced upon the I. A. O. S. 
107 
In 1910 the difficulties of the co-operative credit societies 
were further compounded by an indiscriminate attack on the system by 
108 
T. W. Russell, at the January meeting of the Congested Districts Board. 
Russell, it will be remembered, was both the effective head of D. A. T. I. 
and also a member of the C. D. B. Describing the credit system as "rotten" 
he claimed that if wound up many of the societies would not realise 2s. 
and 6d. in the pound. 
109 There would thus be heavy losses to D. A. T. I. 
and the C. D. B. on the loans they had previously advanced to such societies. 
At the May meeting of the C. D. B. Russell claimed that several thousand 
pounds had to be recovered from societies with the aid of legal action, 
and predicted substantial bad debts on loans outstanding. 
110 
The I. A. O. S. 
lll demanded greater detail, particularly as public funds were involved. 
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Figure 3. The number of co-operative credit societies in each county in 1914. 
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Russell refused. In the ensuing controversy in the press, Russell 
reiterated his charges but steadfastly refused to name any of the 
societies falling within the scope of his remarks. Under pressure, 
he rather disingenuously shifted the terms of the argument and 
revived an old charge that the I. A. O. S. was "identified with hostility 
to a political party and to certain trading interests". 
112 
Russell's 
letter, published in the Irish Times, drew a stern rebuke from the 
editor of the paper. Utterly unrepentant, Russell decided early in 
1912 to set up a formal inquiry into credit societies and issues 
relating to agricultural credit. The findings of the inquiry did not 
bear out the vice-president's gloomy assessments. 
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Before concluding this section it may be helpful to identify 
precisely the sources of capital drawn on by the credit societies: 
Joint Stock Banks 115,000 
Depositors 120,000 
D. A. T. I. 112,000 
C. D. B. 16,000 
Total 153,000 
This was at the end of 1908, and the position was substantially the same 
in 1910, with the important qualification that roughly 12,000 had been 
repaid to D. A. T. I. 
114 It is clear from this breakdown of the source 
of funds that D. A. T. I. was a minority supplier of capital and, even 
more significantly, the confidence of the commercial banks (who had no 
special mission to develop agriculture) is also manifested by their 
considerable lending to the societies. One indication of the credit- 
worthiness of these co-operatives is furnished by Micks, first secretary 
of the C. D. B. and later historian of that body. Over the period 1898- 
1910 loans totalling 17,345 were advanced by the C. D. B. to credit 
societies. When recalled the sum advanced was repaid with interest, 
with the exception of 3s. and ld. (as to which the Board's claim was 
not clear). 
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AGRICULTURAL SOCIETIES 
Agricultural co-operative societies concerned themselves mainly 
with the bulk purchase of fertilisers, agricultural seeds, and feeding 
stuffs. 
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The first budding of this form of co-operation was along 
the Tipperary-Kilkenny border in 1894 (see Fig. 4). 116 These societies, 
by combining their resources, succeeded in forcing down the price of 
artificial manures by over 30% after what has been described as "the 
first pitched battle with the organised middlemen, and also the first 
effort at federation for trade purposes". 
117 With further progress on 
the front of co-operative purchase, the wider impact of these initiatives 
was a general lowering of fertiliser prices and the collapse of the 
manure manufacturers' cartel. 
118 The Irish trade in artificial manures 
amounted annually to about £400,000. Thus the reduction in price 
effected - in the order of 25% - would imply a saving of about 1100,000 
per annum to all farmers. 
119 
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Figure 4. Spatial distribution of co-operative agricultural societies in 1895. 
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Despite this auspicious beginning, agricultural societies never 
occupied a leading role in the distribution network for agricultural 
inputs. 120 Few developed substantial fixed premises, while many lay 
dormant for much of the year. Members would come together in the 
springtime to assess their needs for the coming season, bulk their 
orders, and organise purchase and distribution of their requirements. 
These relatively simple procedures required no elaborate capital 
fixtures or technical skills (unlike creamery co-operation for instance). 
In some instances societies had little more than a paper existence. 
The members would seek tenders from wholesalers and then use these 
quotations for bargaining purposes with a local retailer. Clearly such 
limited, though useful institutions could not contribute powerfully to 
the gleaming edifice of rural organisation envisaged by the co-operative 
pioneers. 
The progress of these societies is summarised in table 6, while 
Fig. 5 indicates their geographical distribution. The source of the data 
is again the I. A. O. S. 's annual reports (relevant years). 
Table 6. The development of agricultural co-operative societies. 
Paid-up 
Loan Number Members share capital 
Turnover Year 
capital 
I1f 
38 3,000 1,639 1,124 39,741 1896 
112 11,695 3,053 11,285 71,704 1901 
159 13,063 5,553 29,812 72,175 1906 
171 18,271 6,836 40,672 129,199 1911 
222 21,155 11,343 46,708 197,146 1914 
219 23,450 31,734 52,187 310,341 1915 
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Figure 5. The number of co-operative agricultural societies in each county 
in 1914. 
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MISCELLANEOUS SOCIETIES 
Creamery, agricultural, and credit societies represent the bulk 
of the agricultural co-operative movement in Ireland. However the co- 
operative principle was also applied, with varying degrees of success, 
to other areas of the rural economy. Egg production, based on Irish 
fowl of dubious pedigree whose "chief characteristic was a ripe and 
unprofitable old age", suffered from problems of dirtiness, staleness, 
and inefficient marketing. 
121 Attempts to organise the collection, 
grading, and marketing of eggs and poultry along co-operative lines 
met only slight success. One friendly observer concluded in 1917 that 
"thus far experience would indicate that Irishwomen are far less co- 
operative than Irishmen". 
122 The following table shows the position of 
these societies in 1915. 
Table 7. The position of egg and poultry co-operatives in 1915. 
No. of societies Members Capital Turnover 
13* 4,042 13,743 184,922 
About a half of these did not furnish details of their capital or 
turnover, either through indifference or because they were defunct. 
Another venture which was taken up at the beginning of this century 
was the promotion of flax societies. 
123 This form of society was most 
relevant to the northern counties, with their long established tradition 
in the cultivation and working of flax. The flax societies sought to 
purchase better quality seed then was available from local dealers, 
arranged for scutching (some societies built their own scutching mills), 
and undertook sale of the produce. Against a background of increasing 
imports of foreign flax and yarn, and a depressed linen industry, this 
type of co-operation never made much headway, and was represented by 
less than a dozen societies in 1914.124 
A more successful experiment was the extension of co-operative 
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methods into meat processing. Roscrea co-operative Bacon Factory was 
formed in 1905, and this was followed a few years later by the establish- 
ment of the Wexford Meat Society Ltd. 
125 The combined turnover of these 
societies was £175,000 in 1914, and they embraced 6,000 members. 
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Leaving aside. a heterogenous grouping of societies such as 
beekeeping and home industry types, 
127 
only one further species merits 
particular attention. This is the co-operative society that serviced 
other co-operative societies - the trading federation. As early as 
1893 a number of co-operative creameries had banded together as the 
Irish Co-operative Agency Society Ltd. to market their butter collectively. 
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Bad debts and a lawsuit, resulting in low prices to the parent societies, 
almost aborted the embryonic development. 
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The fledgling society 
persevered, however, increasing its turnover from 146,000 in 1893 to 
£65,000 in 1894.130 Its existence though was a struggling one; co- 
operative creameries were happy to spoil it with supplies when other 
outlets were clogged up, or when they wished to dispose of poor quality 
produce. Despite the exhortations of the I. A. O. S. for greater discipline 
in the marketing of butter, a common front among the various co-operative 
creameries or a successful national marketing strategy did not 
materialise. 
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In 1915 the turnover of the I. C. A. S. was a respectable 1177,500. 
It should be remembered though that this represented only about 5% 
of total butter sales from the co-operative creamery sector. 
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Table 8. Progress of the Irish Co-operative Agency Society Ltd. 
Year Turnover 
1893 145,600 
1898 1133,000 
1903 1186,100 
1908 1160,600 
1913 1163,800 
1915 
37 
1177,500 
It had been originally intended that the I. C. A. S. should also 
deal in manures, feeding stuffs, seeds, and various creamery requirements, 
but in 1897 it was decided to constitute a separate co-operative 
federation to handle these goods. 
133 This was the Irish Co-operative 
Agricultural Agency, renamed the Irish Agricultural Wholesale Society 
in the following year. In 1899 it had a membership of 47 shareholders 
(made up of individuals, dairy and agricultural societies), a paid up 
share capital of £1,866 and a turnover of £30,000.134 Its net profit 
in that year is given as zero. Through the years the I. A. W. S. gathered 
strength, and played a useful role in servicing dairy and agricultural 
societies. 
Table 9. Progress of the Irish Agricultural Wholesale Society Ltd. 
Year Turnover 
1897 114,500 
1900 138,000 
1905 £54,000 
1910 £123,500 
1915 £375,000 
THE POSITION OF THE MOVEMENT IN 1914 
A Statistical outline of the agricultural co-operative movement - 
its development over time and its position in 1914 - is conveyed in 
tables 10 and 11. It is clear that in terms of numbers, membership, 
and turnover, the creameries represent by far the most important 
component. They were also to be the most durable element in the 
movement; maintaining their members through the war years and beyond, 
they then expanded their share of the dairy processing business. 
135 
The number of credit societies in 1914 is somewhat misleading in 
that some of these were inactive. Inactive societies tended to slide 
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into oblivion during the Great War. The total number of credit societies 
fell dramatically to a level of 124 in 1920 (and indeed this number fell 
even more drastically in the following decade). 
136 By contrast, over 
the same period the number of agricultural societies showed a strong 
upward tendency. This growth was induced by the boom conditions of the 
war years, but when the post-war slump took effect in 1921 the weaker 
agricultural societies began to topple rapidly. In less than a decade 
two-thirds of the societies had been erased from the co-operative map, 
the number of societies in 1929 being just over a hundred, or slightly 
less than the total for 1902.137 The fall in turnover between 1920 
and 1929 was less drastic but nevertheless substantial. 
The outbreak of the Great War represents a convenient cut-off 
point for our study of the early history of the co-operative movement. 
The inflationary war-time situation changed greatly the economic environ- 
went: some forms of co-operation enjoyed a luxuriant, if artificial 
growth, while others withered away. Social conflicts focusing on the co- 
operative began to pass largely into folk-memory. Indeed, in terms of 
the symbolic order of nationalist Ireland, the burning of creameries by 
the British armed forces removed any lingering ambiguity attaching 
to these institutions. On another level the period prior to 1914 is 
of particular importance to this study. As previously explained, this 
work has a dual focus. Foreground developments, the patterns of co- 
operative growth, illuminate the crinkled backcloth of rural economy and 
society. It is the early decades of co-operative propagation that 
offer the clearest insights into Irish rural society. Once the cutting 
edge of the movement had become blunted, once the new system was 
routinised, the utility of this approach is greatly diminished. Having 
circled high over the co-operative movement and discerned its outline 
features, it is now necessary to descend in gradually expanding circles 
to take note of the finer detail of subject and setting. 
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Table 10. Summary of agricultural co-operative development 1889-1914. 
Year Number of societies 
Total 
turnover 
1889 1 4,363 
1890 1 8,500 
1891 17 50,382 
1892 25 98,969 
1893 30 140,780 
1894 33 151,852 
1895 76 184,947 
1896 104 435,905 
1897 148* 398,953 
1898 243 675,423 
1899 424 910,387 
1900 477 1,038,877 
1901 564 1,182,580 
1902 706 1,242,547 
1903 840 1,391,047 
1904 778 1,532,320 
1905 835* 1,477,538 
1906 873* 1,814,449 
1907 913* 2,017,623 
1908 881 2,252,380 
1909 835 2,394,469 
1910 880 2,589,559 
1911 934 2,666,483 
1912 947 3,205,189 
1913 985 3,333,189 
1914 1,023 3,668,958 
''Figures for Irish Co-operative Agency Society Ltd. not 
available in these years. 
TABLE 11 
SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FORMS OF 
CO-OPERATION IN 1914 
Type Number of Societies Membership 
Creamery 
Agricultural 
Credit 
350 
222 
233 
47,086 
21,155 
20,340 
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APPENDIX 
The number of creameries and their ownership form 
in 1905 
Counties 
Total 
Number Proprietary Co-operative 
of and Joint Farmers 
Creameries Stock 
Ownership Form 
Antrim 19 11 8 
Armagh 14 59 
Carlow --- 
Cavan 40 34 6 
Clare 13 12 1 
Cork 125 104 21 
Donegal 17 3 14 
Down 211 
Dublin --- 
Fermanagh 26 14 12 
Galway --- 
Kerry 74 65 9 
Kildare --- 
Kilkenny 31 20 11 
Laois 211 
Leitrim 21 8 13 
Limerick 112 83 29 
Londonderry 14 3 11 
Longford 11 83 
Louth --- 
Mayo 11- 
Meath --- 
Monaghan 31 15 16 
Offaly --- 
Roscommon 14 86 
Sligo 24 13 11 
Tipperary 121 89 32 
Tyrone 50 19 31 
Waterford 22 17 5 
Westmeath --- 
Wexford 633 
Wicklow 1-1 
Total of Ireland 791 537 254 
Source: The Agricultural Statistics of Ireland for the year 1905 
(B. P. P., 1906, CXXXIII), pp. 837-8. 
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The detailed breakdown of the ownership structure, as revealed in 
the appendix table, raises some interesting side-issues in relation to 
the milk processing sector. It is apparent that in the strongly 
dairying counties of Limerick, Tipperary, and especially Cork (five 
private enterprise creameries to every one co-operative, reflecting 
the very determined opposition co-operators met there) the co-operative 
creameries represent a subsidiary form of development. The principal 
factor underlying the high ratio of private enterprise to co-operative 
creameries in the south is the headstart the former system enjoyed. 
In Ulster, by contrast, there were few creameries of any kind in 1895. * 
The co-operative system was just then being introduced to the northerners, 
co-operatives and private creameries got off to a start around the same 
time, and co-existed in roughly equal proportions a decade later. For 
Ireland as a whole in 1905 there are approximately two private enterprise 
creameries to every one co-operative. Though the future lay with the 
co-operative (the joint-stock or proprietary creamery is in the 1970s 
a faint memory in the minds of older countryfolk), it is worth 
emphasising that the ratio between the two systems in 1905 declined 
only gradually over the following decade. In other words, within the 
full period of the present study the farmer owned creamery is not the 
typical form of enterprise in the milk processing business. 
*See table 4 of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ADOPTION OF CO-OPERATIVE ORGANISATION: 
THE EARLY YEARS 
In this chapter co-operative organisation is treated as a form 
of agricultural innovation. Our aim is to effect a rough reconstruc- 
tion of the adoption process which is necessarily associated with the 
diffusion of co-operative organisation through the countryside in the 
early 1890's. To this end a decision-making model of the kind that 
has found a wide currency in the field of agricultural innovation has 
been used. The particular form used is that described by Jones in 
1972 (reproduced in slightly modified form in Figure I here). 
1 
This 
was chosen because it represents a sophisticated elaboration of main- 
stream research into the adoption process. 
Technical Change in Agriculture 
A simple model of technical change identifies three conceptually 
distinct systems: (a) a knowledge-creating system generating a stream 
of innovations over time, (b) a system for diffusing such innovations 
plus information about them, (c) a client system i. e. in the present 
instance, the farmers and labourers to whom these innovations poten- 
tially refer. Normally it is more realistic to conceive of these as 
three interacting systems with feed-back linkages between each. We 
only briefly discuss the first two systems here as these have been 
treated, albeit less explicitly, in'the previous chapter. Most atten- 
tion is concentrated on the third system, using the Jones' model as 
our major analytical device. 
In the Irish case knowledge of the innovative item - the co-' 
operative form of organisation = derived from the historical experience 
of consumer co-operation in Britain, and more immediately from the 
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British Co-operative Union's developing interest in Ireland in the late 
1880s. Coupled to this was the spontaneous interest and limited co- 
operative experience of some Irishmen, most notably Horace Plunkett. 
At a slightly later point in time European rural co-operative expe- 
rience was drawn on by two other co-operative pioneers, Fr. Finlay, 
S. J. and R. A. Anderson. 
Initially the task of diffusing information and technical aid on 
agricultural co-operatives was undertaken by Plunkett, Anderson, Fin- 
lay and a small group of philanthropists. Essentially these consti- 
tuted the channels whereby foreign experience was transferred and 
adapted to the Irish context. In the. course of propagating co-opera- 
tive organisation, field experience came to modify, sometimes in fairly 
drastic form, the initial objectives and strategies of these pioneers. 
The year 1894 saw the creation of a formal propagandist body, the 
Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (I. A. O. S. ). Its central con- 
cern was the promotion and consolidation of co-operative forms of 
enterprise. It also advocated a number of complementary innovations 
at national level, most particularly state departments of agriculture 
and technical education. With the institution of the I. A. O. S. the 
production and diffusion of information regarding co-operatives was 
developed along more systematic lines. The I. A. O. S. made itself res- 
ponsible for the provision of paid instructors, propaganda leaflets, 
a co-operative newspaper (Irish Homestead), and some further speciali- 
sed services such as accountancy and engineering expertise. For a 
brief period after its inception in 1900 the Irish Department of Agri- 
cultural and Technical Instruction aided the spread of co-operatives 
but later assumed an antagonistic posture. A further state develop- 
mental agency, the Congested Districts Board, initially played a modest 
role in promoting less controversial forms of co-operative organisation 
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such as co-operative credit. 
2 
As regards the media, some newspapers 
were sympathetic to the spread of the co-operative idea, but in the 
main the press, especially the nationalist press, transmitted hostile 
comment either in relation to specific forms of co-operation or, less 
frequently, in relation to the co-operative movement as a whole. 
3 
A swift appraisal of features of the cultural environment is 
helpful in considering the process and problems of innovation. Many 
Irish farming communities at the end of the 19th century possessed 
an essentially peasant character - strong attachment to the family 
land-holding, work and leisure patterns regulated by seasonal and wea- 
ther conditions, and a consciousness that stressed the central reali- 
ties of religion, kinship, and tradition. In so far as tradition was 
a major determinant of behaviour it is to be expected that forms of 
social deviancy, such as attempts to adopt complex innovations, were 
likely to evoke strong negative pressures. 
4 
Resistance to innovation 
was very probably reinforced by the patriarchal structure of the 
family (especially as reflected in the intra-family exercise of 
decision-making functions), and also by the reluctance to transfer 
the family holding to the ageing and necessarily celibate heir. In 
addition to the unfavourable age structure of the farm population, its 
sex composition as viewed from an economic standpoint was also dete- 
riorating. 
5 
Again, bearing on the human resources engaged in Irish 
agriculture, the quantity and quality of formal education embodied in 
the working population compared unfavourably with that of a major 
competitor such as Denmark. 
6 
In some regions, particularly the west 
of Ireland, many holdings had such poor farming potential as to pre- 
clude the possibility of ever attaining a threshold level of economic 
viability. Confronted with these cultural and structural barriers to 
innovation it is hardly surprising that co-operative pioneers found it 
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necessary to convene over fifty meetings before a single society was 
formed. 7 In the words of Anderson8: 
... audiences were composed of suspicious, needy farmers, 
fooled many times by specious charlatans, depressed by bad 
times, endless hardships, often rack-rented. And, almost 
to a man, they were Roman Catholic:; they expressed hat- 
red and distrust of England, they hated the landlords much, 
and the land agents even more. 
Attention should also be drawn to some distinctive features of 
decision-making in relation to the adoption/rejection of co-operative 
organisation. Firstly, a large number of independent decision-makers 
were involved. Secondly, while an individual could reject the inno- 
vation, he/she could not adopt it unless a minimum number of like- 
minded individuals had reached similar decisions and were willing to 
participate in the appropriate group structure. The effective adopt- 
ing unit for a dairy co-operative in the 1890s was believed to require 
a pooled cow population of at least 500 cows within a radius of two- 
and-a-half miles of the proposed creamery centre. 
9 
In the distribu- 
tive sphere, the minimum size of an agricultural society depended 
crucially on the purchasing power of its members. An I. A. O. S. organi- 
ser in an extremely poor area in the north-west of Ireland was moved 
to claim that at least two hundred members would be required to form 
an economically viable group, 
10 
As regards credit co-operatives, a. 
somewhat later development, the average membership size was just over 
sixty members in 1905.11 
Changing Environment 
Our introductory discussion gave little reason to suspect strong 
innovative propensities among Irish farmers. And yet it would appear 
to be over-gloomy. Certain forms of agricultural co-operation did 
gain a firm foot-hold in a comparatively short space of time. By March 
1895,56 dairy, one credit, and 10 agricultural co-operative societies 
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had been formed; on the eve of World War I there existed a total of 
1023 societies, about a third of these being dairy societies. 
12 
Two 
distinct forms of innovative behaviour are possible here. One is the 
situation where a farmer anticipates or actively seeks out profitable 
opportunities or other forms of goal achievement. This requires 
strong initiative and forward planning. The second type is more 
reactive in nature. The farmer responds to adverse changes in his 
environment, e. g. downward pressure on his accustomed or expected 
standard of living forces him to adjust established production and/or 
marketing arrangements. The latter would seem to describe the moti- 
vational source for most Irish farmers' adoption of co-operative 
organisation. 
Irish farm produce prices were depressed under the impact of the 
international depression in agriculture from the mid 1870s onwards. 
In the key dairying industry butter prices fell heavily between 1875 
and 1900.13 Even more serious, by the early 1890s more uniform crea- 
mery produce, from Denmark in particular, tended to depress further 
the price of home produced Irish butter on its traditional British 
market. Other strains in the rural economy stemmed from unsatisfac- 
tory credit arrangements for small farmers and labourers, and in some 
instances defects in the marketing and retailing structure. Thus in 
this particular instance adoption of co-operative organisation appears 
to have sprung less from a sharp entrepreneurial response than from 
forced adjustment to a changing economic environment. 
Having specified the changing environment and the major motiva- 
tional force for innovation, it is now possible to proceed with a more 
detailed application of the model. The model is set out in a somewhat 
modified form in Figure I. Thus, for the sake of brevity, stage one 
is presented in a more compressed form without, it is believed, taking 
from the analytical apparatus or its capacity to embrace the particular 
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historical sequences under study. 
Figure 1A model of innovation decision malting 
1, Changing Total Environment 
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Problem definition might seem a comparatively easy step. However, 
in the present case, identifying relevant causal variables was compli- 
cated by the constitutional link between Ireland and Britain, the 
strength of nationalist passions, and the unsatisfactory state of 
landlord-tenant relationships. It is best therefore to conceive of 
stages one and two as partly overlapping. In the process of diffus- 
ing information about co-operatives, the-pioneer co-operators sought 
TI 
Integration of decision 
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to define the basic source of agricultural depression in terms of the 
vastly enhanced productivity of some European and American agricultu- 
res and the development of an international food market which tended 
to integrate these rural economies. 
14 
Rent levels, which in any case 
were coming to be regulated by judicial rather than market forces, 
were given little emphasis in the co-operators' explanatory framework. 
By contrast the major nationalist organ, the Freeman's Journal, was 
not unrepresentative of public opinion when it exclaimed "The most 
real and substantial remedy for agricultural distress is substantial 
reduction of the exorbitant rents"'. 
15 
In general it may be stated 
that co-operators deviated from much conventional wisdom in emphasis- 
ing economic as distinct from quasi-political interpretations of 
social distress. 
Already in strong dairying areas small groups of farmers were 
groping towards an effective response to some of their problems. Thus, 
one notes in Plunkett's diaries during the first two years of his 
co-operative crusade that joint-stock creameries owned by some lead- 
16 
ing farmers were being seriously considered. However, such instan- 
ces were quite isolated; in the absence of strong co-operative pro- 
paganda from outside the farming population, a"farmer response either 
along co-operative or private enterprise lines would not have procee- 
ded very far. As a further indicator of'the weakness of an autonomous 
farmer response to their difficulties one notes that, in areas where 
private creameries had entered the market, farmers were quite reluc- 
tant to develop their own producers' organisations. Plunkett exclai- 
med: "Not a meeting did we hold to start a creamery society at which 
there was not manifested a strong preference for having the work done 
for them by someone else. They offered to enter into engagements with 
us for the supply of all their milk upon the most reasonable terms if 
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only we would risk the capital and undertake the management". 
17 
Effec- 
tively the range of innovative possibilities specifically geared to 
dairy farmers reduced to the following: formation of a co-operative 
creamery, supplying to a privately owned creamery where available, 
and in some areas supplying to a creamery branch of the English or 
Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Societies. Overall, in relation to 
dairy and other forms of co-operation, it can be said that precise 
problem definition and awareness of innovative possibilities were 
interacting processes, one serving to clarify the other. 
In the early 1890s one can really only speak of information receiv- 
ing on the part of farmers. A small band of philanthropists, concen- 
trating their efforts mainly in the southern counties, sought to induce 
farmers to form co-operative agricultural and dairy societies - credit 
and industrial societies being later proposals. Initially developments 
were slow; meetings were often poorly attended; politically or econo- 
mically motivated opposition compounded the problems of suspicion and 
apathy. At Rathkeale, in the rich dairying county of Limerick, the 
plain dairy cow was put in the shade by a far more sacred beast: 
"Rathkeale is a Nationalist town - Nationalist to the backbone - and 
every pound of butter made in this creamery must be made upon Nationa- 
list principles or it shan't be made at all. "18 Anderson recalls 
another disappointing meeting in the same county, 
19 
... a meeting was arranged at the school-house. We anived 
punctually, in torrents of pitiless rain. We were met by 
the schoolmaster and the R. I. C. sergeant. It was in holi- 
day time and the school was cold, mouldy, damp and horribly 
smelly. Turf was produced, but it was so wet that it would 
only smoulder and produce suffocating clouds of smoke from 
which we were glad to escape to the lee-side of the build- 
ing. One by one, half a dozen or more drenched farmers 
rolled in... Nothing resulted from this meeting, nor from 
scores of such meetings. 
A small turning point was reached in 1892. With obvious satisfaction 
Plunkett records in his dairy (end of August of that year) of being 
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approached by a deputation of farmers who came to seek his aid in 
starting a creamery although, as he notes, they had not "taken advan- 
tage of my offered help two years ago". By 1895 the demand for co- 
operative information had severely strained the capacity of the 
I. A. O. S. to supply such. In consequence there was a shift of empha- 
sis to consolidating existing co-operatives rather than opening up 
new areas. 
Farmers' Evaluation of the Co-operative Idea 
As already indicated, in the early phase of co-operative pro- 
pagation farmers tended to be fairly sceptical of information flows 
emanating from co-operative enthusiasts. Their estimation of the 
economic benefits that might accrue to them through co-operative 
organisation was similarly in line with this negative appraisal. It 
must also be remembered that the initialenphasis was on co-operative 
stores rather than dairy co-operatives and farmers either then or 
later were less easily convinced of the suitability of such an inno- 
vation and/or their ability to adopt it. Indeed this component of 
co-operation never secured more than a slow and uneven progress by 
comparison with dairy co-operatives. However, co-operative pioneers 
were quick to note the lines of less resistance and switched the 
emphasis accordingly. 
The form in which information might be conveyed to farmers pre- 
sented some problems. The most important means of spreading preli- 
minary information about co-operation was through the medium of pub- 
lic meetings, frequently held in the open air outside church gates. 
Plunkett was a poor public speaker, a severe handicap in a country 
noted for rousing speech-making. In order to make the co-operative 
message more attractive, Plunkett acquired the paid services of a 
nationalist member of parliament64ith developed demagogic qualities. 
For a brief period co-operative meetings might be opened to the strains 
of a nationalist brass band but this ended with the untimely death of 
the M. P. in September 1890, less than a month after joining the cam- 
paign. 
20 
Henceforth, less revivalist type techniques were employed. 
Anderson developed as a competent public speaker, increasingly sensi- 
tive to the moods of his audiences. Not only that, it appears he some- 
times played an important role in bridging the communication gap that 
could open up between Plunkett and his listeners. Anderson recalls, 
for example, that in the early days of co-operation two meetings in 
succession were destroyed by the unfortunate choice of a metaphor by 
Plunkett. 
21 On Anderson's advice the offending reference was dropped, 
thus removing at least one self-created communication barrier. These 
episodes, though, serve to illustrate the delicate nature of the task 
sometimes facing co-operative speakers. 
It may be helpful at this point to reproduce an abbreviated account 
of a meeting to organise a co-operative society. This serves two pur- 
poses: (a) it typifies the kind of arguments advanced by co-operative 
promoters and (b) it gives an indication of the issues presumed impor- 
tant in terms of farmers' perception of the situation. If one goes 
further and accepts that co-operative propagandists were reasonably 
sensitive to the problems and preoccupations of their farmer-listeners 
and that they shaped their arguments accordingly, then one may be also 
given a rough and admittedly indirect impression of some of the domi- 
nant issues coursing through the average farmer's mind. The meeting 
selected is one at Ballyrashane in 1896 where about 250 farmers and 
other interested persons attended to discuss the possibility of form- 
ing a co-operative creamery society. The report of the proceedings 
is taken from a local newspaper. 
22 
The Chairman opened the meeting with some well-chosen remarks 
on the subject of foreign competition and suggested that the 
Danes should be defeated in the butter trade as our ancestors 
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had beaten them in other respects in days of yore. He 
explained that to do this it was necessary to adopt 
their methods of manufacture... 
Mr. Bourne, of the Irish Agricultural Organisation 
Society, next addressed the meeting at length, giving 
a detailed description of the formation and working of 
a co-operative dairy society... Every person in the dis- 
trict who had cows should be a shareholder in the 
society. The shares, he explained, were £1 each, and 
each farmer took shares according to the number of cows 
he owned; thus a farmer with five cows took five shares, 
and a farmer with ten cows took ten shares. - That per- 
haps might frighten a farmer who, though he had 
ten cows, was not able in these times of agricultural 
depression to put his hand in his pocket and produce a 
£10 note; but this was not necessary. All the farmer 
was obliged to do was to pay one fourth - five shillings 
- on each of his shares on allotment. Another call would 
be made by a committee elected by the shareholders in 
about three months' time. In most of the dairying socie- 
ties, two calls were all that had been made on the share 
capital. Mr. Bourne went on further to explain the work- 
ing of the society. 
Subsequently he was most intelligently 'heckled' 
on various subjects relating to dairying by several 
of those present. 
The Ballyrashane meeting is fairly representative of the business- 
like meeting where political or other vested interests did not intrude 
on the discussions. However, as we have previously noted, in other 
areas and at other public meetings extra-economic factors might cloud 
farmers' reactions. Thus for more than the first two decades of co- 
operative development considerable doubt attached to the credibility 
of the main information channels. Plunkett, of course, was of the 
ascendancy class, and in politics a unionist. His chief field activist 
was a former land agent -a distinctly unpopular occupation during a 
period of strained landlord and tenant relations. Both were Protes- 
tants, always an important consideration in Catholic Ireland. Even a 
casual reading of news-reports of meetings called to organise co- 
operative societies shows the extreme sensitivity of these issues. 
Consideration of co-operators' credentials and the identifying charac- 
teristics of those who had associated themselves with their work were 
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matters of intense concern. Thus, one finds advocates of co-operation 
repeatedly assuring listeners that the I. A. O. S. and the co-operative 
movement were non-political and non-sectarian - this being in itself 
something of an innovation! 'Sometimes the assurance was in a form 
at once explicit and also quite revealing of what non-political and 
non-sectarian meant in an-Irish'context. Thus, Plunkett describes the 
composition of the I. A. O. S. at a public meeting as follows: "The 
society consists of men, and'I might say leading men of all shades 
of politics. There are six Unionists and six Nationalists in the 
society". 
23 
On another occasion Anderson, under some pressure to 
defend the membership of the I. A. O. S., cites the presence of a promi- 
nent Roman Catholic Bishop and some nationalist M. P. s in that body. 
However, as he wryly comments in his autobiography, while most of these 
rarely attended meetings of the I. A. O. S., nonetheless "we had to get 
names 'to conjure with' . 
24 
Indeed well into the present century the 
I. A. O. S. under increasing political attack had to request individual 
co-operative societies to prepare submissions testifying to its non- 
political and non-sectarian character. 
25 
One assumes such attacks on 
the credibility of co-operators and on the economic soundness of co- 
operative enterprise produced an inhibiting effect on the rate and 
direction of co-operative development. However, such distrust was 
probably less keenly felt within interested farming areas once initial 
resistance had been overcome. In relation to dairy co-operatives at 
any rate Plunkett's assessment of reaction to his efforts'seems plau- 
sible: "They respect me, if they don't like my politics". 
26 
With additional practical experience, more finance, and a perma- 
nent organisation from 1894 onwards, co-operators were better placed 
to provide a more comprehensive flow of information, as well as more 
specific aids on particular problems. The development of specialised 
services relating to building design, accountancy, quality control, and 
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the marketing and buying of certain agricultural inputs and outputs 
at wholesale level also tended to reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
adoption of co-operative organisation - this in turn tending to increase 
the expected net benefit to the farmer from adopting the innovation. 
It is also quite probable that an increasingly negative assessment of 
the alternatives available further boosted farmers' estimation of the 
expected net benefits stream. Co-operators were not slow to exploit 
this point. 
27 Plunkett warned of the dangers of monopsonistic prac- 
tices in dairying areas if control of milk processing passed into the 
hands of private enterprise. The Irish Homestead frequently alleged 
28 
that the rural marketing structure supported too many unproductive 
middlemen, while local moneylenders were commonly the subject of attack. 
Needless to say, once the co-operative experiment had proved successful 
in some areas, farmers had a firmer base from which to judge anticipa- 
ted outcomes in their own particular situations. Thus, the first 
annual report of the I. A. O. S. contained detailed reports on the prices 
paid to farmers by dairy co-operatives as well as a statement of co- 
operative retail prices for artificial manures. This propaganda mate- 
rial was radiated by the Irish Homestead, some local newspapers, and 
by co-operative instructors. 
Later Stages of the Adoption/Rejection Process 
When farmers had proceeded to that point in the decision-making 
process where they had mentally accepted as a good idea one or more 
of the proposed co-operative innovations it was still possible for 
some to conclude that they were unable to move forward to the adoption 
stage. This could be due to real inability or inability to adopt 
arising out of social tensions. In the former category one might 
place such, factors as insufficient capital resources, considerable 
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variation about the expected outcome level (making an innovation 
unsuitable for subsistence-type farmers for instance), personal, phy- 
sical and psychological barriers to the effective adoption and inte- 
gration of an innovation. In the present case most of these could 
only be weakly limiting factors; the capital burden imposed on co- 
operative shareholders was relatively light; risk-bearing was unequally 
distributed; the benefits of group trading were frequently extended to 
non-shareholders. Furthermore, a co-operative society did not neces- 
sarily require a high level of business skills and the active parti- 
cipation of more than a limited core of its total membership. The 
more significant instances of such inability stemmed from the unsui- 
tability of an innovation for particular categories of farmers (e. g., 
creameries were unsuited to areas with a low milk density, while cre- 
dit societies by virtue of their unlimited liability rule were not, 
well adapted to farming communities with a highly unequal income dis- 
tribution). Inability to adopt also arose at the individual level 
due to the logical necessity of involving other farmers in group 
schemes. 
The efforts of co-operators or aspiring co-operators were also 
constrained by the socio-political realities of rural Ireland. Impor- 
tant non-farming groups in rural society - traders, politicians, 
sometimes Roman Catholic clergy - sought to emasculate the competi- 
tive thrust of co-operative enterprise. By raising the level of 
uncertainty, associated with the co-operative innovation, vested inte- 
rest groups prolonged the decision-making process and in some instan- 
ces forced the abandonment of group ventures. 
29 The imposition of 
sanctions on farmer co-operators was a feature in some areas. also. 
30 
Of major relevance to the adoption and diffusion of innovations 
are their technical characteristics. Farmers' decisions in relation 
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to co-operative organisation were certainly not facilitated by the 
fact that this involved totally new concepts of business methods and 
economic relationships. Associated with these changes went some re- 
structuring of social relationships as well as'a new spatial arrange- 
ment of economic activity. Unlike some farming innovations which 
are readily divisible and easily subjected to trial, (fertilisers 
for instance), no such pilot schemes could be resorted to in the 
case of co-operatives. A full commitment to the setting-up of a local 
society had to be made, or the idea abandoned. An indirect form of 
trial was, however, possible and was powerfully exploited by co- 
operative propagandists. In the early stages of the movement Irish 
activists could appeal to the successful experience of European, 
especially Danish, farmers in implementing co-operative forms of 
organisation. 
31 
Later of course it was possible to use existing Irish 
societies as models which could be inspected and emulated. 
32 A foun- 
der member of a dairy co-operative society in the west of Ireland, 
for instance, relates travelling specially to the south of the coun- 
try to study dairy co-operatives at first hand. 
33 
Indeed co-opera- 
tive developments in the northern half of Ireland initially lagged 
behind developments in the south by several years. Thus, the latter 
were frequently used as models in convincing farmers of the perfor- 
mance capabilities of the proposed innovations. 
To place the extent of the adoption of co-operative organisation 
in brief historical perspective we recapitulate on the broad quanti- 
tative features of co-operative growth. (It should be clear though 
that our application of the decision making model really only refers 
to the first six or seven years of co-operative organisation - in many 
respects the most interesting phase from the viewpoint of innovation). 
By 1915, despite strenuous opposition, co-operation had spread widely 
through the Irish farming community. In the western region credit 
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societies predominated, while in the southern counties, and to a les- 
ser extent in the north-west, dairy co-operatives were firmly estab- 
lished. Some limited success had been achieved in the formation of 
agricultural supply societies, handicraft societies and some miscella- 
neous types of enterprise. Over 100,000 farmers had become members of 
co-operative societies by 1915, and indeed these societies probably 
serviced an even wider body of farmers, as some were willing to trade 
with such societies but reluctant to become full members. This is 
modified, though, to the extent that there was some overlap in member- 
ship between different types of co-operative societies. It does not, 
however, alter the more significant point in the present context that 
roughly 100,000 innovative decisions were made by farmers (and occa- 
sionally labourers). These decisions, of course, reflected varying 
degrees of activity and passivity, and it could be argued that in 
many cases a dynamic minority carried along the bulk of farmers. 
The above structuring of the historical material is a product 
of the interaction of theory and empirical data. It might be classi- 
fied as what is loosely known as applied-history. 
34 
Historical mate- 
rial is cast in a form which readily lends itself to intertemporal 
comparisons as well as, as in the present instance, representing an 
addition to the relevant case study literature. In addition, issues 
regarding the adequacy and generality of social science models are 
raised. One presumption on the part of the writer when beginning 
the present study was that on the methodological front there are large 
areas of potentially fruitful exchange between social science discip- 
lines and history. The following chapter is devoted largely to an 
exploration of issues of method raised by this particular application 
of theory to history. 
7I. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. G. E. Jones, 'Agricultural Innovation and Farmer Decision Making', 
in Agriculture (Open University, 1972). In 1967 the same author 
described a rather similar, though less detailed model - represen- 
tative of the then current state of research - in his massive sur- 
vey of the adoption and diffusion of agricultural practices. 
Jones, 'The Adoption and Diffusion of Agricultural Practices', 
World Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology Abstracts, vol. 
IX, No. 3,1967. The 1972 version is really a refinement of the 
earlier model, modified in the light of further empirical and 
theoretical work. 
2. W. L. Micks, History of the Congested Districts Board (Dublin, 1925). 
3. An interesting and valuable exception among nationalist local news- 
papers is the Nenagh News in the 1890s (later absorbed into the 
Nenagh Guardian). Its editorial policy was strongly in favour of 
co-operative ventures and its columns carried especially detailed 
accounts of public meetings on co-operation. 
4. Plunkett in particular emphasised and deplored the sensitivity to 
social pressures and the prevalence of conformist patterns of 
behaviour. H. Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century (London, 1904), 
pp. 80-1. 
5. R. Crotty, Irish Agricultural Production (Cork, 1966), pp. 104-5; 
J. Lee, 'Irish Agriculture', Agricultural History Review, Vol. XVII, 
1969. 
6. Primary education had been compulsory in Denmark since 1814 and by 
the 1870s ten per cent of the rural youth attended a Folk High 
School. See F. H. Webster, Agricultural Co-operation in Denmark 
(Oxford, 1973). Compulsory primary education had not become effec- 
tive in Ireland until the early 20th century. 
7. Plunkett, quoted in the Northern Whig, 20, December 1895. 
8. R. A. Anderson, With Horace Plunkett in Ireland (London, 1935) p. 39. 
9. Anderson, quoted in the Derry Recorder, 23 Nov. 1895. The average 
number of members associated with a dairy co-operative in 1894 was 
just over 50. See I. A. O. S., Annual Report 1895 (Dublin 1895). 
10. P. Gallagher, Paddy the Cope: My Story (Tralee, n. d. ). 
11. I. A. O. S., Annual Report 1905. 
12. Statistics taken from relevant I. A. O. S. annual reports. 
13. T. Barrington, 'A Review of Irish Agricultural Prices', Journal of 
the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society-of-Ireland', Vol. XV, 
1926-7, pp. 252-3. 
14. Note, for example, Plunkett, op. cit. pp. 179-80; Anderson, quoted 
in the Coleraine Constitution, 23 Nov. 1895. 
15. Freeman's Journal, 9 Oct. 1895. 
72 
16. Plunkett Diaries 1889-90, passim. 
17. Plunkett quoted in Labour Co-Partnership, Vol. IV, 1898, p. 94. 
Note also Anderson, op. cit. pp. 245-49 and the comments of W. L. 
Stokes on the Castlemahon creamery affair in his article 'Irish 
Creameries' in the Co-operative Wholesale Society Annual (Man- 
chester) 1897,419-449. 
18. Quoted in M. Digby, Horace Plunkett (Oxford, 1949), p. 55. 
19. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 34-5,37. 
20. Plunkett Diaries, 9 Sept. 1890 and 20 Sept, 1890. 
21. Anderson, op. cit. p. 38. 
22. Coleraine Constitution, 14 March 1896. 
23. Quoted in Irish Independent, 14 Jan. 1896. Some other meetings 
where there is defensive comment on the composition of the LAOS 
may be noted. See, for example, reports in the Nenagh News (30 
June, 1894), Northern Whig (22 Oct. 1895), Roscommon Herald (30 
Nov. 1895), Nenagh News (25 Jan. 1896), Cork Examiner (10 Febr. 
1896). 
24. Anderson, op. cit. p. 85. 
25. I. A. O. S., Annual Report 1911, p. 50. 
26. Plunkett Diaries, 17 Oct. 1892. It should be borne in mind that 
this entry was made after a meeting of co-operative delegates in 
a region which Plunkett himself had canvassed intensively over a 
period of about three years. It is interesting, nonetheless, to 
see that farmers were actively separating out the economic from 
the political issues. 
27. See for instance reports of meetings on co-operation in the follow- 
ing local papers: Tyrone Constitution, 15 Nov. 1895; Belfast News- 
letter, 22 Nov. '95; Coleraine Constitution, 23 Nov. '95; Roscommon 
Messenger, 18 Jan. '96; Cork Examiner, 10 Feb. '96. 
28. Report in Northern Whig, 20 Dec. '95; Labour Co-Partnership, IV, 
1898,94. 
29. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 8,16-17,20-24. 
30. Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 98-104,118; L. Smith-Gordon and L. Staples, 
Rural Reconstruction in Ireland (London, 1917). 
31. Instances of the use of Danish or other European co-operatives as 
models for the Irish situation occur frequently in newsreports of 
co-operative meetings. See, for example: Drogheda Conservative 12 
Oct. '95; Belfast News-Letter 22 Oct. '95 and 22 Nov. '95; Wexford 
Chronicle 30 Oct. '95; Tyrone Constitution 15 Nov. '95; Coleraine 
Constitution 23 Nov. '95; Cork Examiner 10 Feb. '96; Roscommon 
Messenger 28 Dec. '95. The point was frequently made by the Irish 
Homestead, and also in official publications of the I. A. O. S. 
73 
32. The use of existing Irish co-operatives as models for other areas 
is strongly evident. See: Belfast News-Letter 20 Nov. '95; Tyrone 
Free Press, end of Nov. t95; Newtownards Chronicle 23 Nov. t95; 
Northern Whig 20 Dec. '95; Wexford People 22 Jan. '96; Cork Herald 
12 Feb. '96. See also official I. A. O. S. publications. 
33. J. Gore-Booth at a general meeting of the Drumcliffe Co-op. Dairy 
Society, quoted in the Sligo Champion, _28 
Sept. 1895. 
34. For a pursuit of the definitional point see the editor's introduc- 
tion to M. Drake (ed. ), Applied Historical Studies, (London, 1973). 
74 
CHAPTER 3 
AN EVALUATION OF THE JONES' MODEL 
As stated in the previous chapterAmulti-stage model of the adop- 
tion process in relation to agricultural innovations is now widely 
accepted, and indeed has found some application in other research 
areas. 
1 
The basic model (of which there are a number of variants) 
postulates a logically ordered series of psychological states consi- 
dered crucial in the individual's adaptation to a changing environ- 
ment. This essentially classificatory device allows the filing of 
social data in a systematic fashion, while also specifying a particu- 
lar chronological sequence. One way of assessing the scope and vali- 
dity of such a model is to test its performance in specific histori- 
cal situations. What is the sphere of reference of the model? How 
space and time bound are its implications? And from the point of 
view of the applied'historian, how useful is the model in develop- 
ing meaningful reconstructions of the past? With these questions in 
mind we consider in some detail the exercise contained in the previous 
chapter. Having matched the Jones' model against a particular empiri- 
cal situation, we are now in a position to form an evaluation of its 
performance. From within the narrow but exacting framework of our 
case study, a number of findings emerged which are supplemented by 
reference to some general methodological considerations and an 
expanded set of empirical observations. 
Interdependencies in decision making 
Perhaps the first problem, which must be confronted by any social 
scientist using a model building approach, centres on the selection of 
data. Thus while synthetic models may be more or less useful in render- 
ing social action intelligible, in any overall assessment the practitioner 
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"must be guided by his knowledge of what is left out... as well as 
what is included... "2 Inferences based on the data used in the model 
should be consistent with inferences drawn from the total data set. 
Thus in the Irish study it was clear that a number of points on deci- 
sion making in relation to the formation of co-operative societies 
needed to be emphasised. The varying responses of different social 
groups to the spread of agricultural co-operation requires treatment. 
While interdependencies within farming groups were stressed in the 
commentary on the model3 the strategic role of non-farming groups in 
the rural social structure was somewhat obscured. Landlords, land 
agents, clergymen, and some professionals such as schoolteachers and 
rural doctors - few of whom had any direct economic interest in co- 
operative innovation - frequently played a crucial leadership role in 
the formation of societies. Such prominent local personalities, who 
are nation-oriented as distinct from community-oriented in the ter- 
minology of Wolf, often acted as secondary sources of information, 
reassurance, and initiative. 
4 
In the more backward regions these 
sometimes constituted the main focal points of change. 
5 
In view of 
the increasing numerical significance of non-farming groups in rural 
parts of Ireland and Western Europe6 this is likely to be a factor 
of increasing rather than diminishing importance, at least in relation 
to the adoption of certain forms of innovation in the years ahead. 
The forces of reaction are no less important. Where powerfully 
arrayed, they affected major areas of the individual and group decision 
making process - awareness of the innovation, interest, information 
seeking and receiving, evaluation, ability to adopt or not. Intense 
hostility to the spread of co-operation emanated from rural traders, 
and to a lesser extent from Nationalist politicians. Thus the negative 
information flows generated are crucial to an understanding of farmers' 
evaluative judgments of the co-operative idea, and indeed of the history 
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of particular co-operative developments. Not infrequently such hostile 
comment bore only the most tenuous relationship with reality: co-opera- 
tion might be blamed for "emigrating" the people, poisoning the calves, 
causing idleness among women, or creating- various other strange dis- 
orders. 
7 A recent writer has added the further complaint that credit 
co-operatives increased jealousy in rural communities. 
8 
The more sub- 
stantial criticisms were of a political or economic nature. 
It appeared initially that the model failed to accommodate such 
negative information flows, but on reflection it may be possible to 
include either (or both) negative and positive information, and cer- 
tainly in the real world the process of evaluation would normally imply 
consideration of both. The adequacy of the model in this respect rests 
critically on what one means by "information". Jones gives one generic 
definition of information as that which reduces uncertainty. If one 
adheres strictly to this definition (an unnecessary constraint it could 
be argued) then the model does not in general embrace negative informa- 
tion. If ors uses the term negative information to cover misinformation 
- because of its practical significance misinformation should enter 
somewhere - then obviously the effect is normally to increase uncer- 
tainty. Even if the information is accurate but unfavourable it may be 
selective in its treatment of issues, weighting too heavily the costs 
of innovation, and not infrequently raising the level of uncertainty 
facing the potential adopter. One may note here that in the case of 
Irish co-operatives the effect of both misinformation and of hostile 
but factually based statements was to promote uncertainty regarding the 
outcome of adoption. 
9 
It might be helpful, in-view of the foregoing, to build the dis- 
tinction between positive and negative information (or some such 
classification) more explicitly into the theoretical structure. It 
might-also be suggested that overt treatment of both kinds of information 
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would provide further connecting tissue with processes in the social 
environment which bear, favourably or otherwise, on decision making. 
Such lateral linkages, in contrast to the largely forward flowing 
stages of the model, would relate decision making in a complex, but 
more realistic manner to its social context - essentially, that is, 
highlighting the specific points of contact between psychological 
states (in the model) and sociological situations (in the larger social 
system). Overall it would seem that the model is better adapted"to cop- 
ing with individualistic decision making, notably in capitalistic farm- 
ing where the economic and other spheres are well separated and, com- 
plicating cross-currents reduced to a minimum. Given the less'diffe- 
rentiated character of Irish rural life, with its numerous interweaving 
social and economic relationships, systematic analysis is rendered more 
difficult. 
Socio-political dimensions of innovation 
Emphasis on negative information flows leads directly into a major 
issue, the socio-political characteristics of certain innovations. Almost 
inevitably, the formation of new group organisations to undertake pro- 
cessing, marketing or supply functions induces currents of-opposition 
from existing interests. After all, the central objective of such group 
innovators is usually either to improve their terms of trade with out- 
siders, or to entirely displace certain economic interests. The history 
of agricultural co-operation bears ample testimony to such induced social 
tensions as has been demonstrated by Smith in his world wide survey of 
co-operative developments. 
10 
And it would be highly misleading to give 
the impression that the socio-political dimension is relevant to only 
a small and rather special sub-set of the total number of innovations. 
11 
Adjustments to tenurial relationships, introduction of regulations regard- 
ing products and markets, diffusion of technical information'on grades, 
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qualities, composition of farm inputs and outputs as well as price 
information - all such changes may affect the relative power positions 
of groups and individuals and thus become politically charged issues. 
Related to the foregoing is the wider symbolic significance of 
certain innovations. Thus, for instance, an overtly economic instru- 
ment such as a co-operative may be readily accepted by farmers (and 
others) not only because of the economic and personal prestige bene- 
fits anticipated, but also because adoption links up with a complex of 
factors at the community or societal level. The innovation may be 
infused with a deeper meaning which derives directly from the emotional, 
political, or moral sensibilities of the individual. This feature is 
again best demonstrated by reference to a range of co-operative expe- 
rience. Agricultural-co-operation in Denmark assumed a special social 
significance because it could be readily identified with the nation's 
political and cultural revival. 
12 
In Finland co-operation became a 
vehicle for resurgent nationalism. 
13 
In Britain the quite ideological 
consumer co-operative movement might be viewed as an instrument of 
working-class organisation, attracting adherents, in part because of 
its political and class coloration. 
14 In some African countries co- 
operative enthusiasts have been fired by nation building or quasi- 
racial considerations, 'for example, the transfer of trading functions 
from immigrant to indigenous groups. 
15 
Further instances might be 
cited but the basic proposition - the general significance of these 
wider variables - is sufficiently illustrated. In the Irish case these 
considerations are somewhat complicated. Co-operation diffused through 
the countryside despite its lack of strong identifying characteristics 
of a national or sectarian kind. The co-operative message did, however, 
have an ideological gloss. But this was of a kind likely to appeal, im 
the main, to non-farming groups. Rather abstract principles stressing 
the value of self-help, democratic organisation, and community 
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development, were more likely to strike a responsive note among bene- 
volent landlords and landagents, some clergymen, schoolteachers and 
others. 
16 
Had the Irish co-operative movement developed as a more 
full-blooded organism, attuned to the passions and prejudices of its 
period, one may wonder if its course would have been smoother and its 
progress greater. 
The role of time 
Definition of the appropriate time unit is a problem which con- 
fronts most model-builders. This is particularly important when 
using a static model of the present type. If the time period is set 
too wide then the probability of neglecting newly emerging forces is 
increased. The role of contingency in the unfolding of social action 
is largely ruled out. 
17 
Further distortion may arise through neglect- 
ing the interplay of existing forces through time. Using a single 
time unit implicitly creates the impression that causal factors (i. e. 
the changing total environment in Stage I of the model) have been 
attributed particular and unvarying weights throughout the time period. 
Relating these general points directly to the Irish case study: the 
adoption of co-operative organisation was a response to vigorous pro- 
pagandising in the early 1890s as well as unfavourable price movements 
in Irish agriculture. Nor did the environment of the individual farmer 
cease changing over the following decade in relation to this innovative 
item. At particular points in time some elements made for change 
favourable to co-operation while others tended to impede it, and the 
balance between various opposing forces varied through time. 
A rather ironic illustration of this was the role played by the 
Irish Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction. In its 
early years it encouraged the formation of co-operatives, but within a 
decade, consequent on political changes in the wake of the Liberal 
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triumph of 1906 it adopted an antagonistic role. Of course the spread 
of an innovation may itself be a factor in the changing environment. 
Thus the early success of co-operation in the south of Ireland was 
significant in changing the external conditions facing farmers in 
other regions. An essentially static constructcannot allow for a pro- 
cess whereby later decision makers' behaviour is a function of the 
rate of innovation itself. It is of course possible to minimise this 
problem by taking a number of short consecutive time periods, and 
specifying the changing total environment anew in each case, although 
there are clear costs involved in view of the cumbersome nature of such 
a procedure. In the present case study the first 6-7 years is probably 
the maximum time period that can be regarded as reasonably uniform in 
terms of the operation of causal variables. 
While these qualifications regarding use of the model appear valid, 
they should not be pressed too far. They represent a plea for critical 
application, and possibly some refinement of the theoretical structure, 
not a claim that it is seriously defective. Even if not entirely vin- 
dicated, the utility and generality of the model emerge with considerable 
force. A strength of the method, particularly in historical reconstruc- 
tion is the provision of an explicit conceptual framework which aids the 
selection of data; unwitting reliance on concealed or subliminal pro- 
cesses is thus reduced. 
18 
Comparative analysis is also facilitated. 
The existence and relevance of the different stages in adoption can be 
inferred from the historical data, in particular from the structure of 
arguments advanced by co-operative pioneers and the feedback they recei- 
ved at public meetings. 
19 
Use of the model illuminates various elements 
in the co-operators' strategy, while this strategy is seen to bear 
directly on the most sensitive areas of the decision making process. 
To conclude: we have presented a critique of a particular, though 
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representative type of innovation decision making model. The assess- 
ment is based on the use of the model in a study of the adoption of 
co-operative organisation in Ireland in the final decade of the nine- 
teenth century. The main problems encountered related to the role of 
negative information flows in complicating decision making, the exis- 
tence of. a socio-political dimension to co-operative organisation,. and 
the role of time in the model. It would seem though that the time and 
space constraints on the model are not as severe as might have been 
anticipated, thus pointing to its generality. 
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APPENDIX 
Most Irish unionists were probably indifferent to the efforts of 
their fellow unionist, Horace Plunkett, in his attempts to promote 
agricultural co-operation in Ireland. However, it is also clear that 
a considerable number of mainly unionist landowners, land Egents and 
others were responsive to his appeal. Thus when Plunkett made his 
early organising tours in the south of Ireland his work was much faci- 
litated by use of his own particular ascendancy network. The dispro- 
portionate presence of such elements in the early stages of the move- 
ment is also revealed by an analysis of the lists of voluntary sub- 
scribers to the I. A. O. S. These lists are published as appendices to 
the I. A. O. S. annual reports. In 1895, out of a total of 350 or so sub- 
scribers, roughly a quarter held high military or honorary civil tit- 
les. The latter ranged through dukes, earls, lords to honourables at 
the bottom end of this sub-group. Possession of such military or civil 
titles is highly correlated with landownership and/or unionist convic- 
tion. At the more active level, landlords and/or unionist elements are 
disproportionately represented on the I. A. O. S. over the period under 
review. This may be contrasted with the underrepresentation of nationa- 
lists. A further indication of the social origins of the different 
types of co-operative activists (i. e. those who were prominent outside 
their local context) is furnished by Table I. This is derived from a 
breakdown of the 32 co-operators whose major contribution to Irish co- 
operation is given special recognition by R. A. Anderson in his auto- 
biographical work. That this selection would command a broad measure 
of assent is suggested by other sources - the debates of the I. A. O. S. 
and reports of co-operative meetings, for example. 
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Table I. Social background of some leading co-operators 
Landed gentry 8 
Land agents 2 
Deputy-lieutenants 4* 
Clergymen 4+ 
Businessmen 5 
Large farmers 1 
Writers 1 
Unknown 7 
32 
* This is not, of course, an occupational sub-group but the holders of 
such an office are more likely than not to come from substantial back- 
grounds with possible connections to the landed gentry. (The one 
large farmer noted later in the table, incidentally, is Coroner J. 
Byrne, a prominent farmer and cattlebreeder, and a moderate nationa- 
list). 
+ Two parish priests, one priest-academic (Fr. Finlay), and one Pro- 
testant minister. 
One would not expect these patterns to be replicated at local 
level. However, a preliminary study of local co-operative meetings 
in the mid-1890s suggests that in the formative years of the movement 
considerable assistance was received from landlords, landagents and 
other non-farming groups. (Landlords, who of course sometimes farmed 
directly part of their estates, are deliberately excluded from our 
notion of non-farming groups. To mix landlords, tenant farmers, and 
labourers in the same category would be to distort utterly the nature 
of economic relationships in the countryside). It should be strongly 
emphasised, though, that our sample is small and while accounts of 
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meetingsx, p-re taken at random from local newspapers it is not assumed 
that the sample is representative. The 40 meetings - relating mainly 
to creamery co-operatives - took place in 16 counties in the years 
1895 and 1896. Our summary of the information gleaned from newsreports 
of these meetings is presented in Table 2, and is only intended to 
convey a general impression that needs to be brought into proper focus 
by a larger study. 
Table 2. The total numbers from different social 
categories present and identified at 40 
meetings on co-operation 
Category Numbers 
I Landlords or land agents 26 
II Men with military titles 13 
III Public officials 78 
IV Clergymen 42 
V Professionals 18 
VI Others nos. unknown 
Category II refers to those with the title of captain or above, 
and is probably closely related to category I. The third category 
refers mainly to justices of the peace, but also includes a minority 
of poor law guardians. The latter sub-group is likely to have inclu- 
ded a fair proportion of nationalist traders and tenants but the for- 
mer is more likely to hold a disproportionate number connected with 
the unionist camp. At least 207. of those in category IV are Protes- 
tant clergymen. Category V contains a mixed grouping of schoolteachers, 
doctors and others. The final category, by far the most significant 
numerically, is made up mainly of tenant farmers. 
It is interesting to note also the status of the chairmen at 
IL 
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these meetings. This information, based on the previous sample of 
meetings and supplemented by some meetings recorded in Plunkett's 
diaries in the early 1890s, is set out in Table 3. 
Table 3. Status of chairmen at 47 local meetings 
on co-operation 
Landlords, land agents 9 
Men with military titles 6 
Public officials 10 
Clergymen 16 
Professionals 1 
Others and unknown 5 
Total 47 
Table 3 tends to support previous impressions of disproportionate lan- 
ded and unionist support for co-operation. A final comment on this 
table may be worth adding. Clergymen chaired one third of the meet- 
ings noted, but in no case did a Protestant minister perform this 
function despite the fact that such clergymen were sometimes present. 
Our sample of meetings is too small to support any firm interpreta- 
tive comment but this rather intriguing feature, assuming it cannot 
be attributed wholly to sampling fluctuations, might be worthy of 
further exploration. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SPREAD OF CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERIES 
As creameries represent the dominant form of co-operative enter- 
prise their particular diffusion pattern merits more attention than 
it was possible to provide within the context of our overview of co- 
operative development. We have seen that the first co-operative 
creamery was established at Drumcollogher, county Limerick, in 1889. 
This was followed in fairly rapid succession by other co-operative 
creameries in the Golden Vale region - the rich heartland of the Mun- 
ster dairying industry. Five years after Drumcollogher one finds 
that co-operatives are still heavily concentrated in a band of sou-' 
thern counties. By the end of the first decade, however, one notes 
a sharp discontinuity in the pattern of geographical coverage. Rather 
than continuing to develop in close proximity to established centres, 
there is a jump from the southern to the northern end of the island, 
bypassing the midland and mid-west counties. Ulster becomes the new 
growth region as a fresh crop of creameries come into existence. An 
eastern boundary which is only slightly permeable is also taking shape. 
By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century the contours 
of the co-operative creamery territory are clearly etched on the land 
surface. Further development is mainly concerned with filling in an 
existing creamery territory : opening new creameries to some extent 
but also taking over private enterprise creameries (as well as, of 
course, sometimes losing creameries to competitors). 
These spread patterns have stimulated a number of hypotheses 
regarding farmers' behaviour. Noting that Ulster counties lagged 
behind the southern counties in adopting the co-operative innovation, 
the Rev. M. O'Riordan saw this as reflecting favourably on the 
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enterprise of the latter and, by implication, less favourably on that 
of the former. 
l (This is an element in his wider case that but for 
historical and institutional factors Catholic communities in Ireland 
would have been every bit as successful economically as the allegedly 
more enterprising Protestants of the north-east). More recently, in 
the course of, a brilliant essay on creamery co-operation, Dr. 0 Grada 
compares the rate and extent of diffusion of co-operatives. in Ireland 
generally and Limerick in particular, with the Danish experience, and 
suggests that the usual unfavourable contrasts between the two in terms 
of economic behaviour may be in need of revision. 
2 As a further prop 
to his argument, Dr. 0 Grada develops two mathematical models which 
are interpreted as showing that the spread of creameries is largely, 
if not wholly explicable by reference to economic factors. 
3 
In terms 
of this analysis a favourable light is thrown on the innovative 
characteristics of Irish farmers. These various lines of thought are 
now examined in some detail. 
Supply and Demand Factors in Relation to Innovation 
In the early stages of diffusion supply factors - availability 
of the innovation, possibilities for trial, information services - 
are of crucial importance. Normally at this point the supply condi- 
tions are the major determinants of where and when adoption takes place. 
Through time demand factors assume a greater significance. These pre- 
liminary observations suggest that in considering differences in diffu- 
sion patterns (differences in the rate of adoption and the extent of 
adoption) between regions or countries one does well to begin with 
supply side conditions. 
The initial supply of information regarding co-operative organisa- 
tion is almost wholly due to the efforts of a small group of enthusiasts, 
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in particular Plunkett and Anderson. It is only with the formation of 
the I. A. O. S. in 1894 that such activities are fully institutionalised. 
So by reference to Plunkett's diaries, supplemented by newspaper reports 
and later accounts of the early propaganda work, we can trace out in a 
fairly rough fashion the districts which were exposed to information on 
co-operative organisation, and just as importantly, note those in which 
the innovation was unavailable on similar terms at particular points 
in time. In the early years it appears that organising activity was 
concentrated in the Limerick, north Cork, north Kerry and south Tippe- 
rary areas. 
4 
Less sustained forays were made into Kilkenny, Waterford, 
and Clare. Thus the districts most intensively canvassed also happen 
to be those best suited to the dairying industry. In 1893 Plunkett 
and Anderson engage in a brief tour of Donegal, 
5 but two further years 
elapse before the co-operative message is vigorously circulated in the 
northern counties. Anderson relates to a meeting of tenant farmers 
on the Brassey estate near Londonderry as late as October 1895 that 
his experience of organising work in Ulster was extremely limited. 
6 
By 
1895, however, the I. A. O. S. is firmly in existence and information and 
assistance regarding the formation and development of co-operative 
organisation is available on a systematic basis. A co-operative news- 
paper, the Irish Homestead, is vigorously commending the new movement 
to Irish farmers and labourers. Supply factors, at least in relation 
to creamery diffusion, no longer represent a major constraint on co- 
operative adoption in different regions of the country. 
Before leaving aside the supply aspects of the innovation for the 
present it is important to stress one important point. Co-operative 
organisation was promoted with great zeal, first by a group of philan- 
thropists whose exertions sometimes border on the extreme, and later 
, 
by the I. A. O. S. whose pioneer workers absorbed much of the millenarian 
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fire. Thus in the autumn of 1890 one reads of Plunkett and Anderson 
rising at dawn, driving through cold and rain, seeking to interest 
farmers in the new system of organisation. "Arrived at 8 p. m. ery 
tired this being the seventh meeting addressed in five days. "7 Ander- 
son who bore the brunt of the organising work recalls that in one 
month he "slept in thirty different places sometimes on the seat of 
a night train, with no covering other than my frieze overcoat. "8 Such 
was the crusading spirit of the pioneers that these brief excerpts 
do not appear to be highly untypical. By 1895, as well as Anderson 
and the assistant secretary of the I. A. O. S. there were five additional 
organisers active in the field. The I. A. O. S. annual report of that 
year records the attendance of at least one of these at a massive total 
of 315 meetings held during the year. 
9 
The annual report of the follow- 
ing year states that no fewer than 241 co-operative meetings were 
organised in new areas alone during the previous twelve months. 
10 
Thus 
it is apparent that a powerful wave of propaganda activity, originat- 
ing and largely sustained from outside the farming community, carried 
co-operative ideas across the country in the early 1890s. The economic 
effect of these activities is presumably to reduce the supply price of 
the innovation to farmers through lowering the uncertainty surrounding 
co-operative innovation and lowering the cost of relevant information 
to farmers. The wider significance of this is that the more strongly 
one emphasises supply factors, the more heavily is farmers' innova- 
tive behaviour qualified. Thus, for instance, if the supply price of 
the co-operative innovation in Ireland was less than that in Denmark 
then, other things being equal, any comparison of innovative behaviour 
between the two countries has a bias (of some undefined magnitude) in 
favour of Ireland. 
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This summary treatment of the supply of the co-operative innova- 
tion helps shed light on some of the issues referred to earlier. Faced 
with identical supply curves the rate of adoption of an innovation by 
farmer groups who are similarly placed - net benefit from innovating 
is the same for each - is a clear index of relative propensities to 
innovate. Needless to say these ceteris paribus assumptions are diffi- 
cult to fulfil in real world situations, but before making strong infe- 
rences regarding innovative behaviour the historian must be reasonably 
satisfied that the historical evidence is broadly compatible with such 
assumptions. In terms of this criterion one can immediately fault 
O'Riordan's comments on the north-south contrast in relation to adop- 
tion of co-operation. Quite simply, since the innovation was not avail- 
able in the northern counties for some years after it was supplied in 
the south, 
11 
any comparison over a time interval dominated by this 
lag is necessarily misleading. To roughly adjust for this complicating 
feature we adopt the following procedure : Taking the existence of at 
least one co-operative creamery in a province as a proxy for the availa- 
bility of the innovation, we then compare the extent of creamery forma- 
tion in Munster and Ulster in their first decades (1889-1899 and 1895- 
1905 respectively). 
Over the period 1889-99 the Munster co-operatives developed to 
reach a level of 64 - an average of 10.7 creameries per county. In 
Ulster, in its first decade of co-operative development, 108 creameries 
or an average of 12 per county were established. 
12 
Another way of look- 
ing at relative performance within this north-south framework is to 
express these levels of co-operative formation as a fraction of total 
co-operative formation at the end of our study period in 1914. This 
provides a further measure of the extent of co-operative progress achie- 
ved in the first decade of co-operative propagation in each of the two 
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provinces. Thus of the total number of creameries formed in Munster by 
1914, less than half (44%) had been established by the end of the first 
decade of co-operative growth. For Ulster the corresponding ratio is 
markedly higher, being 73%. Perhaps then the point at issue should be, 
not whether northern farmers lagged behind southern farmers, but rather 
the reverse? There is clearly little comfort for O'Riordan in these 
spread patterns, but while the evidence seems to suggest that his obser- 
vation should be stood on its head such .a position 
is not without its 
difficulties either. The profitability of creameries was almost cer- 
tainly greater in the south13 so the incentive to innovate was greater 
there. On the other hand the existence of successful working models in 
other parts of Ireland reduced the level of uncertainty facing poten- 
tial northern adopters. It would be too convenient to assume that these 
two distorting features cancel each other out (though they do at least 
work in opposite directions). There is the further problem that Munster 
co-operatives had to compete with a more firmly based private enterprise 
system. It seems reasonable to assume that this impeded rapid expan- 
sion initially somewhat. 
14 
One may conclude then that on the evidence 
supplied by the adoption of co-operative organisation there is no unam- 
biguous basis on which to argue marked differences in the economic res- 
ponses of farmers at different ends of the island, religious and other 
cultural differences notwithstanding. However at the risk of gravitating 
from a position of excessive blandness towards one of rashness, the wea- 
ker judgment may be proffered that, despite the imperfect nature of the 
comparison, the innovative behaviour of Ulster farmers emerges as the 
more impressive of the two. It should be emphasised though that a pro- 
perly conducted north-south contrast would require comparison over a 
range of innovative items. Co-operative organisation is but one element 
in such a comparison. 
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In relation to the Danish and Irish experiences of co-operation it 
is obviously even more difficult to control for the various factors 
influencing the rate of acceptance in the two countries. Dr. 0 Grada 
takes the very sensible, but easily overlooked precaution of selecting 
an Irish region - county Limerick - which he says is broadly similar to 
Danish dairying conditions. Other Irish regions with much lower milk 
densities per square mile are clearly not suitable for comparative pur- 
poses. He concludes: "Perhaps the Irish performance did not quite match 
the Danish. Still the Irish farmer came a very honourable second. it15 
One wishes we had more runners though; in a two horse race it is not 
always easy to judge an honourable second. It would seem to be the 
case that where Irish conditions were most similar to those obtaining 
in Denmark diffusion proceeded almost as far, that is, the ceiling values 
in terms of the acceptance of the creamery innovation were not notice- 
ably different. By 1914, dairying districts in the two countries which 
were suited to the new system were saturated with creameries. However 
the timing of innovation was earlier and the rate of diffusion consi- 
derably faster in the Danish case, and these rather than the eventual 
extent of innovation would appear to be the crucial indicators of inno- 
vativeness. Figure I shows the cumulative totals of Irish and Danish 
creameries, both co-operative and private enterprise, through time. 
16 
A visual comparison of the slopes of the diffusion curves over the first 
decade or so for each of the two countries suggests significant diffe- 
rences in the respective rates of development. Indeed in the period 
1885-90 in Denmark a phenomenal 511 co-operative creameries were built 
or almost one third of all the co-operative creameries established between 
1881 and 1914.17 By contrast progress in Ireland is steadier and slower 
while the efective starting point is at least five years later. Interes- 
tingly the rate of development of co-operative creameries over much of 
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FIGURE 1 
Creamery Development, Co-operative and Private, in Ireland 
and-Denmark over the period 1880-1914 
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the time period is slower in the Irish-case than that of private crea- 
meries. Dr. 0 Grada quite rightly points out that the prominence of 
the proprietary sector in"Ireland is understandable in terms of the 
prior history of the Irish butter trade. Butter merchants and others 
associated with the trade were well placed to implement the new sys- 
tem of butter manufacture. However, this does not appear to consti- 
tute a sufficient explanation for the different patterns of develop- 
went in the two countries. After all, Denmark had been a considerable 
exporter of butter since at least 1870. Butter wholesaling had been 
mainly conducted by merchants, not farmers. Co-operative creameries 
did not initially engage in marketing their own butter but rather ten- 
ded to rely on existing wholesalers. 
18 
Yet the massive adoption of 
co-operative organisation is almost wholly due to the actions of farmers. 
Very little of this achievement is attributable to groups servicing the 
agricultural sector. Even if one takes Munster, the Irish region most 
suited to dairying and the creamery system, one finds that of a total 
of roughly 200 creameries in 1895, only 50 are co-operatively owned. 
19 
Even in the county of Limerick, farmers control less than half of 
the milk processing business. 
20 It would seem, therefore, that the 
extension of the creamery system in Munster, and to a lesser extent in 
other regions, is more indicative of entrepreneurial alertness on the 
part of merchants (and others) than of farmers. 
It may be objected that in districts were private enterprise had 
not secured a headstart on co-operatives their respective shares of 
total milk processing are more evenly balanced. This is true but the 
more significant implication of this is to point up the importance of 
supply factors for the development of Irish co-operation. In Denmark 
creamery co-operation seems to have been embraced more wholeheartedly 
by farmers in a very short space of time following the successful 
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formation of the first`creamery'at Hjedding in western Jutland in 1881-2. 
It is evident. from Figure I. that. the role of private creameries was slight. 
This ; is. how-Jensen describes the origins of-the-system, in Denmark: 
21 
the-Danish co-operative movement is an independently deve- 
loped, farmer-created movement. It was planned and developed 
by the-farmers themselves independently-of events in other 
countries and without any outside guidance or support. Work- 
ing farmers were, organising-to-do business in an improved way 
and did not know they were founding a co-operative movement... 
The Hjedding creamery was an economic success, and this 
fact soon became known outside the creamery's own territory. 
From far away came groups of farmers to familiarise themsel- 
ves-with the methods-used and the results obtained, and in a 
few years co-operative creameries were organised by the hun- 
dreds. 'A wave has arisen near the North Sea and is sweeping 
the whole country', it was said by one of the farm leaders of 
that time. -- 
By--contrast, -intensive propaganda from outside the farming community 
was, necessary to overcome Irish farmers'-initial scepticism and inertia. 
22 
The effective adoption by-Danish farmers-of other forms of co-operation 
- store co-operatives, meat processing, various marketing federations, 
credit societies - serves to underline the considerable differences in 
innovative responses between the two countries in relation to group 
innovations. 
23 
A more general implication of our emphasis on supply factors in 
innovation is to direct a favourable light on the activities of Horace 
Plunkett and his band of co-operative pioneers. Plunkett and his fellow- 
workers were quite clear that they had not saved the Irish dairying 
industry from ruin. 
24 
They appreciated that private enterprise would 
have effected the transition from a domestic to a factory system of 
butter manufacture. Their major achievement in this area of the rural 
economy then was not to establish creameries but rather to determine the 
ownership structure of many of the creameries formed. Co-operative 
ownership, it may be added, was the form that was ultimately to prevail. 
In the absence of Plunkett, it is reasonable to conclude, control of 
milk processing would have passed largely out of the hands of farmers. 
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Certainly a string of farmers' joint-stock companies would have deve- 
loped25, but whether this would have protected the bulk of creamery 
suppliers, as, distinct from a core of substantial farmers from mono- 
psonistic practices maybe doubted. In any case,. given the firm 
footing achieved by other creameries in, the early 1890s, it is quite 
unlikely, that a, farmer response of significant proportions would have 
developed along joint-stock lines. ., 
The Uneven Spread of Creameries 
We have already noted that co-operative or other creameries did 
not spread evenly across the country., This is readily explained by 
reference to established patterns of production in Irish agriculture. 
Many districts were better adapted to forms of farming activity other 
than dairying. Less obviously explained though is the fact that crea- 
meries did not extend to all dairying districts. In 1922 almost half 
the milk of the country was-not finding its way into creameries. 
26 
Dr. 
0 Grada contends that by 1914 diffusion of the creamery innovation had 
proceeded as far as was profitable, given locational and technical 
constraints. To operate successfully a creamery needs a minimum milk 
supply within a catchment area which is not so extensive as to make 
milk transport costs prohibitive. Some dairying districts could not 
satisfy these conditions and so continued with home butter production 
(sometimes adopting small hand separators) or switched to other farming 
lines. In areas with an urban concentration nearby, direct milk sales 
were more attractive than butter production. Thus Dr. 0 Grada suggests 
the following model to explain creamery dispersion and tests this 
against co-operative data for the year 1913.27 
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CR =a+b MCPA+c COW -d "POP 
Expressed in commoner'symbols, the number of creameries per county or 
perýpoor-1äw union (CR) is a function of milch cow density (MCPA), availa- 
bility of dairying land'(COW), -and population'(POP). Milch cow numbers 
are used here as a proxy for dairying land. Incorporation of the variable 
milch cow density into the model reflects in an'approximate way the role 
of distance and transport cost factors. The signs of the co-efficients 
in the regression equations turn out to be as expected, but strictly 
speaking"only the'co-efficient for population can be interpreted. This 
is because the two-way causation present in the historical situation 
cannot be accommodated within the confines of the model. 
28 
Thus while 
creamery numbers in a particular geographical entity are a function of 
milch cow density and cow numbers, these are in turn a function of crea- 
mery development - as the redistribution of the national cow herd in the 
29 
wake of creamery development indicates. By 1913, after a quarter cen- 
tury of co-operative growth, farming adjustments and readjustments, the 
one-way causation postulated (creamery numbers responding passively to 
existing values for MCPA and COW) can only be accepted as a crude sim- 
plifying assumption. However, these qualifications should not be pushed 
too far. There can be little doubt that milch cow density and dairying 
land are each positively correlated with creamery numbers both at a late 
point in time such as 1913, when the system is roughly in equilibrium, and 
S 
also at earlier points in time. 
Essentially this statistical exercise suggests certain correlates 
of creamery development. (To go further and regard these relationships 
as constituting an explanation of the spread of creameries would be to 
engage in an unacceptable form of reductionism). Dr. 0 Grada supplements 
the cross-sectional tests with the aid of a further regression model which 
relates the profitability of creameries to their date of establishment 
(or age), thus conferring a very interesting longitudinal dimension to 
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this part of the study. "Not only were creameries scarce in unpromis- 
ing locations : it'also seems that co-operative creameries at least 
were set up first-where the highest returns were most likely to accrue. " 
31 
If this is indeed. so then the role of purely economic considerations in 
determining where. and. when creameries first budded is heavily underlined. 
A high level of economic rationality on the part of the farming popula- 
tion is implied while emphasis on the role of supply factors, as in this 
chapter, seems misplaced. 
The crucial' equation is as follows: 
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1913 - 52,232 - 1,588 D 
(14.9) (5.8) 
51913 22 milk supply in 1913 (a proxy for creamery 
profitability) 
D= date of foundation 
R2 = 0.12 
Nm 237 
The first point to be noted is that the relationship is very weak 
(R2 = 0.12); little over 10% of the variation in the profitability of 
creamery enterprises is explicable by reference to date of establish- 
ment. Furthermore, there are at least three reasons why even this weak 
relationship may be doubted. These are now elaborated. 
The interpretation of the above equation offered is that the poten- 
tially most profitable sites were worked first, superior profit oppor- 
tunities motivating more rapid adoption than in less. favoured locations. 
But this is not the only possible interpretation. It is also possible 
that creameries required a developmental period in coming to full pro- 
fitability (as is the common experience of new firms). If this is so 
then the later creameries are somewhat unfairly treated in the test. 
In the context of the dairying industry one would expect lags in 
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acquiring-market knowledge, developing commercial contacts, and accu- 
mulating managerial and technicalrexperience. 
33 
Economies might also 
accrue from changes in. the local . 
farming environment, as for instance, 
farmers increased-their cow herds in response to; the emergence of crea- 
meries in a particular district. 
34_lAs 
creameries operated under con- 
ditions. of. increasing returns. to-scale. over most of the relevant range, 
inducing an increased milk supply would lower unit costs. 
35 
Such 
economies would not be-immediately available to new creameries, thus 
tending to yield a spurious relationship between late formation and low 
profitability. 
Another problem, one which arises from-the-neglect of supply fac- 
tors in relation to-the. diffusion process, should be considered. The 
creamery innovation was first made available in-the region best suited 
to the new system, that is in the province of Munster. Historical acci- 
dent, as we have seen earlier, rather than compelling economic incen- 
tive is the explanation here. Quite clearly this chance factor is not 
neutral in terms of its influence on the test, rather it is a distort- 
ing feature which contributes to the impression that the most favour- 
able locations were developed first because they were the most profit- 
able. 
However the most important, and methodologically most interesting 
problem relates to the actual creamery data themselves. The data used 
to test the model relate only to those co-operative creameries still 
in existence in 1913. Thus competitive forces had been operating on 
the system for almost a quarter of a century. Not surprisingly the 
least profitable firms, some of which had been established quite early 
on, had been eliminated. 
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To describe the 1913 list of creameries as 
historical remnants or survivors would be to overstate the point as 
the failure rate was not especially high, but the 1913 creameries repre- 
sent, nonetheless, a biased sample of the total population. Given the 
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hypothesis under test, it seems that the relevant population should be 
defined as all co-operative. creameries that existed for any length of 
time. between the inception of the movement, -and-. 
1913. Use of the "full" 
data set would dilute further the already weak relationship that appears 
to exist between creamery profitability and ,. 
date of, establishment. (The 
wider significance of., this. last-point in the writing of business history 
may be briefly, noted. Definition. of the appropriate population of firms 
when making general statements about an industry or sub-industry will 
vary according to the purposes in mind. The submerged strata - the 
business failures - are easily overlooked, but in some circumstances 
are as relevant to the explorations of the business historian as the 
more visible survivors). 
Overall, the three distorting features operate in the same direc- 
tion and bias the outcome of the test in a manner favourable to the ori- 
ginal hypothesis of a relationship between profitability and date of 
establishment. In view of the foregoing, little credence can be placed 
in this. 
We may now summarise our view of the unfolding of the co-operative 
creamery system in space and time. Creameries were established within 
the traditional dairying regions from about 1890 onwards. To say that 
creameries were established only where a milk supply was available is 
not perhaps very illuminating, but the extension of the creamery system 
to some but not all dairying districts can be explained largely in terms 
of differences in area milk densities and the availability of more eco- 
nomical alternatives to creamery processing in some districts. The fact 
that the co-operative system developed first in the south of the country 
and later in the northern counties appears to be largely fortuitous. It 
cannot be explained primarily in terms of greater innovativeness in the 
south or the existence of larger profit opportunities there. Interpreting 
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the spread of co-operatives largely or exclusively in economic terms 
tends to obscure the role of important mediating factors. The spatial 
and temporal patterns traced out by the emerging creamery system were 
the outcome of complex human, 'geographical and economic processes. 
Finally our brief, and necessarily incomplete contrast of Danish and 
Irish co-operation does not incline us to accept a strongly revisionist 
view of relative performance in the two countries. 
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1. Rev. M. O'Riordan, Catholicity and Progress in Ireland (London, 
1906), p. 231-2. 
2. C. "0 Grada, -'The Beginnings of the IrishýCreamery System, 1880- 
1914', Economic History Review, XXX, 1977,284-305. Dr. 0 Grada 
succeeds in compressing an enormous range of issues into this 
single article and may be said to pioneer the analytical study 
of many areas of Irish co-operative history. On the whole, only 
points of°disagreement relating to the spread of creameries are 
raised here. At the risk 'of creating the impression of detract- 
ing from the general excellence of the paper I ignore many other 
issues covered in the paper (in particular those on which our views 
coincide). I might also add that these dissenting comments are in 
part a form of self-criticism as I have now seen fit to retract 
some of my earlier views on the spread of co-operation'. 
3. Ibid., p. 289. "The diffusion of the system was dictated mainly, 
if not entirely, by commercial considerations. " 
4. Plunkett Diaries, 1889-1892, passim. 
5. Ibid., 4-7 Nov. 1893. 
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7. Plunkett Diaries, 1 Oct. 1890. 
8. R. A. Anderson, With Horace Plunkett in Ireland (London, 1935), p. 33. 
9. I. A. O. S., Annual Report 1895, pp. 4-5. 
10. I. A. O. S., Annual Report 1896, p. 5. 
11. Put more precisely: the co-operative innovation was not available 
on similar terms to the northerners until several years after the 
southern movement got under way. No doubt a vague knowledge of the 
existence of the system was present in some farming circles in 
Ulster in the early 1890s, but detailed expositions of the working 
of the new system as well as the practical and ideological stimuli 
of the pioneer co-operators were lacking. Similarly one might note 
that some knowledge of recent developments in the technology of milk 
processing (in particular the invention of the centrifugal separa- 
tor) was available to Irish farmers in the early 1880s but, despite 
the efforts of some early-enthusiasts, it was not until the follow- 
ing decade that farmers responded in any substantial numbers. 
On the activities of some dairy reformers who preceded Plunkett 
and his fellow co-operators see 0 Grada, loc. cit. pp. 288-9 and 
W. L. Stokes, 'Irish Creameries', Co-operative Wholesale Society 
Annual (Manchester) 1897,421-3. 
12. These figures, and the calculations immediately following in the 
main text, are based on data contained in I. A. O. S. annual reports 
for 1895,1899, and 1914. 
The Ulster creameries handled, on average; -smaller'quantities-' 
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of, milk so one would expect rather more of, them to, a given area. 
On the other hand the average Ulster'creamery had a. larger number 
of farmer-suppliers, while of course the mean county size in 
Ulster, was considerably, smaller_thanvin, Munster. 
13. One indicationrof this is-the earlier-development-of private crea- 
meries in, the south.. - Note also 0 Grada, loc. cit. p. 294 and the 
evidence presented. therein (based on I. A. O. S., data-on regional 
differences in milk-prices). 
14. As against this, the existence : of, working models, even if privately 
owned, must have been of some benefit in, reassuring farmers of the 
1,1 viability of the system. ,, z, .,. - 
15.0 Grada, loc. cit. p. 300. 
16. This is taken from"O_Grada p. 296. 
17. E. Jensen, Danish=Agriculture Its Economic Development (Copenha- 
gen, 1937), p., 324. Note also F. H. Webster, Agricultural Co-opera- 
tion in Denmark (Oxford, 1973), 'p. 139. -, 
18. Jensen op. cit. pp. 322,326. 
19. Agricultural Statistics of Ireland for the Year 1895 (BPP, 1896, 
XCII), p. 331. 
20. In 1893 (figures not available for 1895) there were 49 dairy factories, 
mainly creameries, in Limerick. of which 20 were co-operatively owned. 
Agricultural Statistics of Ireland 1893 (BPP, XCIII, 1894), p. 196. 
21. Jensen op. cit. pp. 319,322. 
22. In fairness to the Irish farmer it should be added that the opposi- 
tion of vested interest groups, including politicians was strong in 
the Irish case (though creamery co-operation was far from being the 
most controversial form of co-operation). 
23. Danish credit co-operatives predated their Irish counterparts by 
almost half a century. Consumer co-operatives, to take one further 
example, spread rapidly through rural Denmark in the 1880s while 
attempts to propagate this form of organisation in Ireland met with 
practically no success. According to Webster (p. 139) there were 
550 such societies in Denmark in 1891, almost all of them located 
in rural areas. Note also Anderson, op. cit. pp. 99-100. 
24. H. Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century (London, 1904), pp. 187-88. 
25. Plunkett records the existence of some such ventures in the Golden 
Vale region. See Plunkett Diaries 28 April 1890,27 Sept. 1890, 
28 Sept. 1890. 
26.0 Grada loc. cit. p. 291. Note also J. O'Donovan, The Economic 
History of Live Stock in Ireland (Cork, 1940), pp. 326-7. 
27.0 Grada, pp. 293-4. 
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28. A. larger model- a. simultaneous equation system - would be required 
to fully cope with the problem of mutual dependence. 
29. The national cow herd numbered; 1,400,000 in-. 1890 and 1,534,000 in 
1913--: an increase of. 9.57..:. However if one compares, the strongly 
dairying province of-Munster, °where°creameries were established 
on an extensive scale, -with, a, weak creamery region such as Lein- 
ster_one`finds that; -the-cow population. 
increased by some 167. in the 
former as against 57. in the latter. (Indeed one county - the 
dairying county of. Kilkenny., -,: aloneaccounts, for more than half the 
increase-in Leinster). The. strong creamery counties registered 
increases in cow-numbers,: that well, exceeded the increase at national 
level over the period'1890-1913. - Thus Limerick,, Cork, Tipperary, 
Kilkenny-showed gains, of-157., 187., 207. and 207. respectively. Agri- 
cultural Statistics of Ireland 1890 (BPP, LXXIX, 1890); Agricultural 
Statistics 1913 (BPP, XCVIII, 1914). It is probable that these 
changes. -in the, spatial. distribution-of cows, are more pronounced at 
the level of smaller-geographical-. units than. that-of the county. It 
should be added that: we are not. attempting to attribute all such 
change to developments in dairy technology - spread of creameries, 
hand separators and the like - but it seems impossible not to accord 
major significance to these factors. 
30. One expects these relationships to be weaker at some but not neces- 
sarily all earlier points in time. 
31.0 Grada p. 294. 
32. Ibid. p. 294. T-statistics are in brackets. 
33. "Also I notice that the proprietary factory as a rule pays the 
highest prices for milk. The owner is generally a butter merchant, 
and owing to his trade knowledge he obtains a price for his butter, 
which enables him to pay as much or more for milk as the united far- 
mers do at present, and have a decent profit afterwards. His manage- 
ment is also better and sounder" - writer in the Irish Farming World, 
25 Nov. 1892. The writer goes on to suggest that until the farmers' 
societies succeed in developing their methods of selling butter they 
cannot claim an advantage over private concerns. The competitiveness 
of co-operative creameries in our period implies that farmers succee- 
ded in overcoming initial management and marketing problems. 
34. The empirical basis for this point has been noted earlier in this 
chapter. 
35. This is apparent from I. A. O. S. data on milk prices paid by various 
size-categoriesof creameries. This data for the years 1913 and 1918 
is conveniently summarised and arranged in 0 Grada loc. cit. p. 294. 
36. Of the 84 co-operative creameries registered as being in existence on 
the 31 March 1897, a quarter of these had disappeared by 1913. This, 
in fact, understates the failure rate of the early creameries as those 
that had failed prior to 1897 would not appear on this list. The 
location of the failures and the numbers involved (figure in brackets) 
were as follows: Limerick (4), Cork (4), Clare (3), Tipperary'(3), 
Kilkenny (2), Waterford (1), Kerry (1), Leitrim (1), Londonderry (1), 
Carlow (1), Tyrone (1). Nine of these had failed prior to the 31 
March 1892; suggesting that early establishment and profitability. are 
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not necessarily correlated. 
Our general point is, 'perhaps', brought out most sharply in 
the case of Clare. "In. 1913 the county boasted a single-co-operative 
creamery, formed in that year. This is a good indication that the 
creamery system was unprofitable there. Yet to infer from this that 
a low (or negative) level of profitability prevented the early 
.; establishment-of creameries there 
is to neglect historical evidence 
relating to the years prior to 1913. Taking only the first five 
°,. years. of co-operative propagation (1889-1894) at least three Clare 
creameries - Labasheeda, Kildysart, and Kilfenora - had been formed. 
Not a trace of these appears in the 1913_ statistics. Thus while an 
end view of co-operation in Clare shows little sign of activity, 
viewed through time an interesting array of creamery wrecks becomes 
apparent. 
The data forming the basis of these comments are derived from 
I. A. O. S.. annual reports. - in particular Annual Report 1897, appendix 
C and Annual Report 1914, pp. 76-95 of the statistical appendices. 
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CHAPTER 
THE-EARLY RESPONSE OF THE IRISH CATHOLIC 
CLERGY TO THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT 
The primary aim bf this chapter is to form an assessment of the 
role of the Roman Catholic (R. C. ) clergy in agricultural co-operative 
development, drawing on evidence from the last decade of the 19th and 
the first decade or so of the 20th century. It is hardly possible 
however to treat such activity in isolation from the manifold pre- 
occupations of rural society, as in practice no clear demarcation 
existed between economic and non-economic activity. An attempt is 
made to place such clerical activity in the cultural context of rural 
society, while simultaneously paying, attention to the specific ideo- 
logical, pastoral and economic preoccupations of the clergy - the lat- 
ter viewed as a distinctive social category with affiliations not only 
within the rural community, but extending beyond it also. 
The importance of the clerical response in influencing the pros- 
pects of any social or economic development in rural Ireland requires 
no amplification. Because of the democratic nature of co-operative 
organisation - requiring as it does mass participation by sections 
of a rural community - this position of strategic importance is likely 
to have been even more heavily underlined. It is probably not an 
exaggeration to state that in some areas clerical acquiescence was a 
necessary condition for co-operative progress in the formative period. 
Moreover, clerical numbers had increased steadily from about 5,000 
priests, monks and nuns in 1850 to over 14,000 in 1900 - despite a 
falling lay population. 
1 
In addition another key social category 
was increasing in relative terms in the late 19th century. This was 
the traders - publicans, shopkeepers, dealers in agricultural inputs 
and outputs. After the clergy, the traders formed the most influential 
non-farming element in rural society. 
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As a. - 
formlof; check; on our analysis=and lines of, interpretation 
the, role of the clergy in. related areas of, rural economic activity 
is briefly considered. ;A certain measure of consistency in clerical 
behaviour-should emerge within, this; comparative-framework, or at 
least deviations should-be explicable by. reference to special extenuat- 
ing, factors. Otherwise-a lower., level-of, probability must be ascribed 
to our, findings. 
_ 
Making, use of this broadened context some tentative 
generalisations are made regarding-the clerical role in rural society 
over the time, period relevant to this study..,, 
The institutional church: economic and social ideals 
Rerum Novarum2 published in, 1891 signified Pope Leo XIII's 
willingness to attempt, a reconciliation between the R. C. Church and 
modern industrialising society. : Leo XIII's stricture to "bridge the 
abyss between-the priest and, the people; 
3 believed to have arisen out 
of the-twin processes , of. 
industrialisation and urbanisation, was un- 
necessary in the Irish case., Industrialisation, in Ireland was limited 
and showed a high degree of, regional concentration, and in rural Ire- 
land a reverse process had been under , way.,, 
Thus, for. the greater part 
the R. C. Church operated, within a socio-economic, environment which 
traditionally had proved conducive to Catholic orthodoxy. 
The Irish R. C. Hierarchy was poised delicately-between the insti- 
tutions of British civil authority and those of the nationalist (pre- 
dominantly Roman Catholic) population, extracting advantage from both. 
4 
At parish level the identification of chapel and cabin was more complete. 
Given that Catholicism and nationalism were almost perfectly correlated, 
that the social origins of the Irish clergy lay to a very considerable 
extent in rural Ireland, 
5 
and that both priests and laity subscribed 
to a common, though highly selective and sometimes misleading view of 
Irish history, the unity of priest and people is not unexpected. It is 
impressive nonetheless. 
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Factors which'further reinforced these bonds were the exclusion 
of'the local clergy from the more prestigious (usually Protestant) 
segments of society and'a pervasive sense of being bounded by alien 
institutions, `regarded as inimical to'Roman'Catholicism. 
6 
As L. Paul- 
Dubois commented in 1908: `"The Catholic I clergy have never ceased to 
regard their flock as the object of the snares set by'Protestantism". 
It'is perhaps well to bear this'psychologic'al"climate in mind when 
attempting " to'interpret later events. 
The position of the R. C. Church on economic'policy may be briefly 
and somewhat crudely summarised as follows: maximise the numbers of 
people on the land-as this is more'conduciveto the "good" life and 
8 
where possible"develop alternative employment' opportunities to stem 
emigration'and its associated hazard''- leakage' from'theR. C. faith. 
A'practical-implication of this was large scale redistribution of 
land, and population ' flows from areas with unfavourable man4and ratios - 
generally the western regions-of the country "toareas less densely 
populated. In a. joint pästoral letter, in, `1900, 'the bishops signified 
their support for'such a land`policy. ý'--1ý"... the great grass plains 
that are at present ' worthless: to' their owners, and'are economically 
lost to'the country" should'be returned to the poverty stricken Irish 
peasant. 
9 
Political " constraints; ' however, ruled out any massive 
structural changes in Irish"agriculture. The Congested Districts 
Board (C. D. B. ) operated-'a policy of land redistribution on a modest 
scale, and this had the support of the'Irish bishops. A C. D. B. scheme 
of land division on Clare Island, for-instance; had the moral and 
financial backing of the Archbishop of Tuam, Dr. McEvilly. 
10 
Striking confirmation of the effectiveness with which the notion 
of the superiority of rural life was communicated to the lay Roman 
Catholic is furnished by this extract from a taped interview with a 
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townsman who is now approaching80 years of age. Referring to Dr. 
Kelly, Bishop of Ross, and an acknowledged specialist on economic 
matters, and to Dean White P. P. of Nenagh he recalls: "They regarded 
the land: you see. as the great asset of the, country, which it was, and 
that character, (pause) that even character was. formed by the land. " 
Continuing, he suggests that the clergy of this period were not oppo- 
sed to industrial development, rather they wished to see it "allied 
to the economy, of the country" and that between agriculture and indus- 
try there should be "a good balance,, but the, land should be the grea- 
ter". 
Nor were all forms of economic development, to be welcomed uncri- 
tically, by, some. of the, clergy at least. A Belfast or a Birmingham 
might not be intrinsically "hostile to the spirit of the Catholic 
ll 
Church", according to the Rev. T. F. Macken, 
But it is emphatically not the ideal to be striven after and 
attained in-this country,. -"' If we are to look abroad for 
examples, it is to be hoped that Ireland will develop after 
the model of Belgium or-Denmark rather than on-the'lines of 
those countries where the land is deserted, and where the 
toiling millions are congregated in large cities and towns, 
and leading lives of moral, and physical degradation... The 
farm is known to be the best'place`to bring'up worthy sons 
and daughters... And so in Ireland-the land industry must 
be cultivated first of all, 'and other-industries must be 
brought to the homes of the people... 
Clearly the pattern of development favoured by many of the clergy was 
at variance with the experience, and probably the requirements of modern 
industrial societies. It is interesting to note, though, that agricul- 
tural co-operatives would seem to fit almost perfectly within the frame- 
work of clerical preferences regarding organisation and type of economic 
activity. If the clerical response to co-operation was shaped solely 
by Church social ideals then a uniformly favourable reaction is to be 
anticipated. But then life is rarely so- simple, even for men whose 
kingdom lies elsewhere. 
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Two'hypotheses and some evidence 
In' relation'to'the, formätion of co-operative societies it is 
possible to envisage two polar'positions on'the part of the R. C. 
clergy. " One might hypothesise that the R. C. clergy in general 
12 
sought to actively promote the cause of agricultural' co-operation. 
A second hypothesis is that the clergy worked` actively to impede 
such developments. It'should be pointed out immediately that in so 
far'as this matter has received attention'the consensus of opinion 
is in favour of`hypothesis one. 
13 
The orthodox interpretation lauds 
the widespread participatiön of clergy in co-operative endeavour. 
The evidence in favour of this'interpretation is impressive. 
Horace Plunkett in a brief reference'on page, 119`of'Ireland in the 
New Century notes that of`the co-operative societies organised by 
the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society "there are no fewer 
than 331 societies of which the local priests-are theýChairmen, 
while to my own knowledge during the summer and-autumn'of 1902, as 
many as 50,000 persons from all parts'of Ireland were personally con- 
ducted over the exhibit of the'Department of Agriculture and Techni- 
cal Instruction at the Cork Exhibition by their`local'clergy. " Other 
writers, while not providing quantitative evidence-'of this kind, 
carry a similar theme of constructive clerical involvement. 
Further such co-operative developments were congruent with the 
R. C. Church's social-thinking'and the interest of that Church in 
stabilising the rural population, and promoting smaller scale industry 
where possible. The Irish Catholic newspaper spoke in approving terms 
of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society (I. A. O. S. ), "It is simply 
the truth to say that the work of the Irish Agricultural Organisation 
is planned exactly on those lines of co-operation which the sovereign 
Pontiff, Leo XIII, has so strongly commended to the workers of the world. 
It is eminently gratifying to be able to infer from the course of the 
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proceedings at the Conference, that the counsels of the Pope are des- 
tined to bear permanent fruit in the country... "14 The first annual 
report of the I. A. O. S. states that in many districts its success is 
largely due to the help of the R. C. clergy. 
15 
The obvious point of departure in subjecting these claims to more 
detailed scrutiny is the private diaries of the leading co-operator, 
Horace Plunkett. These are referred to hereafter as the Plunkett 
Diaries. That Plunkett was sensitive to the temporal power of the 
R. C. clergy there can be little doubt. His diaries indicate that as 
a co-operative pioneer (and also as a member. of the C. D. B. ) he made a 
special effort to try and enlist their support for his work. The 
organisation. of local meetingsuus sometimes preceded by a call on the 
local clergy or on occasion 'a visit to the Bishop. Thus for instance 
Plunkett did not hesitate to approach Bishop Coffey in Killarney to 
"get his assistance with the Priest at Listowel". 
16 
Bishop Dwyer of 
Limerick in whose area much early co-operative development took place 
became a respected acquaintance. It should be noted however that the 
latter was a very independent minded prelate and regarded as somewhat 
of a tory politically. Dr. O'Donnell, Bishop of Raphoe entertained 
Plunkett during a co-operative organising tour of Donegal in 1893, but 
the relationship appears to have declined at a later stage. 
17 
Viewing the first three years of co-operative propagandising 
through the medium of the diaries, i. e. the years 1889, '90 and '91, 
it appears that at 4 of the public meetings recorded the clerical reac- 
tion was favourable and at 2 it was negative. Over this time period 
one finds about 35 references to different public meetings arranged to 
promote the formation of co-operative societies for farmers and/or rural 
labourers. (There is some degree of arbitrariness involved in deter- 
mining what meetings fall into this category; I have tried to eliminate 
in this count references that relate to the organisation of urban 
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workers and also meetings of co-operative committees, or small groups 
of farmers that appear tobe of a semi-private nature. ) It seems 
significant that". of_these 35 meetings, a clerical presence, favourable 
or otherwise, is recorded in only 6, instances. ' (There is no indication 
of a clerical presence at the other gatherings excluded from this count. ) 
This would appear to indicate that the dominant. clerical reaction at 
local level was one of non-participation. Allowing for the high degree 
of selectivity and under-reporting involved in, making diary entries it 
still seems difficult to blow-up our rough index of active clerical 
involvement - about 17%, or 11% if one includes favourable references 
only - to a figure which might compel an alternative interpretation. 
Nor was Plunkett normally indifferent in his diary entries or else- 
where to those who,, were present'at meetings. An entry in the summer 
of 1891 reads: "At 10. a. m. met the conference of delegates from 15 
dairy co-op. societies,,. and, Fingall, Monteagle, Anderson, Stokes, Gib- 
son, Cleeve, Beamish,, two: priests. and. l clergyman and a few others - 
over 60 in all". Again the number of R. C. clergy present as a propor- 
tion of the total gathering is,, tiny. 
Moving forward in time to 1895-when a. central organising body 
(the I. A. O. S. ) was in existence one finds two prominent R. C. clergy- 
men on its committee, Dr. O'Donnell, Bishop. of Raphoe, and Fr. Finlay 
S. J. of whom M. "Digby18 commented in her. biography of Horace Plunkett: 
"He was one of the few Catholic clergy of high standing who from first 
to last gave Plunkett active support and valuable counsel". 
Again concentrating on clerical participation in co-operative 
activity at national level an analysis of. the delegates at the 1st 
General Conference of the Irish Co-operative Dairy and Agricultural 
Societies in September 1895 reveals that of 60 delegates (representing 
29 societies) present, two were R. C. clergymen. 
19 
Another rough index 
of clerical interest in the central organising body of the co-operative 
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movement may be provided by a breakdown of the annual list of voluntary 
financial subscribers to the I. A. O. S. 
20 In 1895, there were 15 clergy- 
men among the subscribers, representing 4% of the total. A decade 
later this number had increased to 64 or roughly 13% of the total. 
By 1915 the number of clergymen had declined to a mere nine, or 6% 
of all subscribers. These levels of clerical support are further 
deflated when it is considered that they also include a minority of 
Protestant clergymen. From this it would appear that enthusiasm for 
the co-operative movement as a significant national force did not rise 
to any great level, and this impression tends to be reinforced by a 
reading of the I. A. O. S. AGM debates between 1896 and 1920. As repor- 
ted in the relevant annual reports these debates do not appear to have 
induced many clerical contributions - if one excludes the addresses of 
Fr. Finlay who was vice-president of the I. A. O. S. over this long period. 
A firm impulse to the co-operative movement, as a movement, does not 
appear to have been forthcoming, and this undoubtedly weakened its pro- 
gress in certain directions. This contrasts with the experience of 
co-operative pioneers in some European countries, most notably Belgium, 
where the clerical response would appear to have been more wholehearted. 
The picture which is emerging is one in which in the initial sta- 
ges of local co-operative endeavour clerical reaction was mixed, and 
clerical participation not nearly so marked (either at local or national 
level) as former accounts suggested. In instances where evidence of 
non-involvement at a particular point in time exists it is not safe to 
conclude that this indicated indifference. It is unlikely that many 
individual members of the clergy did not play some role at parish level, 
that at the very least a sense of approval or disapproval was communica- 
ted. The involvement of the clergy in political and social affairs 
requires little substantiation, especially during the period immediately 
prior to and after the fall of Parnell. 
21 
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" So far we have merely considered in ä fairly abstract and rather 
incomplete way some measures of the extent and direction of clerical 
activity. No explanatory scheme embracing the probable determinants 
of such behaviour has been offered. We possess some observations 
but lack a theory. Why should the clergy show anything but favour, 
to the new movement? - This brings us back to our introductory comments 
on the nature of rural'society. 
Conflict of economic-interests 
11 1 The three social' categories identified in our introduction as 
being of central significance, in terms of the present inquiry, were 
the tenant farmers, 'the clergy, and-the traders. There is over- 
whelming evidence from many parts of-Ireland-to suggest that the last 
were generally opposed to co-operative developments. The early writers 
on co-operation in Irelan&whose'works have been cited, Plunkett, Smith- 
Gordon and Staples, Johnston are consistent on this point. So also are 
22 M. Digby, C. C. Riddall, 23 24 and Paddy the Cope. Newspapers in the 
1890s such as the Skibbereen Eagle, 'Wexford People, Waterford Star, 
Cork Constitution, and on occasions the Freeman's Journal and the Cork 
Examiner railed against the co-operative societies. Written communica- 
tions25 from 21 co-operative societies indicate that in over half of 
these cases opposition to local co-operative development was evident, 
and in some instances very bitter indeed. Twenty of these are dairy 
co-operatives, and it is reported that in 17 of these twenty cases 
later expansion into non-dairying activities induced a hostile reaction. 
Viewed in the light of these experiences, the co-operative movement 
represented a disruptive force which exposed latent contradttions in the 
rural social structure. In a small community characterised by many 
face-to-face relationships the local clergy would have found it well 
nigh impossible to insulate themselves wholly from the newly emerging 
social tensions. The nature of their dilemma in such situations is 
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well summarised by Dean, White,,, parish, priest, of the town of, Nenagh. 
Having reluctantly accepted the chairmanship of a public meeting to 
discuss co-operation he warned his audience that his presence should 
not. be misinterpreted, as signifying, approval of co-operative enter- 
prise. : Observing that most of the, traders. were absent from the meet- 
ing, and that they, were generally_very uneasy regarding the movement, 
he defined his position as follows: -"When 
itis made clear to me that 
the traders,, and, shopkeepers have nothing to dread from the spread 
of this agricultural co-operative movement, Iwill have neither diffi- 
culty nor hesitation in giving the movement my support, but until I 
am satisfied on that point my position will be, a neutralcne". He is 
further quoted as saying: "Any effort that would be calculated to 
weaken, the trade's influence and interest in towns would, I think, 
be, very dangerous". 
26It is,, worth_bearing_in mind that Dean White 
was not an, obscure cleric, but,, rather aprominent. figure, in. North 
Munster-agrarian and political circles. 
In noting , 
the: emphasis. placed, on the traders' importance and the 
dangerous nature of any., threat to, their position one is led to explore 
possible relationships between the clergy and the traders. The econo- 
mic sphere suggests itself as one-area which might be fruitfully explo- 
red. While it is readily acknowledged that the clergy do not exist in 
a social vacuum and that their behaviour is modified, by the network of 
social relationships, which embrace them, the economic prerequisites 
of church activity are often ignored or naively assumed not to exist 
in such a sacred sphere. This economic dimension - the revenue needs 
of the R. C. Church - is certainly a relevant variable in considering 
clerical behaviour. 
Some crude estimates of the revenue needs of the Church and the 
consequent burden imposed on its members have been made for the 
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nineteenth century. 
27 , While'we`have little confidence in the cal- 
culation of'this burden, ' Larkin'S'pioneering`work at least illustra- 
tes the incontrovertible point'that'Church financial demands were of 
a substantial order of magnitude. 'Given'the existence of extensive 
belts of near-subsistence farming and the frustration of income expec- 
tations in Irish agriculture'in the 1880s and the 1890s, it is most 
probable that the middle strata of rural society - big farmers, large 
and'medium sized commercial interests, 'members of the professions - 
contributed much more per capita than the relatively less prosperous 
peasant farmers. This`is'especially likely in relation to items of 
capital expenditure, be`it the provision'ýof a stained glass window 
or a new church school. 
In rural Ireland, then such financial dependence on traders, 
shop-keepers and publicans would-ensure that their interests were not 
lightly forgotten'by the clergy. The correspondence between clergy- 
men reproduced in Larkin's article indicates the'intensity with which 
the clergy sought revenue; any development which endangered revenue 
sources is'unlikely to have received an unambiguous welcome. And 
as we have seen commercial interests were quite vociferous in publicly 
denouncing the co-operative movement as a threat to "legitimate" busi- 
ness. It may be added, in parenthesis, that large farmers, particularly 
graziers, stood to gain little from co-operative organisation. No doubt 
these also constituted important sources of clerical funds, but the 
priest's dilemma was softened to the extent that conflict cantering on 
the co-operative system impinged less directly on the interests of large 
farmers. 
Oral testimony from a former chairman of a dairy co-operative 
society (situated in a medium sized village) claims that clerical oppo- 
sition to his society was motivated by a desire on the part of the local 
clergy to protect their revenue sources among the local traders. However, 
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an. interpretation, solely in terms of a"notion of sacerdos economicus is 
most probably'an. oversimplification. . Teasing out motives is an extre- 
mely delicate process and-the maximum that can be said is that economic 
factors. are.. often important (but-not necessarily dominant) in determin- 
ing behaviour in situations such as this. 
--The, most vivid description we have of clerical opposition to a 
co-operative enterprise. is-contained in Paddy Gallagher's autobiography. 
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Unfortunately he does not. state, explicitly why this was so, but priests 
and traders were both strongly opposed to his pioneering efforts to 
establish-Templecrone Co-operative-Society in 1906. Private communica- 
tions (see appendix) from 4=other co-operative societies (situated in 
East Cork, Mid-Tipperary,. Tipperary-Limerick border,, and Co. Roscommon 
respectively) state-that while-the clergy were interested, and in some 
cases active in the formation'of purely dairy co-operatives, expansion 
into retailing. brought clerical, opposition. - Three of these communica- 
tions imply that observations of. opposition on this point are not limi- 
ted only to the co-operative society in question. Thus one such commu- 
nication reads: "The shopkeepers accepted the co-operative up to the 
time when the stores started and at that time in most places the parish 
priest was the man to show his disapproval and in nearly all cases he 
sided with the shopkeepers". --Another reads: "... as in the last 30 or 
40 years many local clergy were either directly related to or fairly 
closely related to retail traders, they did as a matter of ordinary 
personal reaction tend to work in their local community against the 
idea of the co-operative developing into retail trading". 
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This is an 
especially noteworthy comment in that it suggests that, on occasion, 
kinship ties may have played a crucial role in determining behaviour. 
It is, of course, also quite suggestive on the social origins of the 
clergy. 
The Plunkett Papers30 contain an interesting exchange of letters 
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between Horace Plunkett and. the R. C.. Bishop; of Elphin, Dr. Clancy. 
Plunkett opensby, commenting: "... I, understand that you are letting 
it be known that you are opposed to the co-operative creameries which 
have been widely established in your diocese". 
31 
Dr., Clancy replies 
(June-9th, 1908) that he has been misinterpreted as denouncing such 
ventures, when in fact he. denounced certain abuses associated with 
co-operative creameries., A long, list of such abuses, is then elabora- 
ted, and. onevis_left in. little doubt as, to the extent of Dr. Clancy's 
enthusiasm-for such creameries. One. such, defect he notes in the new 
system may be significant in the context of our discussion of cleri- 
cal sensitivity to commercial. interests. 
Many of our Irish towns possessed, some, few years, ago, a 
flourishing Butter Market; and when the farmer sold his 
; 
butter, he expended the money he received in purchasing 
food stuffs and clothing for*the-needs of his'hoüsehold. 
This meant a large circulation of money. in, our towns, and 
commercial interests of every kind were in flourishing 
, 
condition. ...; Thus the destruction, of the local Butter 
Trade has been followed by the decay of many subsidiary 
. 
forms of industry,. and nothing has taken their place. 32 
Iý, 
'I- I- II 
, 
Quite apart, from these possible economic implications of co- 
operative development. the political angle must, be considered. Most 
members of the Nationalist party saw,, or. affected to see co-operation 
as yet another Tory instrument designed to smother Home Rule aspira- 
tions with kindness. Prominent nationalists.; like John Dillon and 
Michael Davitt were, °especially bitter in their. denunciations. That 
some of the clergy respoided. to these strictures there can be little 
doubt. One reads of a, case; where the parish, priest had consulted his 
M. P. about the I. A. O. S., 
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and was. advisedto, steer clear of it as its 
purpose, according to the M. P., was merely Plunkett's own political 
aggrandisement. 
Under the newspaper heading (February 1896) "Vigorous Condemnation 
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of the-CO-operative'Association by, the'Borrisokane Nationalists" one 
finds7cö=öperation'denouncedIas aýlandlords'plot'to extract further 
benefits from tenant farmers, and`a, protest registered against col 
operative projects in'the region. 
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The`meeting'is chaired by a 
parish priest. `' Indeed thisis indicative of the divisions that some- 
times` occurred within clerical ränksünder"the'impact of conflicting 
11 loyalties. 35 Within-this'very region, and'atthisýtime, there was a 
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number'-6f priests, deeply'involved'in local co-operative societies. 
Margaret Digby, ýPlünkett's'biographer , ýand`'a'member of the Plun- 
kett Foundation team which carried out acounty by county survey of 
agricultural' co-operation in Ireland'in 1930, states that her impres- 
sI ion is that-by and`large''the'clergywere suspicious of and/or anta- 
gonistic to co-operators in the . early, 
formative years. 
37 While this 
impression is not based on-any systematic` collection of data it can- 
not be easily set'aside as Miss Digby had personal access to most of 
the leading co-operative pioneers and'is arguably one of the leading 
living authorities on Irish and European agricultural co-operation. 
This reaction she feels`may`be explained partlyin'economic terms, 
partly in terms of certain shared characteristics between clergy and 
the stronger traders relatively high status in the community, and 
interests which extended beyond the local and the mundane. Thus 
local clergymen, who incidentally were excluded by virtue of their 
religious badge from other high status groups in Irish society, would 
tend to gravitate towards elements in the local community who approxi- 
mated more closely to them in terms of prestige, economic status, and 
world view. This accords reasonably well with our depiction of rural 
society. If one excludes the large farmers, the clergy and the traders 
were the only significant groups who might be described as possessing 
a cosmopolitan, outlook, with formal links (either ecclesiastical or 
trading) extending outwards and upwards from an intensely community 
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orientated, -parochial setting. Economic. bondsýbetwenn the clergy and 
the stronger traders. are also compatible-with this interpretation. 
Further evidence and attempted synthesis_-. - -- 
_ýA smooth-narrative. solely-in terms of, 
the original'assumption 
of. favourable. clericalreaction-is clearly inadequate. Nevertheless 
clerical support-and/or active participation in the launching of co- 
operative: societies was. an important factor in a significant number 
of-cases. Clearly no-neat synthesis is possible, but can we in some 
instances attemptea partial. synthesis of. these conflicting experien- 
ces-subject to the: further. check that. this'interpretation meshes with 
evidence on, other aspects : of. rural . 
life?, -'-Let us take the case of 
one-mid-Tipperary co-operative creamery, founded in 1908, "and located 
in a medium sized. village. Local farmers with long-associations with 
the co-operative speak of the major role of"the parish priest in 
establishing the-society. This is. confirmed by the minutes of meet- 
ings of the management. committee. 
38 
. However it. is claimed privately 
that the original committee of management. had to promise him that the 
creamery would largely confine itself to milk. processing and not 
engage in any business activity which might bring-it into competition 
with the village traders. 
39 
. If this off-the-record assurance was given, 
and my personal assessment is'that these informants are quite reliable, 
then the. priest/chairman was-instrumental. in blocking potential deve- 
lopments of a controversial-nature. Holding a key position on the far- 
mers' management committee and combining with this role the further role 
of spiritual leader of the local, community - embracing both villagers 
and country-folk - he was in a powerful position to determine what activi- 
ties were the legitimate concern of. what particular social groups. He, 
it would appear, legitimised co-operative activity in one direction, thus 
facilitating realisation of the farmers' main objective - an improved 
system of milk processing. In turn he protected the interests of the 
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village traders who were . 
dependent iin part on. the sale of agricultural 
inputsäand,,, consumer goods-and the purchase of certain agricultural 
outputs, but were unconcerned with milk processing. Thus a direct 
clash of economic. interests,. was avoided, stress points in the social 
structure eased,, and,. the integrated nature of this, microcosm of Irish 
society reaffirmed. 
It is impossible to, assess how general this experience may have 
been.. It is certainly. compatible with much, of our knowledge of the role 
of the. priest: in Irish society and it would show our two fundamentally 
diverging sets. of, experience: in a different and less contradictory light. 
Without. doubt. the clergy entertained a. general. sympathy for any attempts 
that, might appear to promote the economic prosperity of, -their congrega- 
tions, provided there., were. no adverse. side-effects. as viewed from the 
vantage point of the, R. C. Church. 
40.. 
Evaluating a new social movement 
and determining the appropriate reaction wasunlikely, to be a hasty 
process. The presence. of. landlord and protestant elements in the co- 
operative movement and, the-hostility of most nationalist politicians 
compounded the; problems_posed; by the natural antagonism of the traders. 
If the direct and indirect evidence we have adduced in favour of a re- 
interpretation of the clerical role is . correct  then it appears, ini- 
tially at least, that many, of the clergy. stood coldly aloof from co- 
operation. This in itself would prove quite an effective damper on 
co-operators' organising, movas. A more sophisticated development how- 
ever would have involved channelling co-operative enterprise, as the 
movement gathered momentum, -along moreacceptable 
lines, thus deflect- 
ing its socially disruptive thrust. This via media, as illustrated 
in the case of the Mid-Tipperary co-operative, is analogous to the 
strategy adopted by the clergy in the Land League agitation of roughly 
a decade or so earlier. 
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Taking another area of rural economic life - that relating to the 
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labourers and their struggle to win economic concessions - the clerical 
mediating role between distinct socio-economic groupings is perceptible. 
Thus the Rev. E. M'Swiney, presiding over a monthly meeting of the Ennis- 
keen (Co. Cork) branch of the Democratic Labour Federation is careful to 
refute the suggestion of, some farmers that "the labour agitation was an 
attack upon themselves". But nothing, he claims, could bemore absurd 
than this, "because the labour movement was as much in favour of the 
farmers as the labourers". 
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This parish, priest then develops a skil- 
ful, though rather dubious, argument which serves to accommodate all inte- 
rests. Devising a_solution to the land question and the problem of the 
rural labourer involves transferring the land to the tenant farmers at 
low prices, thus leaving the new proprietor in a sound economic position - 
one in which he will be able. to employ, ruralLlabourers. By contributing 
to the tenants' agitation the labourers can, bring the land struggle to a 
successful conclusion thus ensuring their own employment prospects within 
a prosperous peasant proprietary. Viewed in, this light thdr respective 
struggles are complementary. 
At a "monster meeting" of the representatives of the trades and 
labourers of Skibbereen in; 1894, the priest presiding notes the growing 
strife betwe n capital and labour at home andabroad. 
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He regrets that 
the "friendly relations that should exist between workmen and employer 
are being, strained, and are beginning to snap asunder". Ile goes on to 
emphasise the necessary interdependence between capitalist and labourer 
and the need for mutual co-operation and good-will. 
In almost identical vein, one might note the address of the Rev. 
Chairman to a labourers' meeting in Nenagh in December 1894.44 The role 
of mediator in economic affairs is illustrated in a more active sense 
by Bishop Dwyer's intervention in the strike of bacon curing workers in 
1890, affecting Limerick, Waterford and Cork, and in the Limerick and 
Waterford railworkers strike of 1891.45 The exercise of a similar type 
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function by the clergy in relation to land disputes involving tenant 
farmers'is generally recognised. This further dimension of clerical 
activity, as revealed by comparative analysis, enhances our understand- 
ing of the clerical conception of social organisation and the appro- 
priate social relationships between different classes. The reality of 
social stratification is recognised and accepted. The ideal society 
is conceived as a system of interlocking, mutually interdependent parts 
functioning smoothly in the interests of all. Although non-egalitarian, 
it is essentially a harmony model of society, as opposed to, for instance, 
the marxist conflict model. Conflict between different socio-economic 
groupings, be it between farmers/co-operators and traders, or farmers 
and labourers represent deviations from the social ideal of a harmony 
of classes, or what continental clergymen knew as la paix sociale. 
In the light of this ideological orientation -, it is hardly sur- 
prising that the priest should play an important part in the management 
and resolution of conflicts within rural society. His role in settling 
land disputes between neighbours, and agro-industrial disputes betweei 
employers and employees, his reactions to rural labourers' claims and 
to co-operative developments display considerable consistency. Certain 
forms of social conflict were to be deprecated as these introduced 
tensions which disturbed the stability and cohesion of Roman Catholic 
communities. 
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Social deviants such as co-operative pioneers had to 
be reintegrated into community structures if the old clerical power and 
authority patterns were to be maintained intact. Participation of clergy 
in co-operative societies would have gone a long way towards achieving 
this. 
Evidence of joint action on the part of priests and traders in 
a number of instances is somewhat unexpected and suggests some interesting 
lines of enquiry. While interpretation of such an association is extremely 
tentative, considerations of social status, revenue and kinship links 
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suggest. themselves-as possible explanatory factors., 
Conclding comments. 
From.. our review of the available evidence it:, appears that clerical 
reaction to the co-operative movementrtook,. three main forms. Firstly, 
reserve or actual-opposition-for a, variety of motives, this being most 
apparent_where, co-operative development: threatened the social equili- 
brium, in; rural, communities., Reserve-and suspicion-are. likely to have 
been more general,. in the innovative period. sometimes crystallising into 
opposition where co-operator and" trader. groups. adopted hostile postures 
vis-a-vis. each other. ý'A; very, different-reaction; and-one gaining momen- 
tum, through time was that of active promotioniof-, co-operative enterpri- 
ses.,. The third, approach,. which is really-a refinement of, the second 
position involved conditional and selective promotion of such enterpri- 
ses. e. g. ýpurely milk processing-as opposed-, to multi-purpose co-opera- 
tives. - Approaching the, _endýof, 
the, first. decade. of, co-operative pro- 
pagandising, -the. second, reaction, orvperhaps some refinement of it repre- 
sents the dominant pattern. Instances of hostility might manifest them- 
selves occasionally from now on, but the co-operative form of organisa- 
tion had established itself as a permanent feature of rural Ireland. 
Clerical participation, and interest in the central organs of the co- 
operative moment, and by inference, in the more visionary aspects of 
the co-operative ideology cannot be viewed as noteworthy and would 
appear to have declined from a peak in the early years of this century. 
The publication in 1904 of Plunkett's controversial book, Ireland in 
the New Century cannot have helped in attracting and maintaining cleri- 
cal support. The subsequent renewal of nationalist attacks on co- 
operation as well as a general pre-occupation with political issues and 
remedies after the Liberal electoral triumph of January 1906 were pro- 
bably more significant factors. In view of these, one may wonder if 
the co-operative movement would have been even more successful in 
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attracting the energies of local clergymen had it assumed a somewhat 
sectarian character or adapted itself to the political currents of the 
time by transforming'itself into-'a vehicle for nationalism. A survey 
of co-operation in 1931, for instance, noted in passing that priests 
and. schoolteachers,, who in other, countries had provided-much of the 
local leadership'for credit societies, had'not-performed a comparable 
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role"in'' Ireland. , European°co-operative movements, it'may be noted, 
tended to have strong identifying characteristics of a religious or 
national kind-(infusing'them,, -perhaps, "with the "vital heat" George 
Russell found so conspicuously lacking in the Irish movement). 
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It 
seems reasonable to conclude that`1in certain fundamental respects the 
movement in Ireland fitted less than easily into the emerging social 
and political patterns of-pre-independence Ireland. It retained its 
non-political'andý non-denominational character, but probably only at 
the, cost-of', reducing'its appeal for-certain'non-farming groups - the 
Roman Catholic 'clergy"in particular. ' 
. `äý s. .- 
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tiate this point, as do leading articles from the Irish Catholic, 
and the observations of writers only incidentally concerned with 
religious topics. The issue of clerical involvement in economic 
life is considered in more detail in a laterchapter. 
41. One recalls that only 10 years before the founding of the first 
co-operative creamery Michael Davitt was setting up the Land League 
in Co. Mayo, in spite of strong clerical warnings of communist and 
socialist influences. Yet priests were later quite active in for- 
warding and channelling Land League agitations. Thus the fact 
that by 1903 or so there was considerable clerical involvement in 
local co-operative societies is not in itself quite so significant 
as might first appear. Nor is it necessary to assume a conscious 
strategy; a mere clerical presence on committees of management 
would: imply certain constraints. 
42. Eagle and County Cork Advertiser, 10 March '94. 
43. Eagle and County Cork Advertiser, 1 Sept. '95. 
44. Nenagh News, 22 Dec. '94. 
45. Limerick Repotter and Tipperary Vindicator, 1890-'91. See also Fr. 
Ryder's address to the Archconfraternity (Limerick) urging concilia- 
tion in the bacon industry dispute, referred to in the issue of 7 
Feb. '90. 
46. While the point is not develped it is fairly obvious why these gene- 
ralisations cannot be stretched to embrace the landlord element in 
rural society. 
47. The Horace Plunkett Foundation, Agricultural Co-operation in Ireland: 
A Survey (London, 1931), p. 385. 
48. George Russell, The Building up of a Rural Civilization (Dublin, 1910), 
p. 3. It is interesting to note that the Irish language movement, 
itself contemporaneous with the co-operative movement, evolved a radi- 
cally different approach to the issues of language and nationality. 
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It is hardly coincidental that the language revival campaign 
succeeded in gaining substantial clerical backing, especially 
among the younger clergy. 
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Appendix. 
Three distinct information gathering techniques were used in 
compiling evidence for this chapter. While the main emphasis was placed 
on analysis of conventional documentary sources, this was supplemented 
by use of the technique of oral history and by the social survey 
technique of postal questionnaire. A few comments on the postal 
questionnaires (or private communications) may be in order. Using the 
1912 list of co-operative dairy societies as a sampling frame 68 
societies were randomly selected. Simple questionnaires seeking 
information on, among other thingss, trader and clerical reaction to the 
co-operative in its formative period were distributed to each society. 
It was specified in each case that written communications were desired 
only from individuals, either co-op. staff or past or present members of 
the management committees, who were intimately associated with the local 
co-op. society and felt they possessed reliable historical information. 
It is difficult to precisely assess the response rate as quite 
a number of these 1912 societies are no longer in business; others 
replied that they felt unable to provide information. In all 25 
completed returns were obtained, giving a wide geographical spread, 18 of 
which were useful within the context of the present paper. (In some 
instances interesting replies were followed up with oral interviews. ) It 
should be noted in this brief review of procedure that the emphasis is on 
treating and presenting evidence supplied by private respondents as 
historical source material which must be subjected to the historian's 
checks. No broad social survey type claims are made, or intended. 
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CHAPTER 
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Interaction between the religious and the economic spheres has 
long excited the interest of historians and sociologists. The modern 
form of the debate is most notably linked to the works of Weber and 
Tawney. 
1 
It is not often appreciated, however, that Ireland, a land 
pulsating with religious energies, produced contributions which in 
part anticipate these modern masters. The most famous exchange is 
that between the reforming unionist, Sir Horace Plunkett, and the 
Roman Catholic writer, the Reverend M. O'Riordan. 
2 
Plunkett acqui- 
red his considerable experience of economic conditions in Ireland 
through his work as a member of the Congested Districts Board, as an 
active propagandist for rural co-operatives, and as first vice- 
president of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction. 
Noting a lack of economic progress in Ireland and the differential 
rates of economic growth between Protestant and Catholic nations, 
he criticised in firm though disinterested terms some implications 
of the Catholic religion for economic life. 
3 
Roman Catholicism strikes an outsider as being in some of 
its tendencies non-economic, if not actually anti-econo- 
mic... I am simply adverting to what has appeared to me, 
in the course of my experience in Ireland, to be a defect 
in the industrial character of Roman Catholics which, how- 
ever caused, seems to me to have been intensified by their 
religion. The reliance of that religion on authority, 
its repression of individuality, and its complete shift- 
ing of what I may call the moral centre of gravity to a 
future existence - to mention no other characteristics - 
appear to me calculated, unless supplemented by other 
influences, to check the growth of the qualities of ini- 
tiative and self-reliance, especially amongst a people 
whose lack of education unfits them for resisting the 
influence of what may present itself to such minds as a 
kind of fatalism with resignation as its paramount virtue. 
Needless to say, Plunkett's strictures drew the full wrath of a 
church hyper sensitive to critical comment. Soon after its appear- 
ance Ireland in the New Century was accorded the distinction of a 
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special pastoral denunciation by the archbishop of Armagh, Cardinal 
Logue. 
4 
The Reverend M. O'Riordan reviewed it unfavourably in the 
Dublin paper the Leader for a year, his literary exertions later 
emerging in book form as Catholicity and Progress in Ireland. Plun- 
kett commented with a touch of humour that "a review is usually a 
chapter about a book" but in this case it "assumes the proportions 
of a book about a chapter". 
5 In his lengthy and sometimes testy 
rejoinder, O'Riordan reiterates the traditional nationalist interpre- 
tation of the sources of Ireland's economic ills - unfavourable 
legislation by an alien parliament, deliberate suppression of native 
industries, and tenurial insecurity and rack-renting in agriculture. 
(These nationalist' assertions embodied more political than economic 
logic. Recent research into Irish history has largely dislodged the 
cruder traditional orthodoxies). 
6 
Despite the importance of the issue a comparative quiet had 
settled over debate on the relevance of religion as an explanatory 
variable for Irish underdevelopment - that is until Emmet Larkin 
ventured a modern contribution. 
7 The latter's approach to this 
sensitive topic is bold, sometimes brilliant. The orientation is 
especially interesting in that it focuses on the Irish Church as a 
complex of economic institutions, absorbing and deploying economic 
resources. By contrast Weber, Tawney, and Plunkett concentrated on 
moral and psychological variables, and the resulting character struc- 
ture associated with membership of a particular religious group. 
8 
While analytically distinct the two approaches are not mutually exclu- 
sive and in his concluding comments Professor Larkin briefly mentions 
some of the extra-economic variables. In constructing his case Pro- 
fessor Larkin places special weight on a set of pioneering calcula- 
tions which suggest that in the second half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury the Irish Church absorbed almost 15 per cent of the surplus 
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available over subsistence for the Catholic population. 
9 
While credit 
should be accorded for this early foray into quantification, the 
extremely crude nature of the calculations must be recognised. The 
income estimates are of a very approximate nature, being derived under 
rather heroic assumptions from the British national income estimates 
provided by Deane and Cole 
10 (while the further assumption that the 
Catholic proportion of national income remained roughly constant dur- 
ing the nineteenth century is highly controversial to say the very 
least). A spot check on these estimates is possible by contrasting 
Larkin's estimate of agricultural income in 1901 with the official 
calculation of income from'Irish agricultural output in 1908. The 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (Ireland) arrived 
at a level of £46 millions for 1908 while Larkin suggests the much 
lower level of £31 millions for 1901, or less than a decade earlier. 
(The methods used by the department in collecting its information are 
not above criticism - these methods and a detailed breakdown of the 
quantities and values of the various components of agricultural out- 
put are contained in a pamphlet issued by the department in 191211 - 
but certainly they command much more authority than guess-estimates 
based on British data). Having noted the large discrepancy between 
the two estimates, that of the department being-some 50% higher than 
Larkin's, it should be added that the gap cannot be appreciably clo- 
sed by appeal to rapid growth in agricultural incomes over the short 
interval between 1901 and 1908. In fact the volume of agricultural 
output showed little change while most product prices registered only 
a gradual increase. Thus agricultural incomes can only have exper- 
ienced modest growth in this interval. Even more important, perhaps, 
than casting doubt on this pioneering set of figures for Irish national 
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and agricultural incomes is consideration of the basic methodology 
employed. Developing such aggregates from the rather arbitrary 
partitioning of British totals, while ingenious, would seem to be a 
rather barren exercise as our spot check and Professor Cullen's more 
elaborate calculation suggest. This is particularly unacceptable 
for the turn of the century when an alternative approach - at once 
sounder and more obvious - is available. It is possible to exploit 
the data on quantities and values of industrial and other production 
unearthed by the 1907 census of production (allied to the 1908 agri- 
cultural census) as a basis for some approximate calculations of 
national and sectoral incomes around 1900. It becomes more difficult 
to apply this procedure as one moves backwards in time through the 
nineteenth century, but for agriculture for instance there are exten- 
sive data on output and prices back to the middle of that century. 
Estimates of output and prices for some other industries are also 
possible. Without attempting to minimise the difficulties or the 
data scarcity, it may be suggested that solid progress in illuminat- 
ing the major areas of statistical darkness in Irish history will 
. depend on work along these 
lines. By comparison, refining conjectu- 
res based on what are rough estimates of national and sectoral incomes 
for the neighbouring island appears less than fruitful. 
Because one can place little, if any, confidence in either the 
method underlying Larkin's calculations or the actual results, it 
might even be suggested that the contribution be dismissed ab initio 
or else judgement suspended until more reliable estimates become 
available. Such responses, however, are unhelpful. The degree of 
error associated with Larkin's calculations is a subsidiary issue. 
Given the striking progress of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth 
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century its revenue needs must have been considerable, even if, as 
seems probable, the burden has been exaggerated. So casting doubt 
on a particular set of estimates is merely to clear the way for a 
fresh crop. It does not necessarily undermine the logical structure 
and hence the partial validity of this particular approach. A more 
general refutation is required. 
The core of the Larkin thesis is the contention that the Irish 
Church, in siphoning off a large proportion of the nation's potential 
savings and committing these to unproductive enterprise, inhibited 
economic development. It is certainly true that the Church's acquisi- 
tion and use of economic resources had an opportunity cost in terms 
of benefits foregone in not producing different outputs. " Such diffe- 
rent outputs might have extended from consumer goods only at one 
extreme through various combinations of producer and consumer goods 
to producer goods only at the other extreme of the production possi- 
bility frontier. Maximising economic growth opportunities would 
have involved concentration on the latter end of the range. In the 
short term it is also possible to envisage a situation in which, in 
the absence of the Church, total expenditure in the economy would 
have been at a higher level than was historically the case. Such a 
shift in aggregate demand, if realised, could have a cumulative 
result, initial spending impulses giving rise to additional income 
effects in the economy at large. 
To sustain the argument that the Church's expenditure program- 
mes strongly depressed national income the following proposition must 
be established: in the absence of such claims on resources conditions 
favourable to productive investment in Ireland would have obtained. 
Funds released would fructify in native enterprises. In relation to 
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the shorter term possibility raised above, if this is to possess any 
weight, then one needs to show that increased effective demand would 
have a strong multiplier effect on other sectors of the economy. How= 
ever, in the case as presented by Larkin there is a crucial rupture 
in the logical structure; the very conditions that need to be demon- 
strated are implicitly assumed. Despite this it may be that Larkin, 
while overlooking essential elements in the exposition, has nonethe- 
less arrived at a historically plausible set of conclusions. How 
probable is the counterfactual scenario, necessarily implied by his 
argument? 
12 
Taking the investment conditions first there is no rea- 
son to believe that a shortage of capital at the aggregate level was 
a serious growth constraint. One useful indicator of the expansion 
of the savings base of the economy is the development of banking ser- 
vices between 1851 and 1891. In 1851 there was, on average, only 
one banking office for every 37,600 persons; by 1881 this ratio had 
improved to one office per 10,700 persons. The year 1891 saw further 
sustained improvement as a ratio of one office per 8,200 persons was 
achieved. 
13 A more precise indicator is the level of deposits in the 
main savings institutions. This evidence is summarised in Table I. 
It is clear from this that the savings capacity of the nation was 
quite substantial, and that savings maintained a strong upward move- 
ment over the half century, although as is to be expected, there is a 
slackening during the period that roughly approximates that of the 
Agricultural Depression. 
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TABLE I 
(i) Deposits in Post Office Savings Banks, Trustee Savings 
Banks, and Joint Stock Banks in Ireland 1840-1910 (in 
millions of pounds )a 
1840 
Post Office b Trustee Joint Stock 
Savings Banks Savings Banks Banks 
£ ££ 
2.2 5.6 
1850 1.3 8.3 
1860 2.1 15.6 
1870 0.6 2.1 24.4 
1880 1.6 2.1 30.0 
1890 3.7 2.0 33.3 
1900 8.1 2.3 43.3 
1910 12.0 2.5 55.0 
a Derived from the Report of the Departmental Committee on Agri 
cultural Credit in Ireland (BPP, 1914, XIII), pp. 21,39. 
b First established 1861. 
(ii) Total Deposits in the three Savings Institutions (in 
millions of pounds) and Decennial Changes by Percen- 
tages. 
£ 
%. 
1840 7.8 
185 0 9.6 +23 
1860 17.7 +84 
1870 27.1 +53 
1880 33.7 +24 
1890 39.0 +16 
1900 53.7 +38 
1910 69.5 +29 
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In rural-Ireland capital shortage does not appear to have con- 
stituted a severe constraint on agricultural development. The rapid 
expansion of livestock numbers during and after the Great Famine as 
market conditions favoured such investment furnishes a strong con- 
trary pointer. The total cattle population, representing the largest 
single item of capital expenditure on Irish farms, increased from 
1.84 millions in 1841 to just under 3 millions in 1851. This invest- 
ment continued throughout the century, although not at such remark- 
able speed, a figure of 4.7 millions being reached in 1901.14 In the 
final decade of the century when processing in the dairying industry 
was being organised along factory lines, the rural community contribu- 
ted.. tothese developments. Thus if one examines the farmer controlled 
co-operative creamery movement one finds that from a humble beginning 
of one co-operative creamery in 1889, fifteen years later over 200 
creameries had been built with a combined share capital in excess of 
£100,000.15 Lack of profitable investment opportunities, the level 
of entrepreneurial skills, and unfavourable demographic trends would 
seem to be far more significant restraints on the progress of Irish 
agriculture in the post-famine period. 
16 Somewhat different consi- 
derations apply to the areas outside the commercial farming districts. 
On the tiny and mainly impoverished holdings in the west of Ireland 
the abolition of rent, not to mention church dues would have made 
17 little difference to the material welfare of the people. The major 
investment opportunity lay in outward mobility, a course thousands 
adopted annually, both as permanent emigrants and as migratory labou- 
rers. Detailed evidence on rents, church dues and other forms of 
expenditure are available for 84 western districts stretching from 
Donegal, through Connaught, onto west Cork, and these demonstrate 
conclusively that neither church dues nor rents were important deter- 
minants of poverty in these depressed areas. 
18 
The simple truth was 
that, given the slender economic resources of these areas and the 
disproportionately large population, only massive labour flows 
from these regions could effect a substantial rise in the standard 
of living of those who might remain. Regarding the possible lack 
of capital through diminished savings for rural industries, it is 
difficult to-dissent from the following conclusion: "There are 
ample funds on deposit in. the Irish Joint Stock Banks for the deve- 
lopment of rural industries, if means were only found of creating an 
industrial atmosphere, and attracting to an increased extent the 
confidence of the investor and of the Banks. "19 Through the economy 
as a whole risk aversion rather than capital shortage emerges as the 
more important feature of investment behaviour. An interesting 
illustration of this was the reluctance of Irish investors to commit 
their capital to Irish railway ventures until an inflow of English 
capital had first reassured them of the profit possibilities. 
20 
An examination of Larkin's own evidence on important church reve- 
nue sources - charitable bequests and legacies - sharpens onels'doubts 
that much of this wealth, even if urgently required, would have found 
its way into productive activity in Ireland. 
21 
Religiously inclined 
old ladies, and other pious members of the laity, as well as some 
clergy, are not the most obvious sources of risk capital. In the 
absence of institutions (banking, industrial and agricultural develop- 
ment agencies) specifically geared to native development, and given 
the lack of control of capital movements between different regions of 
the United Kingdom economy, it is highly improbable that the funds 
abstracted by the Church were deflected from fulfilling a major invest- 
ment role. The net outflow of money capital from Ireland in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century removes any lingering doubt that 
availability of capital represented a serious limit on growth. 
22 
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What of the further, less significant possibility that the reve- 
nue extracted might have been expended on certain goods and services, 
the effect of which would have been to stimulate other sectors of the 
economy? A subsidiary point may be made first. The farflung Irish 
networks in Australia and America were a useful source of funds, as 
both Larkin and O'Riordan mention. Thus lay purchasing power was not 
automatically depressed to the extent that Church receipts initially 
suggest. 
23 
More important though one must locate the probable outlets 
for increased lay purchasing power in a situation where the laity 
have been released from their financial obligations to the Church. 
Even under the favourable assumption that effective demand would be 
increased as a result of the change in expenditure patterns the argu- 
ment carries little weight. For a strong impact on the rest of the 
economy spending should be concentrated on commodities produced within 
Ireland with a low, preferably zero import component embodied in them. 
In addition the tendency to consume additional units of income should 
be high. In other words leakages from the economy - in the form of a 
high level of savings transmitted abroad rather than used in Ireland, 
or in the form of spending on imports - should not be especially marked. 
We have already noted that the first of these provisos is violated by 
historical experience. Savings levels were high and because of the 
nature of existing financial institutions tended to be conveyed from a 
peripheral region such as Ireland into the heart of the United Kingdom 
economy. In relation to the second it is known that a high propensity 
to import was a feature of Irish trade, 
24 
thus further dampening the 
wider impact of any initial stimulus. Indeed, in view of these two 
considerations, it is possible to advance a diametrically opposed line 
of argument. The Church was itself a major consumer of goods and ser- 
vices. It had strong linkages to enterprises in the local economic 
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context. By raising the level of domestic demand for such services as 
building and maintenance services, as well as requiring steady supplies 
of food'and food products - outputs which, on the whole, could only be 
provided by native industries - it is probable that the Church contribu- 
ted to economic growth rather than the reverse. A further point in 
relation to spending patterns may be added. The calculation that the 
funding of Church activity absorbed almost 15% of the income surplus 
has no special economic significance; unless it can be shown that the 
associated pattern of expenditure has a definitely anti-growth charac- 
25 
ter it is little more than an interesting artefact. One might just 
as meaningfully calculate a similar type ratio for other forms of con- 
sumer spending, such as drink consumption for instance, and claim that 
this implied a wasteful deployment of resources from the viewpoint of 
economic growth. 
26 Such exercises are more immediately relevant to 
value loaded interpretations of the composition of national output 
rather than the issue of growth as such. 
We have considered the implications of the Church's claims on 
physical resources; to fully round off this treatment it is necessary 
to explore the probable implications of its claims on human resources. 
It has been suggested that the absorption by the Church of a large 
body of entrepreneurial talent had further serious consequences for 
economic growth. 
27 While this point may possess some validity it must 
be firmly recognised that a clerical career was but one of a number of 
attractive outlets opening up to the Catholic urban and rural middle 
classes. The pressure for places in such professions as law and medi- 
cine seems to indicate that a block to social mobility in the 
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ecclesiastical sphere would merely have increased pressure at other 
outlets which are not immediately associated with economic enterprise. 
28 
One traveller in Ireland claimed that the substantial Ulster peasant 
always tried to make one of his sons a lawyer. 
29 
R. A. Anderson, who 
had an intimate knowledge of Irish society through his work as an organi- 
ser of co-operatives, is incidentally quite revealing on the social 
aspirations of tenant farmers. Complimenting a particular land-agent 
on his ability to placate the most troublesome tenants and to extract 
arrears of rent, Anderson quotes the land-agent's skilful use of flat- 
tery : 
30 
"Sure Lord C. must get his rent; the poor man, you know, 
isn't too well off and spends every penny of it at home. 
And, tell me, how is Mikey getting on at school - mind 
you, he is more like his mother than his father, a fine 
healthy boy. What'll you make of him, Mrs. Murphy? May 
be a Priest or a Doctor? " The good woman's rage would 
have been subdued by this soft talk and she'd murmur that 
she had no such great ambitions for her offspring but 
pleaded only that they might feel secure in their pos- 
session of the 'little farm of land''. 
The point that mainly interests us here is, of course, the form that 
such "great ambitions" took. As career preferences within social 
groupings tend to be relatively enduring, it is hardly a plausible 
counterfactual proposition to suggest that, had the convents and 
seminaries not existed, there would have been a significant redirec- 
tion of youthful talent. Nor should it be assumed that the clerical 
role ruled out the possibility of assuming some entrepreneurial func- 
tions. When the socio-political environment favoured more construc- 
tive forms of collective economic activity in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, many Catholic (and Protestant) clergy became 
directly involved. In the depressed regions in the west of Ireland 
local clergy were active in supporting and supplementing improvements 
initiated by the Congested Districts Board. The first secretary and 
later historian of that body, W. L. Micks was especially enthusiastic 
146 
about the economic role of the clergy and in his tribute to their 
enterprise he incorporates a lengthy roll call of clerical acti- 
vists. 
31 In other areas clergy participated on newly formed county 
committees of agriculture (set up in the wake of the establishment 
of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction in 1900). 
32 
The numbers of informed clerical witnesses giving evidence on social 
and economic conditions to governmental enquiries are also indicative 
of a constructive clerical contribution. We have already noted 
Horace Plunkett's comment in 1904 that of the societies organised by 
the I. A. O. S., more than 300 of these had local priests as chairmen. 
33 
He also pays tribute to the activities of the R. C. clergy in conduct- 
ing large numbers of farmers over the exhibit of the Department of 
Agriculture at the Cork Exhibition of 1902. We are also aware though 
that not all priests gave an unambiguous welcome to co-operative 
organisation. However, once the movement had gathered momentum the 
response of the clergy to local economic projects such as creameries 
or credit societies (but not retail societies) was distinctly 
favourable. Obviously one can be over naive in'conducting a mere 
head count of clerical involvement in various economic activities, 
The quality of the contribution, and the suspicion that the indiscri- 
minate accumulation of power may have motivated some should not be'' 
overlooked. Yet it would be too cynical to dismiss the bulk of this 
activity on such grounds. 
If the allegedly negative impact of the Church cannot be traced 
along such specific channels as its useýof resources, perhaps, as 
Plunkett claimed, its inhibiting potential inheres in its doctrinal 
corpus. Thus attitudes and values unfavourable to economic enterprise 
may be transferred and internalised in the process of religious socia- 
lisation. This shifts the critical perspective towards, the angle 
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favoured by Weber and Tawney. 
34 The problem with this approach is 
almost wholly methodological; it is easy to forward plausible hypo- 
theses of this nature, but extremely difficult to test. them. 
35 The 
ongoing debate on the relationship between the Protestant Ethic and 
the emergence of Capitalism testifies to this difficulty. And as 
has been pointed out, a high degree of correlation between these two 
variables is open to a number of different and competing explanations. 
36 
One certainly cannot presume to offer a definitive statement in the 
Irish, case, but the-admittedly limited data available is not especially 
favourable to the classic sociological view. In the eighteenth cen- 
tury, despite legal and other limitations on Catholic enterprise, sub- 
stantial numbers of Catholic entrepreneurs emerged, and indeed-as that 
century closed Ireland had a reasonable claim to be considered a rela- 
tively developed country by European (but not English) standards. 
37 
Unless the economic implications of Catholic doctrine changed radi- 
cally in subsequent decades it is difficult to dismiss this sustained 
development as some kind of temporary aberration. A possible counter 
argument to this may be briefly noted. It is the case that the Irish 
Church gained a much firmer grip of its followers in the nineteenth 
century as its teachings were propagated in a more intensive and sys- 
tematic manner. 
38 Perhaps then Catholic norms, ` while not necessarily 
changing, were being taken more seriously by the mass of the people? 
As against this one must acknowledge that in the crucial post-Famine 
period the growth of piety was paralleled by a growing consumer con- 
sciousness, rising material expectations, and a ruthless commitment 
to land possession almost irrespective of the human costs imposed. 
Pious peasant and economic man merged easily into each other. This 
suggests the relative autonomy of the religious and the economic sphe- 
res, spill-over from the one to the other being limited. However, one 
Catholic norm - the absolute prohibition on forms of family limitation - 
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might be more plausibly linked to a low level of material welfare in 
Ireland. The remarkably large families, stemming from what Dr. Kelly, 
Bishop of Ross, liked to call the "exceptional purity of morals of 
39 
the Irish people" within marriage, might be seen as increasing the 
economically dependent proportion of the population and as straining 
the productive resources of the country. Some development economists 
have focused attention on these adverse demographic consequences; a 
leading practitioner has warned that "certain religious attitudes are 
opposed to deliberate family limitation and may result in overpopula- 
tion, famine and poverty. '/+0 The simple answer to this in the Irish 
case is, of course, that the people of nineteenth-century Ireland 
possessed neither the desire nor the techniques to practise family 
limitation. The Church, on this issue, led the Catholic population 
in the direction in which it was inclined to go in any case. 
Turning aside from Catholic to Protestant groups in Ireland it 
must be admitted that in the nineteenth century militant Protestan- 
tism and industrial progress appeared to be closely related in the 
north-eastern enclave which centered on Belfast, while the Irish eco- 
nomy as a whole went into secular decline. However, it is remarkable 
that some of the leading Ulster entrepreneurs of that century did not 
spring from the predominantly Protestant society of the north-east. 
Thus the "father of Belfast shipbuilding", William Ritchie was of 
Scottish origin, while two giants of that industry, G. W. Wolff and 
Edward Harland were also of non-Ulster stock. 
41 
More generally, the 
great contribution of immigrant groups - Huguenots, Quakers, Scots - 
to the development of the north-east must be recognised. 
42 
Clearly 
in the absence of a representative set of entrepreneurial biographies 
one can only form some crude impressions, but for the proponents'of 
the classic view there are some substantial problems to be explained 
43 
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To conclude: the purely economic functioning of the Irish Church 
represents an improbable line of argument in explaining the poor per- 
formance of the Irish economy in the nineteenth century. The impli- 
cations of Church revenue and expenditure patterns suggest, if any- 
thing, some impulse towards economic growth rather than retardation. 
Rather than seeking such a causal connection between the Church and 
the economy, it may indeed be more realistic, particularly in rela- 
tion to rural Ireland, to view the people's spending on metaphysical 
services as but one reflection of more deep seated elements in the 
social structure inimical to economic development. Local clerical 
participation in economic activities, at worst, emerges in a weakly 
positive light. That it does not assume a considerably stronger aura 
is in part due to its selectivity. Clerical activity of an economic 
nature is almost wholly concerned with rural economic development, 
and is indicative of a stream of agrarianism running through clerical 
thinking. This mood is conveyed by the Reverend T. A. Finlay, Jesuit 
priest and professor of political economy at University College, Dub- 
lin. 
41 "He believed it would be a sad day for this country if the 
multiplication of Belfasts should obscure the great truth that it was 
not in the manufactures, but in the fields of the country, that the 
real prosperity of the nation was to be sought. " There is no evidence 
however that these preferences materially influenced entrepreneurial 
decisions in the nineteenth century. In the typical case one presumes 
the businessman is sensitive to private rather than social costs and 
benefits. So while members of the clergy might be uneasy about the 
social consequences of industrialisation and urbanisation one would be 
very surprised indeed to find profit-motivated individuals neglecting 
investment opportunities on this basis. On a more nebulous though per- 
haps fundamental plane, it is difficult to assess the significance of 
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Catholic doctrine and associated norms for the supply of entrepreneur- 
ship. However in the absence of a convincing demonstration along 
these lines it seems more reasonable to regard the Catholic Church 
as making a positive, if modest contribution to the economy of nine- 
teenth century Ireland. 
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Chapter 7 
FARMING-INTERESTS, TRADERS, AND POLITICAL POWER 
In the final quarter of the nineteenth century political institutions 
were being recast in a form that brought them into a more sensitive relation- 
ship with the body of popular political feeling. The Ballot Act of 1872, 
while not initiating major political trends, at least lowered the cost 
of exercising voting rights in accordance with one's own preferences 
rather than those of the landlord or the priest. 
1 
As a result of the 
extension of the franchise in 1884, smaller property holders and labourers 
were involved for the first time in the process of returning members of 
parliament. Previously such elements were only allowed to register an 
impact on the political system by the use of considerably sturdier instru- 
ments than paper slips? With the fusion of parliamentary and agrarian 
struggles after 1879, a strong countrywide organisational base was grafted 
onto the structure of parliamentary representation in nationalist Ireland. 
Such a broadening of the political pyramid necessarily implied the services 
of an increased number of political figures at local level. The turn of 
the century saw a further diffusion of power through the Irish countryside 
as popular local government, county committees of agriculture and other 
administrative innovations were introduced. Thus, in an era of democratic 
reform when political opportunities were being opened up on a broad front, 
the issue of how the chief beneficiaries of these reforms responded assumes 
major significance. Did the middle and lower strata of Irish society - 
rural and town labourers, tenant farmers, traders/small businessmen - now 
come to enjoy political representation and power in rough proportion to 
their electoral strength? If not, can we go some way towards explaining 
deviations from this hypothesised norm? In the context of a radically 
changed political framework, is any light shed on relative levels of 
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politicisation as between identifiable socio-economic categories within 
the nationalist community? 
A comprehensive treatment of these and related issues is not attempted 
here. Such an undertaking, given the underdeveloped nature of this area 
of Irish historiography, would require a major research commitment. What 
is attempted is a more limited exploration, focusing in particular on 
rural Ireland and the exercise of political power by traders and farmers. 
TRADERS AND POLITICAL POWER 
A reasonably firm starting point is the set of calculations by 
Professor Chubb which indicates that shopkeepers, publicans and other 
(mainly small) businessmen were strongly overrepresented, relative to 
their numerical significance in the population, in the cabinets of the 
various Irish governments over the period 1922-1965.3 In fact they had 
succeeded in filling 20% of all cabinet posts since the inception of the 
4 
State. Similarly an analysis of the socio-economic status of a wider 
sample of politically active persons - public representatives at county, 
county borough, and parliamentary level in the mid 1960s - is also in line 
with these findings. Interestingly, farmers emerge as being underrepresented 
in political life, despite the strongly rural character of the country. 
For instance, they held just under 8% of ministerial posts in the first 
half century of independent rule. 
Can these results be extrapolated from 1922 backwards in time, 
thus indicating a continuity of experience between pre- and post- 
independence periods? O'Brien's examination of the social background 
of Irish parliamentary representatives in 1874 and 1880 is insuf- 
5 
ficiently detailed to be-helpful. And while Irish parliamentary 
groups cannot be conceived as self-subsisting entities, nonetheless at 
these points in time political representation bore a very distorted 
relationship to numerically significant groups in the population. In 
158 
terms of the present enquiry one would need to look at the lower levels 
of nationalist organisation to detect humbler influences. A somewhat 
similar analysis to that by O'Brien has been performed by Dr. Lyons on the 
Irish parliamentary party in the period 1892-1910. Using Lyons' data on 
the occupations of nationalist members in the five parliaments during the 
interval 1892-1910 inclusive, it emerges that on average 13% of the seats 
went to local merchants ("men owning shops in the country towns"). 
6 
This 
is practically the same as the combined share of farmers and tenant farmers, 
and is five times the share of tenant farmers alone, despite of course the 
numerical predominance of the last category. (A distinction between farmers 
and tenant farmers, based on economic status, is drawn by Lyons. Though 
the precise location of the dividing line is not indicated, a rough parti- 
tioning of the far from homogeneous farming category is useful. ) 
It is quite clear, then, that parliamentary representation of the 
tenant masses rested to a very considerable extent with outside groups. 
Though the stronger farmers constituted a solid nucleus, occupying on 
average 1070 of the nationalist seats, nonetheless the more interesting 
feature is perhaps their failure to achieve a dominant role in the representa- 
tion of the country electorate. By contrast, traders are considerably over- 
represented, and while this does not necessarily imply that the deficit in 
tenant representation was made up in part from this source, there is reason 
to suppose this was the case. Indeed, if we are prepared to accept the 
testimony of a diverse group of contemporaries, traders were even more 
strongly entrenched in political life below the parliamentary level, that 
is, in the organisational structures of the nationalist party and in local 
government. 
Thus, a disgruntled figure in the Home Rule movement and later historian 
of the Irish parliamentary party complained that the conventions of the 
United Irish League were made up of "half gombeen-men and half political 
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priests". 
8 
The pejorative term "gombeenman" was applied to local money- 
lenders or, more usually, retailers charging allegedly usurious interest 
rates on credit accounts. The claim of the writer T. W. Rolleston echoes 
this charge: parliamentary representation was controlled by the "small 
country publican and gombeenman". 
9 
Pioneers of agricultural co-operation 
in Ireland such as George Russell, Horace Plunkett, and R. A. Anderson 
frequently asserted that shopkeepers, publicans and other traders carried 
disproportionate weight in the nationalist movement. 
10 
From a different 
ideological position, the labour leader and marxist, James Connolly, in 
the course of a blistering attack on middlemen and dealers in the small 
country towns, speaks of these as "dominant influences in the councils 
of the local Home Rule or other constitutional national organisation". 
11 
Another writer comments in more moderate terms: 
12 
The members of the Irish party are closely connected with the 
class of country traders. The country traders are the chief men 
and the capitalists of their districts; they are strongly repre- 
sented in the local branches of the United Irish League; and they 
naturally exercise a considerable influence on the policy of the 
Irish party. 
These contemporary comments represent rough charcoal strokes on a 
plain historical canvas. Greater perspective and detail may be gained by 
superimposing on this a case'study drawn from the agricultural politics 
of the period. 
0 
AGRICULTURAL POLITICS 
In the quarter century prior to the Great War the history of agricul- 
tural co-operation is rich in instances of conflict between co-operators 
and farmers. Such antagonisms were not confined to the economic sphere 
where they originated but rather tended to spill over into the political 
arena. In fact, co-operators' interest in, and subsequent comments upon, 
the distribution of political power in Irish society derived directly from 
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their experience of traders' use of political weapons to contain or eliminate 
co-operative enterprise.. The Irish nationalist movement, particularly 
after the reunification of its major segments within the United Irish 
League in 1900, was generally hostile to the economic reforms embodied 
in the co-operative,. programme. This position rested-in part on the fear 
that greater prosperity (at least if attributable to a unionist adminis- 
tration13) might sap the desire for political autonomy; the fear that 
"comfort. and prosperity will make you less keen politicians, that - like 
a pack of hounds - you won't hunt unless you are kept hungry". 
14 
Apart 
from the matter of political strategy more mundane considerations guided 
nationalist politicians. Traders were no laggards in making representa- 
tions to political bodies when they felt their interests threatened. This 
may be illustrated by reference to a number of controversial debates that 
illumined the proceedings of the Council of Agriculture and the Board of 
Agriculture between 1905 and 1914. The Council, which consisted of 104 
members, acted as a forum for debate on matters relating to agriculture 
and technical education and had an advisory role in relation to policy- 
making. 
15 
It was conceived essentially as a communication channel between 
the Department and its clients, particularly those on the land. It is 
worth noting the, representative character of the Council; two out of every 
three of its members were elected by the various county councils, thus 
linking it to the recently democratised local government system. The much 
smaller Board of Agriculture consisted of 12 members, eight of which were 
elected by the Council of Agriculture, and it was this body which effectively 
supervised D. A. T. I. 's expenditure. 
We have seen in an earlier chapter that the I. A. O. S. was eventually 
forced to appeal to the Department of Agriculture for financial aid in 
promoting and supervising co-operative societies. When this request was 
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brought before a full meeting of the Board on the 25 January 1905, four 
members were in favour of taking the task of organising farmers away from 
the I. A. O. S. and reserving these powers for D. A. T. I. 
16 
One member stated 
bluntly that the I. A. O. S. should not be subsidised unless it abstained 
from undertaking any work liable to interfere with shopkeepers or private 
enterprise in general. A decision was deferred until the February meeting 
when a grant of £2,000 was conceded on the understanding that non- 
controversial forms of co-operation only would be supported. 
17 A year 
later the I. A. O. S., still in financial difficulties, sought a renewed 
grant of £3,700. The Board reluctantly acceded to this request; stringent 
controls were attached to the grant and the whole matter of subsidising 
co-operative organisation was referred to the Council of Agriculture. 
18 
After an inconclusive meeting in May the Council resumed its debate on 
the issue in November 1906. 
The critics of co-operation were first into the field with a motion 
stating that all work connected with agriculture should be carried out 
directly by the Department. It was "inadvisable to have further moneys 
expended through any irresponsible society" (the I. A. O. S. ), it claimed, in 
effect seeking to terminate the grant. 
19 
An amendment in favour of a con- 
tinuing subsidy from D. A. T. I. in the form of a pro rata contribution to 
top up co-operative societies' contributions to the I. A. O. S. was proposed 
by Colonel Nugent T. Everard and seconded by Fr. Finlay. The amendment 
was carried by what seems to be a comfortable margin, 52 votes as against 25, 
with a further 25 abstentions. 
20 
A look beneath the voting surface, however, 
reveals a more complicated pattern. Voting behaviour, classified according 
to whether votes for or against the amendment came from the elected or the 
nominated group on the Council, is set out in the form of a contingency 
table below. 
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Table 1. Actual pattern of votes, and the expected voting pattern* (figures 
in brackets) assuming no relationship between method of selection 
to the Council of Agriculture and voting behaviour. 
Elected members 
Nominated members 
PRO CON TOTAL 
28 (3511) 24 (16.9) 52 
24 (16.9) 1 (8.1) 25 
All members 52 25 77 
chi-square = 11.8 
Those who were indifferent on the issue of co-operation, one presumes, are 
scattered among the 25 members who abstained from voting, though conflicting 
ties is an equally probable reason for abstentions. A vote in favour of 
the amendment is interpreted as indicating a favourable attitude to co- 
operation and a vote against as indicative of an unfavourable view. These 
seem to be realistic inferences but the voting totals of 52 and 25 should 
not be taken as precise measures of the relative strength of proponents and 
opponents of co-operation on the Council. Some members, though favourably 
disposed, may have recoiled at the notion of a state subsidy for co-operative 
organisation, while others, ignoring the paradox, may have felt that a state 
department such as D. A. T. I. should have sole responsibility for the formation 
of self-help groups. Others still may have felt there were more pressing 
priorities for D. A. T. I. 's funds. Two factors, however, greatly reduce the 
strength of these arguments. Firstly, there was a strand of informed thinking 
on agricultural development, stretching back to the Recess Committee, that 
recognised the value of independently organised farmers, in particular 
noting the greater receptivity of such groups to technical change. Thus, 
21 
even within the limited terms of reference of a state department of agriculture 
* The method of calculating expected values is explained in most standard 
statistics books. 
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the indirect financing of co-operative organisation could be justified in 
strict cost-effectiveness terms. Secondly, the actual subsidy was quite 
slight in the context of the overall budget of D. A. T. I.; the lengthy debates 
and the heat generated bear little relation to the sliver of expenditure 
involved. 
22 
Though our impression of the configuration of attitudes on co-operation 
must be. necessarily more blurred than that conveyed in Table 1, a number of 
points are abundantly clear. But for the solid voting of the phalanx of 
nominated members, mainly Plunkett's nominees, the outcome would have been 
much closer. But it is the elected representatives who really concern'us 
here, as it is the behaviour of this group that offers clues as to the 
popular political forces at work. The elected members of the Council were 
not nearly so enthusiastic about renewal of the I. A. O. S. grant. Thus, if 
attitude to the issue was truly independent of the method of selection, one 
would have expected 25% more voters in favour of the grant from the elected 
group and a considerably smaller number in opposition. 
23 
So even at this 
stage many of the county council representatives were prepared to defy the 
officially endorsed lines of thought emanating from D. A. T. I. and the vice- 
president's office. On the face of it, many members of the "farmers' 
parliament" seem to have acquired a rather circumspect view, if not an 
actual squint, in relation to what constituted farmers' interests. 
With the removal of Plunkett from the office of vice-president of 
D. A. T. I. early in 1907 it soon became clear that a bleak era was opening 
up for relations between D. A. T. I. and the I. A. O. S. The new vice-president, 
T. W. Russell, in the course of his inaugural address to the Council of 
Agriculture, stated that a delegation of traders had made representations 
to him before the meeting, protesting against the state subsidy for co- 
operative organisation. 
24 
Accepting the traders' complaints in full, 
Russell roundly attacked the idea of co-operators setting up stores in 
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competition with traders. 
25 
The subsidy had to be discontinued. Though 
the main charge that'state money was being used to promote co-operative 
26 
shops was unfounded, the-Council of Agriculture recommended that the 
subsidy be phased out over a period of three years. As many as one'ýthird 
of the members'were in favour of immediate withdrawal though the former, 
course of action was the-one proposed by Russell. 
27 
It is, perhaps, -worth emphasising that the I. A. O. S. 'had never promoted 
co-operative stores; in the words of one observer it could not afford "to 
excite'the hostility of the trading classes". 
28 
In the pre-I. A. O. S. days 
Plunkett and Anderson had indeed sought to interest farmers and'others in 
such societies. However, they had soon become acutely aware of formidable 
barriers in their way. Part of the 1892 report from the Irish Section of 
29 
the (British) Co-operative Union is worth recalling: 
owing to the influence of the village shopkeepers in most places over 
the farmers and labourers, the spread of distributive co-operation 
must needs be slow; but having educated the people by showing them 
the advantages of co-operative production, we believe the starting 
of stores to be only a question of time. We hold to our firm opinion 
that it would be extremely unwise and dangerous to the success of our 
dairying movement to force distribution upon the Irish people for the 
present. 
The decision taken in 1907 to phase out gradually the I. A. O. S. grant 
was rescinded the following year. In the wake of a public controversy 
centering on allegations of I. A. O. S. hostility to the nationalist party and 
counter allegations of trader dominance in the nationalist organisation, the 
subsidy was abruptly terminated. 
30 Not until the foundation of the Free 
State did the I. A. O. S. again receive aid from a department of agriculture. 
31 
In 1910 the I. A. O. S., having lurched from one financial crisis to 
another, perceived an opportunity of securing funds for the movement. A 
government-sponsored body known as the Development Commissioners had been 
recently set up to channel aid to agriculture for development purposes. In 
January 1911 an application for a grant of £6,612 out of the Commission's 
funds was forwarded to the Treasury. 
32 
The I. A. O. S. application was referred 
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to D. A. T. I. where T. W. Russell held it over until a meeting of the Council 
of Agriculture the following November. Irish co-operators' patience during 
this ten-month delay was hardly improved by the knowledge that, in the 
meantime, sister organisations, the English Agricultural Organisation Society 
and the Agricultural Organisation Society of Scotland, had received interim 
grants from the Commissioners. 
33 
At the meeting of the Council of Agriculture, Russell devoted his 
address to a long attack on the co-operative movement. 
34 
He warned his 
listeners: "The Development Commissioners may very easily, and with the 
best intentions, land us in very serious difficulties with the traders of 
the country. " Accusing the I. A. O. S. of being "in effect a gigantic trading 
body" he claimed that concession of the grant would imply "a cruel war upon 
the traders and shopkeepers of the country". Any funds available for Irish 
agriculture should be given to D. A. T. I. which would draw up its own scheme 
of non-controversial co-operation, this being defined as "every form of 
co-operation which does not bring us into direct competition and conflict 
with the ordinary traders of the country". Whether such a pure form of 
co-operation ever existed was not the subject of detailed discussion (a 
few years later it was unkindly suggested that lime-burning societies, of 
whichthere were two in 1915, exhausted the official category of non- 
controversial co-operatives). 
35 
Before concluding his speech, Russell humbly 
noted: "I have probably done more for the Irish farmer than the whole of 
the I. A. O. S. put together. " In view of these services to Irish agriculture 
it is hardly surprising that the Council were happy to reward him with the 
decision he sought. 
36 
Russell was not the only one, however, who had put some forethought 
into the matter of blocking the I. A. O. S. grant application. Denis Johnston, 
secretary of the United Irish League, had circularised the Council members 
in advance, charging the I. A. O. S. with ulterior political motives. 
37 
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Following the successful outcome of the meeting, he now wrote to a Dublin 
evening paper stating-that he and others had realised that the co-operative 
movement sought toýcrush their most loyal and faithful friends among the 
shopkeepers of Ireland. 
38, He also released a letter from a Macroom trader 
thanking him, for his exertions on the grant issue. It read: 
39 
Of the many services you have rendered in your time to the Irish 
people none could have been better than the active part you took 
in knocking. out'the grant to the I. A. O. S. We will be sending on 
a large subscription to the Parliamentary Fund from here soon. Who 
arerthe largest subscribers? Why, the shopkeepers of course, who, 
as you know, have always been the backbone of nationality in Ireland. 
George Russell (A. E. ) issued a prompt diagnosis in the Irish Homestead: if 
the Macroom trader represented the backbone of nationality then it must be 
diseased in its spinal column. 
40 
Eventually, though after a delay of more 
than two years im.: äil, the Development Commissioners rejected D. A. T. I. 's 
programme of non-controversial co-operation and made a direct grant (renewed 
in the following years) to the I. A. O. S. 
41 
This was made subject to the 
strict provision that the I. A. O. S. confined itself solely to agricultural 
business. 
42 
What light do these tangled episodes shed on the distribution of 
political power in Irish society? Without seeking to minimise the role 
of personality factors, political paranoia, and genuine disagreement on 
the legitimate spheres of state and voluntary action, it does seem that 
traders were especially alert, relative to farming groups, at mobilising 
political resources on their own behalf. Thus, even in the realm of agricul- 
tural politics where one might reasonably expect farming groups to be well 
entrenched, it is remarkable that the views of traders are not only articu- 
lated with vigour (both within and outside formal structures) but actually 
prevail. 
43 
This observation is given added point by recalling that numeri- 
cally speaking trading groups were insignificant relative to the farming 
population as a whole. 
44 
If political outcomes were simply a function of 
relative electoral strength then traders would have no hope of imposing 
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their views where a. conflict of-interests threatened. Even if one assumes 
large numbers of farmers were indifferent on the issue of co-operation, this 
result-would still. follow from such ,a crude model of the political process. 
It is, of course, quite, possible, even probable, that whatever the extent of 
farmer representation within the Council of Agriculture small and medium 
sized farmers were-weakly-represented (essentially reflecting Lyons' findings 
45 
in the parliamentary sphere). This would have adverse consequences for 
the expression'of views favourable to co-operation. Co-operative societies 
were much more-strongly associated with farming structures characterised by 
medium rather than large farms; large farmers had less need of group services. 
(These-features-are reflected in the spread of co-operatives; the large 
pastoral farms of the east of Ireland nourished comparatively few such' 
societies. 
46) 
Nonetheless, however much one seeks to dilute the evidence, 
the clear impression remains of either a: disproportionate weight of traders 
within the Council of Agriculture 
47 
or vigorous interest group activity 
outside. it, or more probably both. Weak political involvement on the part 
of the bulk of farmers and labourers is also suggested. 
These inferences are further strengthened by the consideration of 
lower levels of agricultural decision-making. A priori one might have 
little reason to expect trader representation on the county committees of 
agriculture. However, in 1906 one'finds the Gorey District Council passing 
the following resolution: 
48 
That it is the opinion of this Council that the efficiency of the 
County Committee of Agriculture and Technical Instruction would be 
increased by-appointing practical farmers on the committee instead 
of traders, who are at present appointed .... (emphasis added). 
If one looks at how appointments to the committees of agriculture 
were made, a strong trader presence is, perhaps, not so surprising. Members 
of these-committees (as indeed was the case for the Council of Agriculture) 
were selected by county councillors, normally drawing from within their own 
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ranks. 
49 
That traders were disproportionately represented on county councils 
was frequently asserted; 
50 
tracing the seam of trader representation running 
from ancillary structures such as the Council of Agriculture and the county 
committees back to its source in the county councils tends to confirm these 
views. 
A final layer of evidence, referring to a somewhat earlier period in 
time, is supplied by Clark's analysis of the social composition of the Land 
League. ' 
51 
Traders, among others, were found to play a disproportionate role 
in organising and giving direction to the final onslaught on the landlord 
and tenant system in Ireland. Political alertness and trader political 
prominence, it would seem, date from at least 1880 onwards. 
52 
These findings, taken in conjunction with a number of revealing 
episodes in the agricultural politics of the time and allied to the impres- 
sionistic views of a range of contemporaries, 
53 
strongly suggest a continuity 
of certain political trends - inverse relationships between representation 
and electoral strength in the cases of agriculturalists and traders - from 
the late nineteenth into twentieth century Irish politics. 
Before concluding this section a note of caution in relation to regional 
differences should be added. In the two decades before independence it is 
not assumed that the general picture of an overrepresentation of traders and 
an underrepresentation of agriculturalists in the political system applies 
uniformly across the country. 
54 
Only regional and local studies will allow 
us to refine such propositions still further, but it may be very tentatively 
suggested that these generalisations are least applicable to regions 
dominated by extensive farm holdings such as parts of eastern Ireland. 
Indeed, in this respect it is as well to bear in mind that Clark's findings 
are derived from the study of a historical episode strongly associated with 
the western half of Ireland. 
169 
DEBT BONDAGE 
If one accepts the foregoing analysis then an obvious question arises. 
How does one explain this situation? The answer, unfortunately, is less 
than obvious, and the tentative explanatory sketch attempted here owes more 
to reluctance to bypass a tantalising issue than a simple confidence in the 
props supporting our argument. However, before searching around for some 
rudimentary building materials, a destructive role is assumed; the not 
unpleasant task of first clearing the ground of competing explanations can 
be approached with greater confidence. 
The Home Ruler, F. H. O'Donnell, having condescended to look into the 
mechanics of low politics, charged that countrymen, locked into a system 
of debt to local shopkeepers, thereby lost both political and commercial 
independence, 
55 
They lose all'power of choice, all right of remonstrance, and all 
liberty of action, so long as they are in debt to the gombeen-man. 
Nobody who wants to be anything elective can speak with too much 
respect of the gombeen-man. He is the curse and the vampire of the 
countryside. He is the most respectable man in the community, if 
he be vampire enough .... About 25 per cent of the keepers of drinking establishments, groceries, general stores, etc., are 
gombeen-men or are trying to be gombeen-men .... A country fellow 
who has run up a bill for a couple of pounds, which he cannot pay at 
once, has got the hook in his jaw. He will never get loose .... 
All the Parliamentarians from Ireland have dozens of gombeen-men 
among their leading supporters. 
This theme - the accumulation of political power through the manipulation 
of ties based on what is described as debt bondage - has been taken up and 
developed by two recent writers. 
56 
Stripped of the rhetoric, however, the 
threadbare quality of such interpretations is readily apparent. 
The prominence of traders as local spokesmen and organisers in the 
Land League agitation has been previously noted. It is to strain one's 
credulity overmuch to suggest that politically active traders (although 
they were ultimately indirect beneficiaries of the rent reductions achieved) 
exploited what economic power they had to ensure their emergence in the 
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forefront of local agitations, the probable rewards of which were none too 
clear then, while the sanctions of the law were plainly visible and visited 
not a few of them. 
More fundamental weaknesses in the theory of debt bondage emerge when 
one considers the probable effectiveness of such coercive strategies in 
terms of electoral success. Some necessary conditions for the exercise of 
effective control would seem to be- an extensive area serviced largely by 
the trader-politician or in conjunction with reliable henchmen (otherwise 
tied voters would be too few to affect the voting outcome); the ability to 
regulate this significant proportion of the total electorate through manipu- 
lation of economic ties; and uncompetitive conditions in local markets such 
that bonds could not be easily dissolved. The purpose served by making 
explicit these propositions is to reveal their implausibility. As will be 
demonstrated in a later chapter, economic aspects of credit retailing were 
frequently misconstrued by contemporary critics while trading conditions 
over most of the country were strongly competitive at the end of the nine- 
teenth century. In addition, electoral reforms had increased enormously 
the cost of coercive strategies. One has to go back before the Irish reform 
act of 1850 to find conditions for the effective monopolisation of political 
resources on a major scale. 
57 
This being the case, the issue of inflated 
trader representation or other manifestations of trader power cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by reference to the crude economic mechanisms 
postulated (though in some quite exceptional areas the factor of economic 
dependence may hold some explanatory weight). And, even in reported cases 
of political abuses based on economic power, it is necessary to distinguish 
carefully between attempted manipulation of economic ties to generate a 
political base and actual success in such endeavours. A local election in 
a remote part of Donegal early in the present century is a case in point. 
There, a coalition of traders failed to return its nominee despite resorting 
SS 
to some unsavoury tactics, including economic intimidation. 
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SOME BASES FOR POLITICAL POWER 
Having rejected the theory of debt bondage (an explanation, incidentally, 
which faces severe difficulties in trying to cope with the continuing promi- 
nence of traders in public life for more than a half century after the agri- 
cultural depression) some strands in an alternative explanation may be 
developed. Two features, the strategic location of traders in the social 
structure and the associated consciousness, may tend to sharpen leadership 
aspirations and the perception of appropriate opportunities. Shops and 
bars are frequently focal points, in spatial and social terms, for life 
in the countryside. Typically the local trader is enmeshed in a variety 
of relationships of a social (including kinship) and commercial kind. To 
this extent he/she is closely involved in a traditional and intensely local 
context. However, a necessary implication of the occupational role is 
mediation of exchanges between the base of society and higher levels. In 
other words the trader is also engaged in wider relationships, mainly of 
a commercial character, which extend vertically upwards through the society. 
The trader -a Janus-faced figure - is both immersed in, and transcends, 
his/her immediate setting. This position would appear to confer considerable 
advantage in terms of broader horizons and perception of opportunities on 
the one hand, 
59 
and the ability (stemming from a high level of social inter- 
action) to mobilise local support on the other. Quite probably also, the 
work rhythm is such as to permit intermittent absence on political duties. 
By contrast the tillers of the soil, though numerous in the aggregate, 
experienced severe disadvantages - dispersed over the land surface; caught 
in the comparative isolation of the farm holding; fenced into rigid daily 
and seasonal work routines. 
60 
While the more substantial traders pushed 
through the ceiling of local community life, in the case of the ordinary 
countryman, the family, kinfolk, the land, absorbed his most passionate 
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energies. Sustained'involvement in the affairs of the "outside" world 
fitted less than easily into the framework of farming or peasant aspirations. 
61 
In terms of this emphasis, the accumulation of power by traders is 
not simply a function of the special characteristics of that particular 
social category but is also related to the political weaknesses of competing 
groups. In strongly rural societies, for instance, it is quite usual to 
t( 
encounter rigid, tradition-encrusted power relationships that have their 
basis in steep inequalities in land ownership. 
62 
In Ireland, however, the 
t 
political hegemony of the landed gentry was first challenged in the parlia- 
mentary field and later trampled underfoot following the parliamentary and 
local government reforms of the late nineteenth century. 
63 
For national 
and religious reasons sources of leadership had increasingly to be found 
below the level of the self-proclaimed "natural leaders". Roman Catholic 
clergymen are obvious centres of political power, but it must be remembered 
also that much of this was exercised indirectly. For instance, priests 
were disallowed from competing for places on local councils. 
64 
At a more 
exalted level - priests did not darken the doors of the House of Commons. 
Traders, as well as other social categories such as professional people 
(lawyers in particular), are obvious beneficiaries of these blocks to 
clerical participation. 
The central theme of this chapter is the unequal distribution of 
political power in rural Ireland (markedly unequal in practice despite a 
radical restructuring of electoral rights that in theory allowed equality 
of access to a broad range of political positions). The evidence assembled 
strongly suggests that trading interests were overrepresented at various 
levels of representative decision-making, while agriculturalists were 
underrepresented. It is not unreasonable to suspect a relationship between 
these two phenomena. Because social and economic ties linked villages and 
towns to their hinterlands one does not get a steep shading away of social 
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contact and mutual understanding at the interface between town and country. 
65 
The world of the shop and the world of the farm intersect. Some traders 
rooted themselves more solidly in the countryside by also engaging in part- 
time farming. 
66 
These considerations, fortified in some areas by the 
superior status accorded traders by the farming community, 
67 
suggest that 
in the eyes of the countryman there was nothing unnatural in the involvement 
of traders in agrarian agitations or their prominence as political 
representatives. 
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nor frequently deflected from a chosen political pathway. On the 
electoral influence of the Roman Catholic clergy see Whyte, 'The 
Influence of the Catholic Clergy on Elections in Nineteenth-Century 
Ireland', 247-248. 
58 P. Gallagher, Paddy the Cope: My Story (Tralee, n. d. ), pp 102-103. 
Economic intimidation could, of course, also be used in the reverse 
direction, that is, customers coercing traders because of their 
political views. See J. S. Donnelly, The Land and the People of 
Nineteenth-Century Cork: The Rural Economy and the Land Question 
(London, 1975), p 328; Hoppen, op cit pp 89-90. It seems probable 
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that over much of Ireland, the trader rather than his customers was 
the more vulnerable party if divisive political passions flared up. 
59 It has also been suggested, rightly in my view, that political com- 
munication channels in Ireland are more highly developed in urban as 
opposed to rural settings - an institutional feature that would tend 
to favour participation by traders in public life. See Al Cohan, 
The Irish Political Elite, p 28. 
60 Berger, in her sensitive study of the Brittany peasantry, observes 
that the "seamless workday" of traditional agriculture inhibits 
regular participation in political and vocational organisations. 
See S. Berger, Peasants against Politics: Rural Organisation in 
Brittany 1911-1967 (Cambridge, '. . 
1972), p 86. 
61 While it is the case historically that low levels of education have 
been embodied in the rural labour force, thus constituting a further 
block to the assumption of political roles, it is not clear if in 
pre-independence Ireland other social categories such as rural and 
town traders enjoyed a comparative advantage on this score. One 
might surmise though that access to educational insitiutions was 
easier in the urban situation. 
62 It is interesting, therefore, to find a clerical spokesman acknowledg- 
ing that in other countries the landed gentry are the natural leaders 
of the people and justifying the priest's political role in Ireland 
by reference to the unacceptability, on religious and national 
grounds, of the landed ascendancy at home. Rev Dr Healy (Bishop of 
Clonfert), 'The Priest in Politics', Record of the Maynooth Union, 
1896-1897 (Dublin, 1897), p 16. 
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63 By contrast, the reform of local government in England was not 
attended by such radical changes. The forebodings of the gentry that 
power would pass to the "farmer and shopkeeper or tradesman" at the 
expense of the local squire were not realised. See J. P. D. Dunbabin 
'Expectations of the New County Councils, and their Realisation', 
Historical Journal, VIII (1965), 353-379. 
64 "A person being in holy orders or being a regular minister of any 
religious denomination shall not be eligible as a county or district 
councillor". Local Government (Ireland) Act 1898,61 and 62 Vict. 
94 (1). (This exclusion clause evinced a bitter reaction from the 
Professor of Irish at Maynooth College, Dr Hickey; see Record of the 
Maynooth Union 1897-1898 (Dublin, 1898), p 30. ) 
65 These issues are discussed in a later chapter. 
66 Of those combining other occupations with farming in 1901,2,362 
or roughly a quarter of those so classified were shopkeepers or 
publicans. Census of Ireland 1901: General Report, p 131. Very 
probably an even, greater. number of those whose main occupation was 
given as trading also had some farming interests, ranging from the 
'little bit of land' to considerable farm holdings. 
67 The point is illustrated by George Russell. A quarter of a century 
ago it was the country shopkeeper who furnished most technical advice 
. 
(and not a little misinformation) on agricultural inputs: "Leaning 
across his counter, he would discuss all things rural with the 
omniscience of one who takes in the daily paper. " Irish Homestead, 
27 March 1909. 
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APPENDIX 
It is claimed that there is a negative association between affluent 
farming areas and co-operative development. This may be demonstrated by 
relating the average valuation of a farm holding in each of the 32 counties 
to the number of co-operatives in these counties in the year 1914. Data 
on these variables is derived from the Census of Ireland 1911: General 
Report, p 436 and the I. A. O. S. 's annual report for 1914. As it is assumed 
that the relationship is non-linear, natural logarithms of our values for 
farm valuations are taken. The postulated relationship is: 
(i) C=a-b log V 
where C= number of co-operatives (creamery + agricultural + credit 
societies) per county, * and V= average rateable valuation of farm holdings 
in a county. 
The result islas predicted (standard error in brackets): 
(ii) C= 92.3 - 22.8 log V 
(6.9) 
R2 R= 0"27 
n= 32 
As a further check it was also decided to regress the number of 
agricultural co-operative societies (A) on farm value. This was because 
it was felt that agricultural societies potentially referred to most, if 
not all, farming areas. Co-operatives such as creameries, for instance, 
were more specific to particular farming patterns and regional contexts. 
The result is again in line with our prior reasoning and equation (ii). 
(iii) A= 26.6 - 6.6 log V 
(2.4) 
R2 R= 0"20 
n= 32 
* In a more refined test C might be expressed in terms of co-operatives 
per square mile in each county (or some similar type density unit). it 
is unlikely though that the broad conclusions would be affected. 
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The interpretation of the findings taken here is that co-operative 
societies are weakly associated with affluent farming areas because the 
type of group innovations potentially available were unlikely to confer 
appreciable benefits on stronger farmers. At the other end of the farming 
scale, it is probable that those on very small, poor quality holdings also 
derived little benefit from co-operative societies. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RETAIL MARKETS IN RURAL IRELAND 
"A vast majority of the country population of Ireland are extremely 
poor in the sense that their earnings are insufficient. " So declared 
Horace Plunkett, then on the threshold of a tempestuous public career, 
in 1888. "But their case is made far worse", he continued, "by the 
fact that they are not able to obtain a fair exchange in commodities 
for what money they expend. "1 Indeed according to his colleague, 
R. A. Anderson, in 1935: "Ireland has always suffered from a plague of small 
shopkeepers. "2 Here Anderson was merely restating a claim he had 
vigorously upheld since at least the last decade of the nineteenth century. 
These brief extracts, apart from their intrinsic interest, point up a 
basic historiographical difficulty: a consideration of marketing and 
supply chains in rural Ireland quickly tends to accumulate ideological 
as well as economic content. While the historical significance of both 
sets of issues is not questioned, the emphasis is here directed towards 
the economic aspects. However, separating out the normative and positive 
elements of the analysis poses severe problems. By using a theoretical 
framework that makes explicit its value presuppositions it is hoped to 
minimise tendencies towards tendentious argument. 
Evaluating the performance of the retailing system is an essentially 
normative exercise. The criteria deemed appropriate in forming such an 
appraisal spring from value judgments; the procedure of testing empirical 
evidence against these criteria is, of course, positive. In the study 
of market-performance, a theoretical'orientation that has attained a 
wide measure of acceptance is that of "workable competition". Pioneered 
originally by J. M. Clark it was subsequently developed by other writers. 
3 
It may be seen in part as a response to the severe criticisms from the 
early 1930's onwards of the traditional theory of the firm and of perfect 
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competition. In essence, the argument was that perfect competition repre- 
sented an unrealistic norm for the comparative study of market performance. 
4 
Given the standard Paretian welfare judgments it had been shown that social 
welfare is maximised in an economy characterised by perfectly competitive 
factor and product markets (with no externalities). However, there was 
(and is) a basic obstacle to transferring this notion of an optimum from the 
theoretical to the practical plane. While the stream of economic consequences 
arising from the competitive model was generally accepted as desirable - the 
Paretian ethical assumptions commanding a broad measure of assent - there 
persisted the difficulty that all the necessary conditions for such an opti- 
mum are never realised in practice. 
Contrary to initial impressions, however, this theoretical "empty 
box" is not without utility. It places inquiries into market performance 
very definitely in a welfare setting; maximising social welfare is explicitly 
the ultimate objective. Market mechanisms and their functioning are 
important primarily in terms of how they contribute to this goal. Clark, 
while arguing the existence of market imperfections, accepted that this 
did not rule out the possibility of widespread competition even where 
the market structure had the apparent characteristics of being monopolistic 
or oligopolistic. The crucial consideration was not market structure, 
but market performance, as evaluated by reference to certain standards 
which were realisable in the real world. It may be noted that this prag- 
matic approach to the notion of an optimum bears a strong hereditary 
relationship to that of perfect competition. 
5 Thus, in a workably 
competitive market it is suggested that the main benefits accruing from 
competitive behaviour are secured for the community. The discretion of 
individual firms with respect to pricing and output decisions is contained 
within narrow limits. Competitive pressures from rival firms, whether 
existing firms or potential entrants, tend automatically to enforce desirable 
patterns of conduct - assuming always that socially beneficial results 
do stem from a competitive economic environment. 
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Having established these value premises, it is now necessary to 
attempt to identify those factors which largely determine whether a 
market is workably competitive or not. Various criteria have been 
suggested by reference to which the assessment may be made. Sosnick 
enumerates twelve variables which may reasonably be taken to have a 
direct impact on welfare. 
6 
Those variables considered most salient in 
terms of the present study have been adopted from the above source, and 
have been ranked in descending order of importance as follows: (a) 
exchange efficiency; (b) technological progressiveness; (c) product 
suitability and participant rationality; (d) unethical practices; 
(e) profit levels. It should be pointed out in advance that empirical 
evidence relating directly to these criteria is not abundant, and of 
course when distributed among the different heads appears even less so. 
However, the various strands form a structure which is more robust than 
the sum of the individual parts. 
PROFIT LEVELS 
The most difficult and controversial area of interpretation is 
probably that of profit levels. Indeed, it has a low ranking as an 
index in part because of problems in the evidence: data is scarce and 
it is not easy to determine what degree of confidence can be placed in 
the limited information available. And profit levels are not unambiguous 
indicators of market performance: large profits may stem from monopo- 
listic or oligopolistic market situations especially if combined with 
effective barriers to the entry of new firms; alternatively they may 
accrue to an innovator in a changing market situation and herald long- 
term gains to the community. On the other hand, tight profit margins 
may indicate vigorous competition, or by contrast resource misallocation 
in the form of excess investment in an industry. Thus, considerable 
care must be taken 1n interpreting profit levels; yet it is clear that 
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taken in conjunction with other considerations they provide meaning- 
full pointers. 
Taking the itinerant vendors who travelled widely through the 
poorer rural areas in the early. 1890's, it is unlikely that their 
charges were excessive when all costs are considered. In addition to 
providing some mild competitive pressure this declining form of trading 
was socially beneficial in so far as it gave employment to some who 
could not easily participate in alternative economic activity - women, 
sometimes single or widowed, Jews and even some disabled. 
7 
However, 
some severe criticisms of itinerant vendors were also made but these 
relate more to their role in marketing farm produce such as eggs than 
to the performance of their retailing function. 
What of traders with fixed premises? The first secretary of the 
Congested Districts Board (C. D. B. ) noted that in the west shopkeepers 
were among the few groups such as clergymen and doctors not pushed 
down to the low standard of living of the mass of the people. 
8 
The 
testimony of another member of the C. D. B., Mr. Walker C. B., is interest- 
ing. He appears to accept that some shopkeepers made substantial fortunes 
in the west of Ireland, but justified these in terms of the important 
economic functions performed. 
9 
A massive volume of confidential reports, 
compiled by inspectors of the C. D. B. on social conditions in 84 districts 
in the west of Ireland, is a major source of information on rural retail- 
ing. Although not explicitly concerned with the issue, a few of the 
inspectors provide evidence which implies a superior economic status 
among traders in some districts. 
10 
In prosperous areas of Ireland economic differentiation between 
smaller traders and farmers was probably less marked, or non-existent. 
Horace Plunkett did not charge the small traders with making excess 
profits, but rather with incompetence and inefficiency which necessitated 
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higher charges. 
11 
His fellow-worker, R. A. Anderson, was inclined to 
take a harsher view, denouncing the village shopkeepers as the overlords 
of the farming community. 
12 
Some further accounts alleging over-remuneration 
of traders relative to the functions they performed may be noted. 
l3 
Contrary viewpoints come naturally enough from spokesmen for trading 
interests and also from the editorial columns of many local and national 
14 
newspapers. 
Fortunately, in view of such conflicting testimony, some quantita- 
tive data are available in roughly sixty of the Inspectors' Reports. 
This information relates to interest charges on retail credit transactions. 
It is summarised in Table I, and this should be viewed as providing 
an approximate picture rather than firm statistical outlines. In 9 
of the remaining districts for which no precise information is given 
the prevailing interest rates are described rather vaguely as low or 
moderate. 
TABLE I 
Interest rates (per annum) charged by traders on credit 
accounts, and their associated frequencies 
0-5% 5-10% 10-15% 15-20% 20-25% 25%+ 
6 14 17 9 6 6 
Total no. of cases 58 
Note: Co-operative societies lending rates were 5-6% per annum 
(roughly similar to bank lending rates). Horace Plunkett 
Foundation, Agricultural Co-operation in Ireland (London, 
1931), p. 374. 
A number of qualifications are, however, in order. Information 
on interest charges is sometimes expressed in terms of a charge on 
large expenditures such as bags of meal or clothes. Thus, the average 
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interest rate over a range of goods (suitably weighted) may not coin- 
cide with the estimate given for a particular district. This is not 
too serious, however, since the information on credit charges is 
sometimes given as a range of values, and in any case in reproducing 
the evidence (in Table I) deliberately wide intervals have been chosen. 
Two factors bias the estimates downwards. Because regular repayments 
on credit purchases were made in some districts the effective rate of 
interest was higher than that reported. It is not clear, however, how 
widespread the practice of paying regular instalments was. Secondly, 
where very low or no interest charges were claimed, the inspectors 
themselves occasionally registered their suspicions. 
15 
Plunkett claimed, 
in reference to the poorer groups who bought on credit in the east of 
Ireland, that while no direct interest was charged on unpaid accounts 
"no usury could exceed the interest indirectly charged". It seems 
quite probable that in some of those cases of low interest charges in 
Table I the current price charged had a credit element built into it. 
It is clear from Table I that interest charges by traders considerably 
exceeded those of commercial banks and credit societies. The chief 
difficulty in making a normative assessment of these divergences springs 
from our uncertainty regarding the relative degrees of risk involved, 
and the consequent incidence of bad debts. In the case of the banks, 
they could achieve economies through their ability to spread risk over 
a countrywide trading area. By being selective in their choice of 
clients and by restricting their operations in the poorer, more remote 
districts, banks could also hold down the cost of loans. In addition 
they normally demanded securities from two other creditworthy individuals 
for even the smallest loans, a procedure which imposed further costs 
on the borrower. 
16 
Thus, the bank lending rate is an underestimate of 
the true cost of bank borrowing particularly to the smaller borrower. 
Certainly the local trader was a more convenient änd accessible source 
192 
of credit in many districts. These qualifications, however, do not 
apply readily to local credit co-operatives who would appear to have 
faced fairly similar trading conditions and the same problems of inability 
to spread risks. While they may have been able to enforce slightly 
greater selectivity in the clients they admitted nonetheless the interest- 
rate savings introduced by co-operatives are important. 
17 
How reliable was the rural debtor? A number of Inspectors' Reports 
draw attention to tardiness in clearing debts. 
18 
The later experience 
of the C. D. B. in its activity of making loans available to rural credit 
societies suggests that the rural community was quite reliable in its 
credit dealings. The experience of the co-operative credit movement, 
as a whole, is similar, but a tendency to delay repayments is evident. 
Smith-Gordon and Staples comment that while farmers and labourers rarely 
defaulted, punctuality in repaying was sometimes lacking, 
19 
a situation 
to be anticipated where incomes fluctuated considerably from season to 
season. Walker in evidence before the Departmental Committee on 
Agricultural Credit describes debtors as "marvellously honest". 
20 A 
member of the Select Committee, on Money Lending, Mr. Ascroft, commenting 
on the experience of the commercial banks, claims that "notwithstanding 
the hundreds and thousands of loans that these banks make to the peasant 
occupiers per year, it is very seldom that they have to take proceedings 
to recover the loans. "21 Overall then, it would appear that very high 
rates of interest could not be justified in terms of the risk involved, 
and that some traders were exacting pure profits in the operation of 
credit services. If one makes the arbitrary decision that only interest 
charges of 15% or less were satisfactory, then the provision of credit 
services in parts of the following counties - Donegal, Leitrim, Mayo, 
Roscommon and Galway - was unsatisfactory in that it sometimes exceeded 
this limit. (This cut-off point refers only to average interest rates 
over a local trading area; the competitive price of credit for particular 
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high risk clients would of course be higher. ) It would be rash to 
presume that excessive rates were unknown in other parts of Ireland, 
22 
but the major problem was concentrated in the north-west and the mid- 
west counties. This regional variation deserves emphasis. If one makes 
the reasonable assumption - one also made by contemporaries 
23 
- that 
high interest charges were most pronounced in the poorer isolated areas 
(such as the congested districts) then it follows that trader credit 
cost less over much of the rest of the country. Credit problems in the 
west would seem to have stemmed in part from the failure of orthodox 
banking institutions to adapt themselves to the particular circumstances 
of these relatively isolated, low-income areas. This point has class, 
as well as spatial relevance. The reluctance of banks to make credit 
facilities available to labourers and small farmers forced these back 
onto other sources of credit. 
24 
Increasing the cost of bank borrowing 
would, paradoxically, have helped remedy these deficiencies. The usual 
practice of charging a low uniform rate for private loans could only be 
sustained on the basis of being quite selective about clients. A less 
selective policy and a range of interest rates (reflecting the different 
cost structures associated with different categories of borrowers) 
would have increased the volume of bank credit transactions and intro- 
duced greater competition into credit supply. Alternatively, the same 
effect could have been achieved by retaining the more rigid policy 
of a single interest rate, though at a higher level and with increased 
cross-subsidisation. Interestingly, some shopkeepers displayed a more 
flexible approach to credit. "Notoriously 'bad pays' are always 
charged a higher rate of'interest", the rate of interest varying with 
the client's (estimated) creditworthiness. 
25 
UNETHICAL PRACTICES 
The agricultural co-operative movement, which from 1889 onwards 
strove to introduce innovations in the marketing and distributive 
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spheres, came under severe attack from various types of traders. Among 
the smaller traders this frequently took the form of wild accusations 
and distortion of the objectives of co-operative societies. Occasionally 
it developed into boycotts and other overt attempts at intimidation. 
Such opposition was not limited to a few areas but sprang up in most 
counties penetrated by the movement. Not all such reactions could be 
defined as unethical, but a fair proportion appears to merit the label. 
Other possible practices of an unethical nature - collusion among sellers, 
adulteration of goods, tying arrangements designed to minimise competitive 
behaviour - must be considered. Evidence on collusion, especially 
price fixing, is slight. The price war which Templecrone Co-operative 
Society waged with local traders really illustrates the latter's 
difficulty in enforcing a common price strategy when under pressure. 
26 
The traders' combination shattered easily when subjected to aggressive 
pricing policies and invasion of their trading areas. (However, the 
traders appear to have been successful in maintaining a united front 
when invoking other sanctions against the Templecrone co-operators). 
R. A. Anderson complained of collusion leading to monopolistic practices 
among retailers (and manufacturers) of artificial manures, and in his 
book describes the break-up of the combination under pressure from newly- 
formed agricultural societies. 
27 
The possibility of using credit facilities as a means of tying 
customers to a particular retail outlet did not'go unnoticed: "They 
[shopkeepers], rather seek to have their customers indebted to them to 
amounts which they consider fairly safe, for these hanging debts insure 
a continuance of the custom!. ' 
28 
Given the absence in many districts of 
satisfactory credit facilities, local credit arrangements could be 
mutually advantageous to customers and retailers alike. However, where 
such practices were deliberately used as an instrument to break up a 
local market then they can hardly be considered desirable restraints 
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on trade. Plunkett complained that a debtor could not break loose 
from local traders nor "deal elsewhere until he has paid the uttermost 
farthing". 
29 
Actual instances of the use of credit as an instrument of 
compulsion have been recorded. Paddy Gallagher in his sketch of trading 
conditions in-the "Rosses" (Donegal) early in this century emphasizes 
this aspect of credit relationships. 
30 However, overtly coercive 
practices were probably infrequent. More prevalent, one suspects, was 
an unwritten social code that constrained debtors' choice. The chairman 
of the Belmullet Board of Guardians in the course of a lengthy submission 
claimed that credit dealings tended "to coerce the borrower from mistaken 
sense of his obligations to his supposed benefactor, to dispose of the 
produce of his farm and labour at lowest prices". He went on to claim 
that the credit system tended to "destroy fair dealing and honest 
competition". 
31 
Further evidence that debts tended to tie a consumer 
32 
to a particular outlet are provided by other witnesses, while a 
County Down witness held that such a custom did not hold in his district 
which was under strong competitive pressure from the city of Belfast. 
33 
It is likely also that credit dealings facilitated certain abuses such 
as the sale of poor quality or adulterated products. 
34 
However, it should 
be emphasised that a condition for credit, such as exclusive dealing 
with a particular retailer until all debts were cleared, is, in itself, 
not open to objection. This condition might, for instance, be dropped, 
but presumably only at the cost of higher interest charges. The customer, 
assuming he had a reasonably clear notion of the costs and benefits 
involved and that no coercion was applied, would enter such an arrange- 
ment only if the "package" of conditions was competitively attractive. 
In actual practice though it would seem that imperfect knowledge and, 
to a lesser extent, elements of compulsion sometimes blurred the 
competitive ideal. 
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PRODUCT SUITABILITY AND PARTICIPANT RATIONALITY 
It seems reasonable to accept that the range of different quality 
goods and their presentation were largely in accord with consumer 
preferences (which is not to say that outside observers were always 
impressed! ). One cannot be so sanguine about participant rationality - 
both on the side of the distributor and the consumer. Desirable norms 
here are that buyers and sellers should have a reasonable opportunity 
to be well informed, and should be in a position to exercise freedom of 
choice in their own interest. Helpful conditions for such rationality 
are the provision of accurate product description in terms of weights, 
grades, and physio-chemical properties. More important, price information 
and the means of maintaining a check on transactions, particularly those 
conducted on credit lines, should be available. As credit arrangements 
were a central feature of trading patterns in rural Ireland in the 1890's 
it is necessary to consider directly the implications for participant 
rationality. 
In practically all of the 84 Inspectors' Reports reference is 
made to the pervasiveness of credit as a commercial practice. Nor was 
buying on credit confined to depressed areas in the western half of 
the country. Contemporary reformers such as Horace Plunkett, George 
Russell, and R. A. Anderson noted it as a general phenomenon. 
35 
A 
witness before the Select Committee on Moneylending (1897) quoted the 
Jesuit economist, Fr. Finlay, as stating that there were 'few rural 
districts on which the Gombeen man 
[usurer] is unknown'. 
36 
By the eve 
of World War I, however, chronic indebtedness to shopkeepers and money- 
lenders had declined steadily. 
37 
Bartering, a largely regional phenomenon, was to be found in 
districts in the mid and north west of Ireland. 
38 
There is nothing 
intrinsically unsatisfactory about bartering arrangements, but where 
these occur in a context of ignorance regarding precise exchange values, 
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then welfare losses ensue. "One of the greatest pecuniary disadvantages 
under which the district labours is the system known as the 'truck' 
system or the 'payment in kind' system", reported one C. D. B. inspector. 
39 
"This system", he continued, "is the great strain on the south-west of 
Donegal, and means a pecuniary loss of many hundreds of pounds to the 
poor people . .6. it 
Consumer and indeed retailer ignorance regarding the chemical com- 
position of such farm inputs as manures appears to have been widespread. 
Anderson claims that manures were often evaluated on the basis of their 
"horrible stench, and sometimes by their hue" . 
40 
The Fertilisers and 
Feeding Stuffs Act of 1906 sought to enforce accurate product description 
on the vendors of such commodities. Of 202 samples of manures with which 
guarantees as to composition were given, 40 fell below the specified 
standards according to official enquiries in 1908-09.41 This overstates 
the degree of adulteration, as do results of tests on feeding stuffs 
and seeds, since sampling was concentrated on the more dubious lots. 
However, prior to the introduction of the Act malpractices were considerably 
more widespread. 
42 
Retailer as well as consumer ignorance was a 
contributory factor. 
43 
In the case of feeding stuffs the official verdict 
was that the position had not improved to the same extent as in the case 
of fertilisers. 
44 
Of the samples of feeding stuffs tested, 20 per cent 
fell below the level guaranteed while 35 per cent fell within an acceptable 
margin of error in 1908-09.45 Inspectors of the Dept. of Agriculture 
and Technical Instruction also tested agricultural seeds under the Weeds 
and Agricultural Seeds (Ireland) Act 1909. The tests showed that a 
considerable amount of inferior seed - 66 per cent of samples in 1910 
were unsatisfactory - was being sold in Ireland. 
46 
The worst districts 
were the western and south-western districts, especially in regard to 
inferior ryegrasses whose sale was "so general and so widespread that 
the Department had considerable difficulty in dealing with it". 
47 
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Some of the seed suppliers admitted that the seeds were pretty useless, 
("merely the bye-products from their cleaning business") but in their 
defence claimed that in some areas farmers preferred cheap low grade 
seeds. 
48 
Representatives of these firms put forward the reasonable 
plea that no one individual firm could afford to abandon this profitable 
line unless all other firms agreed to abstain as well. 
49 We shall 
return to this issue shortly, but the main inference to be drawn now 
is that consumer rationality and the quality of farm inputs was unsatis- 
factory in the 1890's -a state of affairs which persisted into the early 
part of this century at least. 
We now turn to another indicator of market performance - technological 
progressiveness. If technological deficiencies are not to exist in a 
sector of the economy a number of conditions must be met. Those considered 
most relevant in the present context include no suppression of innova- 
tions, an adequate diffusion of technological information, and adoption 
of new techniques. The evidence we considered on the level of technological 
information, as in the case of artificial manures, feeding stuffs, and 
agricultural seeds, is not encouraging. An appreciation of qualitative 
differences was only slowly inserted into the corpus of farming knowledge. 
An autonomous propensity to innovate among-distributors appears lacking; 
attempts to stifle innovation in the form of co-operative societies 
strengthen this impression. 
Much of the explanation for lack of progressiveness must lie in 
(a) the scale of the problems and (b) the'market structure. A major 
attribute of the latter was the very large number of small firms. The 
conjunction of these two sets of factors implied that any significant 
reforms would have to be initiated at a regional or national level. 
It is quite probable that at least some firms benefited from high levels 
of consumer ignorance. ' But even if they had not, no individual firm 
could afford to engage in the production of necessary technical and other 
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information services. A minimum efficient scale of operation would 
be outside the reach of most firms. Furthermore, benef its conferred on 
an innovating firm would also accrue to competing firms. Problems of 
internalising such externalities ensured that production of socially 
beneficial services was sub-optimal. (The case of the producers of 
agricultural seeds neatly illustrates the problem that arises when 
social and private benefits diverge). The major services in the present 
context were related to eliminating illiteracy, developing and diffusing 
technical information and policing product standards - all clearly areas 
for state intervention, and historically state production. Indeed the 
formation of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction 
in 1900 opened a new phase in state intervention in the workings of 
the rural market system. And anticipating the Department's work by 
a few years, the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society campaigned 
vigorously and on a broad front for changes in the rural economy including 
improvements in the description and supply of farm inputs. 
50 
As is argued in a later chapter, traders performed essential functions 
in making credit purchases possible where families depended on uncertain 
agricultural incomes or seasonal earnings through migratory labour. 
Sporadic failures in these sources of income often meant that only the 
local shopkeeper stood between a poor family and near-starvation. However, 
the effective use of such credit facilities required careful checks 
and records. In this respect some of the Inspectors' Reports are not 
very encouraging. The people "being as a rule illiterate, they have 
absolutely no check on the dealer - anything he chooses to put down 
they must accept, as they have no possible means of checking their 
account". 
51 A contributory factor was the problem of illiteracy and 
innumeracy. In 1881,27% of the total national population could 
neither read nor write. This was cut to 12% in 1911. However, national 
figures conceal considerable regional differences. There appears to 
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have been a much more serious incidence of illiteracy in the western 
counties. 
52 While it would be foolhardy to suggest that literacy was 
a necessary condition for consumer rationality, nevertheless it must 
be considered an aid in promoting consumer welfare especially in the 
spheres of controlling spending patterns and monitoring credit transactions. 
EXCHANGE EFFICIENCY 
How efficient was the retailing system in transferring products 
from wholesale suppliers to consumers? Were productivity gains possible 
through the exploitation of possible economies of scale, or through 
horizontal or vertical integration? Ideally one would like cost data 
from individual firms which might then be contrasted with average or 
most efficient firms. Even then some difficult problems would have to 
be surmounted. Adjustments for variation in demand between different 
areas would have to be made. More difficult still, considerable problems 
attach to the measurement of outputs in retailing. 
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Obviously we do not possess evidence of the ideally appropriate 
kind, so only the most glaring deficiencies are likely to emerge in this 
overview. In the final analysis such fragmentary pieces'of information 
should be considered in conjunction with other indicators previously 
explored. 
The supply of certain farm inputs may be a case in point where 
economies could have been achieved through horizontal integration. 
We have seen in our overview of co-operative history, for example, 
how five new agricultural societies in the relatively prosperous 
counties of Tipperary and Kilkenny succeeded in jointly acquiring over 
2,000 tons of artificial manures at a saving of 30 per cent plus on the 
prevailing retail prices. Possible economies through horizontal integration 
in other retailing lines where a continuous service was required were, 
however, unlikely (except perhaps where a large number of people were 
prepared to make a major break with traditional patterns and establish 
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co-operatively owned stores). Other possible changes in retailing 
such as the development of multiple shops, as in Britain in this period, 
were not suited to the low (and declining) population conditions of 
rural Ireland. 
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Rural reformers frequently claimed that the distributive system 
was inefficient, if not actually exploitative. Plunkett claimed that 
small traders showed little initiative and enterprise in purchasing 
their stock; tradition-bound practices resulted in an excessively 
elongated distributive chain. Goods dearly bought were carelessly stored 
and no proper accounts kept. While recognising the existence of a large 
number of potentially competing outlets, he felt that the extensive use 
of credit trading stifled competition thus allowing weak inefficient 
firms to survive. 
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The picture sketched here, based largely on Plunkett's 
experience in county Meath in the east of Ireland, is-in line with' 
descriptions of trading activity in depressed regions in the west of the 
country. Yet one may wonder how class-specific the observations are. 
It may be that, at most, the account is relevant only to the experience 
of the poorest farmers and labourers and those specialising in the 
provision of their requirements. It is also somewhat difficult to 
understand, assuming no substantial barriers to entry at the different 
levels of wholesaling, 
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why a satisfactory degree of vertical integration 
had not taken place. It seems more probable that Plunkett failed to 
appreciate fully the economic functions performed at different points 
in the distributive chain - movement of goods, provision of storage 
facilities, and an especially important service for smaller clients, 
breaking bulk. 
Economic barriers to entry in retailing were low. No expensive 
premises were required as the following description of the typical 
village shop catering for poorer customers makes clear. 
57 
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"The houses, often, more correctly, hovels, have no additional 
accommodation for the business being carried on. If it were not 
for the few clay pipes lolling their heads against the window 
sashes as a sign that even luxuries are supplied, you would pass 
many a roadside house without knowing that you were leaving the 
emporium of a universal provider. If you go in, you may not be 
able to see for a while, but on the threshold another sense 
reminds you that there is more than meets the eye. A delicate 
nose will at once detect the presence of tea, sugar, and tobacco 
in the turf-laden atmosphere .... If you note dirty meal moulding 
in rotten bins, a few loaves for those whose style of-living demands 
scientifically whitened bread, a few jars of peppermint or sugar- 
stick, and a heap somewhere of rapidly fermenting dried fruit, 
and then make an entry of sundries, you have made a fairly correct 
inventory in the market for the poor. " 
It is also clear from occupational statistics that traders formed 
an increasing proportion of the economically active population in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Thus it would appear that entry 
into retailing was fairly fluid in most areas. - On the whole then (and 
here we are anticipating some of the findings of the following chapter) 
the impression formed is of a market structure conducive to strongly 
competitive conditions and consequently efficiency in exchange. The 
evidence we considered under the head of unethical practices, however, 
tends to qualify this judgment of strongly competitive conditions. 
However, competition and exchange efficiency are not the only elements relevant 
to the evaluation of market performance. The evidence assembled by reference 
to the various dimensions of market performance must be considered in 
an integrated fashion. From such a composite picture, and having due 
regard for some divergent views, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
market performance was not satisfactory; there are, however, definite 
indications that it was improving through time. Among the more serious 
deficiencies was the underproduction of services with strong public 
good characteristics - elementary accountancy, technical information 
and standards, and policing of commercial practices. Indeed the 
increasing state intervention in the rural market system, as noted 
earlier, is aPriori evidence of this. In the crucial area of credit 
supply, the formal banking system was less than well attuned to the 
20 3 
requirements of particular categories of borrowers within the agricultural 
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community. - As regards participant rationality, it would appear that 
the balance of advantage not infrequently lay with traders. Saving 
features hardly emerge under the discussion of technological progressive- 
ness. A final point is in order. While critics of rural retailing 
berated traders for most of the deficiencies in the system it is clear 
that the source, and in turn the solution, to many of the problems lay 
at societal rather than shop level. 
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APPENDIX 
The general reliability of debtors in rural Ireland in this 
period has been emphasised. This merits some explanatory comment. 
With regard to shop credit, transactions were conducted against 
a background of detailed local knowledge and of continuing face-to- 
face relationships. It is suggested therefore that social con- 
straints helped shape the economic behaviour of both traders and 
clients. Thus as economic exchanges could not be easily insulated 
from broader social exchanges traders were restrained from moving 
swiftly and harshly against debtors. 
1 
On the other hand, the costs 
of defaulting for a client were also raised. To country people, 
traditionally secretive about business matters, a hint of financial 
incompetence or failure had a strong stigmatising effect. In the 
particularly harsh trading conditions of west Donegal, Paddy Gallag-' 
her recalls that it "was considered a great shame to have the bailiff 
coming to your door", such that a debtor would immediately try to 
pay off the amount outstanding at the threat of such action. 
2 
George Russell was moved to complain in relation to information about 
credit dealings: "It is very difficult to get precise details unless 
you come with the parish priest at your back and his influence to 
aid. 113 More than a decade later the major official report on agricul- 
tural credit in Ireland refers to the factor of social shame as a 
1. This is illustrated in county Cork during the second phase of the 
Land War (1884-92) when seven shopkeepers who violated community 
norms were subjected to boycotting. J. S. Donnelly, Jr., The Land 
and the People of Nineteenth-Century Cork: The Rural Economy and 
the Land Question (London, 1975), p. 328. 
2. P. Gallagher, Paddy the Cope: My Story (Tralee, n. d. ), p. 103. See 
also Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in 
Ireland, op. cit. p. 71. 
3. Report from the Select Committee on Money Lending, op. cit. Q. 2142. 
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determinant of debtors' behaviour. 
1 
These considerations would appear toapply with-most vigour to 
intra-community exchanges. However one would expect that such social 
mechanisms also modified the behaviour of debtors in relation to bureau- 
cratic sources of credit, commercial banks, Congested Districts Board, 
Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction. The efficiency 
of the legal system in facilitating debt collection, and the evolu- 
tion of social attitudes regarding the exercise of formal sanctions 
are also clearly relevant. It is a commonplace to assert that infrac- 
tions of the legal code such as forcible prevention of eviction or 
related agrarian crimes implied no social disgrace, and often the 
reverse. 
2 
However given the frequency with which disputants had 
recourse to law proceedings it is also clear that popular definitions 
of crime coincided with those of law enforcement agencies over a 
broad range of issues. Indeed even in the case of agrarian disputes 
there is some evidence of tenant-farmers being quick to evict dairy- 
men who defaulted in the payment of rent, a penalty sanctioned by the 
law (while at the same time resisting such penalties when invoked by 
landlords against members of their own class). 
3 
Such opportunism 
hardly denotes a fundamental challenge to the institutions of private 
property or alienation from its legal structures. 
In addition to such palpable social controls one-might hypothe- 
sise that internalised controls also affected the behaviour of economic 
agents. The role of superstitition, myth, and religious sanction in 
1. Report of the Departmental Committee on Agricultural Credit in Ire- 
land, op. cit. p. 71. 
2. "Sometimes when I go into a little thatched farmhouse, and am led 
from the raftered wide hearthed kitchen to what is considered the 
greater honour of the inner room, I see the chief place on the wall 
between the sacred pictures given to a small glazed frame. It con- 
tains the warrant for the arrest of a son of the house as a "suspect" 
in the troubled days of the '80s. " Lady Gregory, quoted in the 
Irish Catholic, 12 Nov. 1898. 
3. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 144-5. 
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the regulation of economic behaviour is usually neglected, not sur- 
prisingly as the magnitude of the implied costs and benefits is indeter- 
minate. 
) 
In view of the moral perspectives embodied in much of Irish 
folklore, not to mention the pervasive religious influences, it may 
be unwise to dismiss such cultural factors outright. A piece of oral 
testimony illustrates the possible implications of. such. beliefs for 
probity in economic affairs. "There is no greater fraud in the sight 
of God than that of a shopkeeper giving unjust weight or measure. " 
Narrowing the discussion again to the specific issue of creditor- 
debtor exchanges it is intuitively plausible that enforcement costs 
are affected by the content of the prevailing morality. That is to 
say that such costs vary inversely with conscience or other costs, 
the latter being internally generated and usually stemming from the 
metaphysical suppositions of the individual. However the efficacy 
of this shadowy thicket of constraints is hardly amenable to even the 
crudest measurement, at least within the confines of a study such as 
this. Possibly detailed cross-cultural studies could shed some light 
on the issue. In any case, given the market orientation of rural 
society, it seems appropriate to allow only a small residual role to 
such factors in accounting for the behaviour of creditors and deb- 
tors. 
2 
The policing effect of competition, legal institutions, and 
informal community controls carries the bulk of the explanatory weight. 
The concern so far has been to identify various parameters of rural 
society that are conducive to debtor reliability. Within any particular 
1. Of the slowly evaporating pools of magical beliefs that had formed 
in the peasant consciousness, a quite considerable proportion rela- 
ted to economic matters. The most extensive collection of these is 
contained in the library of the Irish Folklore Commission, Univer- 
sity College, Dublin. See, for instance MS 117, pp. 41-2; MS 96, 
pp. 347-8; MS 437, pp. 365-6; MS 815, pp. 74-5. 
2. A stronger case can be made for these factors in relation to non- 
market exchanges, particularly those involving a one way economic 
relationship such as the giving of food and a night's lodgings to 
strangers. For a brief discussion of some economic and anthropolo- 
gical studies that focus on non-reciprocal exchange see N. J. Smelser, 
The Sociology of Economic Life (New Jersey, 1976), p. 119-123. 
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period short term factors - fluctuations in agricultural incomes and 
prices, changes in the lending policies of the various credit agencies 
- may assume major significance. In the quarter century prior to the 
Great War price and income movements were largely favourable to rural 
communities; ýlending policies in the aftermath of agricultural depres- 
sion were likely to be cautious. "Shops in this district", it is repor- 
ted from Spiddle in 1892, "have this year, as a rule, been strict in. 
refusing credit where there was no visible security for future pay- 
went . "l In districts in Leitrim a few years later it is also noted 
that credit to smallholders was being restricted. 
2 
More generally, 
the necessary role of rational self-interest in regulating the supply 
of trader credit is apparent: "In a bad year, a dealer is much more 
chary of giving out goods to any extent than in a good year, and pro- 
bably £4 or thereabouts would be about his average limit... on a good 
promise of harvest, or in a good year, he will go as high as £7 or £8 
to the same man. "3 The length of credit might also be closely adap- 
ted to the economic circumstances of the client: for some the credit 
period extended for a year or more, for others six months, for the 
very poor it might be limited to a few weeks. 
4 
We may now conclude this brief review of the forces making for 
debtor reliability. Factors affecting both the supply of credit and 
the demand for credit have been examined in the context of the socio- 
cultural framework of Irish society. Some features of the system are 
of a relatively enduring character, the operation of others is more 
variable in the short term (the course of agricultural prices and 
incomes for instance). It is clear though from this overview that 
powerful factors made for a low incidence of bad debts in rural Ire- 
land at the end of the nineteenth century. 
1. Inspectors' Reports, no. 53; see also nos. 62 and 63. 
2. Ibid. nos. 22,23 and 24. 
3. Ibid. no. 19. 
4. Ibid. nos. 4 and 18. 
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CHAPTER 9 
TRADERS IN THE IRISH RURAL ECONOMY 1880-1914 
The role and number of intermediaries in the marketing and dis- 
tributive sectors of underdeveloped economies has attracted both popular 
and scholarly interest. At the popular level attention has frequently 
assumed a hostile form, more especially where racially distinct trad- 
ing communities evolved, such as was the case in Uganda and other parts 
of East Africa, West Africa, Indonesia and elsewhere. However, even 
in countries where the host communities and trading groups were homo- 
genous in terms of ethnic characteristics, social tensions might some- 
times ensue. E. P. Thompson, for instance, has recently focussed atten- 
tion on patterns of conflict between traders and people in eighteenth- 
century England) The father-figure of modern economics, Adam Smith, 
was of course aware of the unfavourable aura that clung to certain 
categories of traders and expressed himself in trenchant fashion on 
the matter. 
2 What of the Irish experience where the rural economy 
in the period 1880-1914 would appear to have much in common with under- 
developed regions elsewhere? The final two decades of the nineteenth 
century heard increasing (though minority) claims that the country 
population supported bloated marketing and retailing sectors. Rural 
reformers, clustered chiefly around the agricultural co-operative movement, 
were particularly vigorous in denouncing the magnitude of the trading 
community. 
3 "There are too many dealers for the available volume of 
trade", thundered the co-operative paper, the Irish Homestead, as it 
warmed to a familiar theme, "too many seeking to make profit out of 
the purchasing farmer .... The burden of parasitic traders for 
whom there is no call, and whom, nevertheless, the farming community 
must support, it is high time to shake off. "4 Were such criticisms 
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baseless, possibly reflecting ideological confusions rather than economic 
logic? Such an impartial observer as the social statistician, Charles 
Booth, was moved to comment in 1886: 
5 
It is impossible to account satisfactorily for the increase which 
is to be found in the numbers as well as percentage of dealers - 
those who live by buying and selling. This increase cannot be 
traced to any improved system of distribution, nor can we account 
for it, as we may in England and Scotland by the fact that increas- 
ing production or greater wealth increase the volume to be dis- 
tributed .9.. 
In subjecting these propositions to closer scrutiny it is helpful to 
look first at the development of trading in aggregate terms, and then 
to concentrate analysis on micro aspects of the problem. By traders 
in this context is meant those performing mainly retailing functions, 
and including those who provided credit services. 
TRADER DENSITY AND PRICES 
Taking the half century after the Great Famine: while the occu- 
pational statistics contained in the earlier and later Irish censuses 
are not readily comparable the broad trends are not in doubt. In the 
case of rural retailing, the national network extended and thickened 
under the impact of rising farm incomes and developing consumer 
consciousness in the more prosperous post Famine decades. 
6 Rising 
levels of literacy and numeracy may also have positively affected the 
supply of traders through time, both in terms of providing useful 
business aids and widening mental horizons. However, the dominant 
factor influencing the supply of traders was undoubtedly the expansion 
of profitable opportunities. Moving forward in time, Table I presents 
census data for four major categories of traders engaged in broadly 
retailing activities between 1881 and 1911.7 To make this summary 
more relevant to rural Ireland, statistics for Belfast and Dublin, 
the only two major urban centres, are excluded from the national picture. 
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Table I. Data on Selected Occupational Groups for Ireland (excludin 
Dublit'and Belfast , '1881-1911 
' 1881 -1891 1901 1911 
Actual Nos. 
Publicans etc. 7,012 8,679 8,548 8,137 
Grocers etc. 11,592 12,970 12,209 11,128 
Gen. shopkeepers etc. 24,221 23,277 24,581 19,422 
Street sellers etc. 2,030 1,986 1,727 1,114 
Total 44,855 46,912 47,065 39,801 
Nos. per 1,000 of population 9.51 11.16 12.32 10.76 
Index no. form 100 . 
117 130 113 
Source: Census of Ireland data, 1881-1911 inclusive. 
The only other category of rural traders worthy of note - cattle, 
sheep, and pig dealers - shows a broadly similar pattern of change. 
The numbers of dealers were: in 1881 4,142; in 1891 4,397; in 1901 
4,169; in'1911 3,783. Expressed in ratio form (number of dealers per 
thousand of the population) these emerge as 0.88,1.05,1.09, and 
1.02 respectively. 
While it is suggested in the appendix to this chapter that Table I 
may exaggerate the degree of change between 1881 and 1901, the rela- 
tive change (an apparent increase of 30% in these two decades) is of 
such a magnitude as to strongly suggest a real shift in the occupational 
structure. How then does one explain this change, particularly over 
a period in part dominated by agricultural depression? Were there 
excessive numbers of middlemen present in the rural economy preying 
on the unfortunate farmer-and labourer? 
To uphold the rural reformers' case it is first necessary to 
demonstrate that strongly competitive conditions did not exist and 
that via one. mechanism or another, prices could be adjusted upwards so 
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as to generate sufficient income to support an uneconomical level of 
traders. A consideration of the market structure of the retailing 
sector represents a convenient point of entry into the controversy, 
Obviously conceived as a single unified national market none of the 
tens of thousands of independent traders were in a position to exercise 
market power. However, it is much more' realistic to speak of a vast 
network of local markets and sub-markets linked horizontally with 
neighbouring markets and vertically as one ascended the distributive 
chain to regional and national levels. Having clarified the appropriate 
unit of enquiry, it may be noted that theoretical and empirical studies 
suggest that such attributes of market structure as the number of 
sellers and conditions of entry to the market are major causal factors 
determining individual firm's pricing policy. 
8 
In this and the follow- 
ing section the relevance of these two sets of factors is explored. 
Fairly crude data on prices and the numbers of retailers are 
available for some areas in the west of Ireland in the early 1890's. 
9 
These allow us to form some impression of the validity, within the 
context of conditions in rural Ireland, of the first proposition: price 
is, in fact, related to the number of sellers in a particular market- 
area. Relating these two variables to each other gives a simple correla- 
tion coefficient of -0.28. The number of cases is 56, and the result 
is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The sign 
of the coefficient indicates an inverse relationship between trader 
numbers and price level - as competitive theory would lead one to expect. 
This result is given indirect support by a consideration of price 
variance in congested districts in the western counties. 
10 Thus of 
95 acceptable price observations from 58 districts, the mean value is 
14, with a'variance of 60. And in Mayo, for example, with 29 observa- 
tions from 16 districts the price variance is higher still at 88 (mean 
value of 16-4). 
11 These indicate a very substantial variation in prices 
216 
between districts, suggesting that prices were highly responsive to 
local factors. Relevant factors, one may presume, included not only 
variables such as location, income levels, and volume of trade, but 
also the density of traders in a particular area. 
This discussion may now be related to the evidence presented in 
Table I. If it is accepted that the price of retail services is 
sensitive to the number of sellers, it then follows that the influx 
of traders in the final decades of the nineteenth century exerted a 
general downward pressure on prices. This conclusion is in direct conflict 
with the claim by rural reformers such as Plunkett that, in relation to 
prices, "competition seems to do no good. "12 The "invisible hand" may 
have worked clumsily, 
13 but the indications are that it was not afflicted 
by paralysis. 
BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
Knowledge of the conditions of entry is fundamental to an understanding 
of the nature of competition in local. rural markets. Claims of attempts by 
landlords to control entry into certain lines of business activity are not 
unknown, but there is no reason to believe such restrictions were of any- 
thing but exceptional and localised significance. 
14 
Strictly economic 
barriers to entry were low. In retailing, given the poor housing and hygiene 
standards the initial capital outlay was not great. 
15 Provision of working 
capital, mainly to finance credit dealings could be more onerous. Where 
the trading system was still at an underdeveloped stage, such as in parts 
of the mid and north west in the 1880's, 
16 traders could resort to itinerant 
selling practices and/or the periodic convening of markets to extend their 
trading area and reduce their average fixed costs. Invasion of neighbouring 
markets by "outside" traders was thus feasible, although probably only to a 
marked extent in relation to transactions carried out on a cash or barter 
basis. This is an important qualification given the prevalence of credit 
dealings throughout rural Ireland. 
17 
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However, entry barriers can also stem from political and sociolo- 
gical features of society. Socio-political constraints ensured that 
attempts by co-operative societies to enter retailing in the period 
1890-1910 were blocked. 
18 
The opportunity of testing the efficiency of 
existing arrangements, that is, apart from the provision of certain 
farm inputs where co-operative societies made some inroads, was effectively 
denied. 19 A less easily perceived barrier to entry of general significance 
may arise from the interpenetration of the economic and social spheres 
in rural life. Social networks, constructed on the basis of kinship 
and other social relationships played a part in determining the distribu- 
tion of custom among competing outlets. One official report noted that 
"many shopkeepers in Ireland are themselves also farmers, or are married 
to the daughters of farmers, so that the line of demarcation between 
the two classes is often very indistinct. "20 The flow of trade along 
kinship lines is described in a number of sources. 
21 Another, less obvious 
dimension of the kinship system is highlighted in the following extract 
from an interview with a townsman who recalls the organisation of retail 
trade and the forms of recruitment into it at the beginning of the present 
century. 
Most of the [town] houses - that would be shops, groceries, 
publicans - they'd be all based on the country, and in taking 
apprentices . .. they'd look 
into the connection, the connection 
of the young lad that would be proposed to them; what relations 
he had, because all those relations were potential customers. 
The family [system] ruled that way .... 
22 
Forms of product differentiation are also relevant when considering 
access to rural markets. Even where a client could not presume some 
definite non-economic ties with a trader the products of a particular 
outlet were differentiated to the extent that such goods and services 
were identified with a particular family or individual. Also it is 
not without significance for their commercial strategy that businesses 
in rural Ireland had the family name -a form of general trade mark - 
emblazoned over the premises. The factor of location is a further feature 
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conferring differential benefits on retail outlets. One should note, 
though, the role of improved communications, and the part played by 
travelling shops and even mail order firms in reducing the isolation 
of local markets. 
23 The effect of these differentiating features is to 
tend to fragment local markets -a tendency that might appear to have 
adverse welfare implications. This is to neglect, however, that clients 
derive satisfaction from such features as convenience and the psychic 
benef its associated with regularised and friendly social intercourse, 
particularly where this is reinforced by kinship bonds. 
24 To condemn 
such differentiating features as of spurious value is to attribute to 
consumer ignorance what can be more realistically viewed as consumer 
preference. Also when one considers the vulnerability of farming incomes 
to such uncontrollable variables as weather and disease it is hardly 
pure sentiment that impelled farmers to build up social and economic 
ties with a particular or a few local retailers. In times of adversity, 
such as the years of disastrous harvests in the 1880's, claims to favourable 
treatment could be based on such relationships. 
SIZE OF THE RETAILING SECTOR 
What then of the charge that rural Ireland sustained an over- 
sized retailing sector in the period 1880-1914? A consideration of 
market forms, allied to our previous discussion of social and economic 
aspects of retailing, allows us to draw reasonably firm conclusions. 
For the country as a whole, the large number of outlets, particularly 
from 1890 onwards, ensured that local monopolies were generally not 
possible. However, in isolated rural areas, mainly in the west of Ireland, 
probably a not uncommon market form before 1890 was one of a limited 
number of sellers, each with a degree of monopoly power, and shielded 
in part by transport and information costs from contiguous markets. 
In cases of such limited local monopolies, underinvestment or too few 
resources committed to retailing was the problem, (a point which would 
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have surprised some rural reformers). These local deviations from 
the dominant patterns were increasingly reduced from the 1880's onwards. 
Thus looking at changes in the four trader categories, as defined for 
Table I, western poor law unions registered substantial increases between 
1881 and 1891: Dunfanaghy (+117%), Glenties (+9%), North Inishowen 
(+29%); Milford (-5%), Glenmaddy (+12%), Oughterard (+52%), Clifden 
(-1%), Gort (+227), Mount Bellew (+42%), Belmullett (+120%), Kilalla 
(+15%), Westport (+44%), Manor Hamilton (, -14%), Dromore West (-12%), 
Tobercurry (+10%), Caherciveen (+6%), Dingle (+22%), Kenmare (+14%), 
Bantry (+73%), Castletown (+5%), Skibbereen (+19%), and Skull (+38%). 
The figures in brackets represent the percentage change in total numbers 
in the selected trader categories between the two censal dates. The 
calculations are based on census data, and the poor law unions included 
are those with little, if any urban development. Thus of the 22 poor 
law unions examined, 18 showed higher levels of increase than that 
nationally (see Table I), some indeed registering increases far in excess 
of the national average of 4.6%. Such a strong supply response indeed 
tends to suggest the existence of elements of monopoly rent. It also 
casts an interesting splinter of light on a further issue. The supply 
of entrepreneurs in the rural economy, at any rate as far as retailing 
is concerned, is shown to be highly elastic in this period. What 
implications this might have for the supply of entrepreneurship generally 
in the economy is problematic, but it does at least suggest no entre- 
preneurial failure in this sphere. 
25 
Taking once again a countrywide rather than a regional focus, the 
possibility that-the national pattern was composed mainly of congeries 
of local monopolies has been ruled out in view of the density of retail 
outlets (Table I), the ease of entry to markets, and the fact that 
criticisms of traders centred on their apparent profusion rather than 
their scarcity. There are some grounds, however, for suggesting that 
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the market form approximated that of monopolistic competition in at 
least some of the local markets. Predictions of the model of monopolistic 
competition, that firms will engage in product differentiation and other 
forms of non-price competition (such as the cultivation of personalised 
forms of trade) are consistent with certain empirical observations made 
here. A further prediction of the model, and one with obvious relevance 
for the rural reformers' concern with the large numbers of traders, is 
that each firm (and consequently the industry as a whole) is forced into 
a position of having unused capacity. This point, however, even if one 
accepts the excess capacity theorem, does not vindicate the reformers' 
concern. The importance of the proposition rests on the existence of 
substantial fixed costs. Such a cost structure did not apply to retailing 
in this period; premises were fairly simple; the owner's time was 
divisible (other occupations could be, and indeed were combined with 
trading). 26 A different but more relevant type of excess capacity, 
given competitive conditions and the ease of entry into retailing, stemmed 
from disequilibrium in retail markets. Table I shows an efflux of traders 
after 1900, and while this overstates the real outflow, 
27 
the movement 
is nonetheless significant. This suggests some overcrowding in trading 
occupations by the turn of the century. 
How seriously, though, one regards the situation hinges crucially 
on a judgment of conditions in the rest of the economy. What is important 
is not the efficiency of the retailing sector in any absolute sense, but 
rather its efficiency relative to other sectors of the economy. Was the 
marginal productivity of factors of production elsewhere in the economy 
that much greater, if at all? ' Transferring resources, mainly labour, 
into agriculture was hardly likely to appreciably affect national income, 
given the large rump of subsistence farming and disguised unemployment 
existing there. 
28 
In relation to industrial development, labour supply 
was not the limiting factor. The quantitatively much smaller effect - 
the freeing of capital-resources in an economy with an already high 
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savings capacity and a shortage of investment outlets29 - would have 
been of negligible significance. _In short, _the., 
social opportunity cost 
of overcrowding in retailing appears low. 
Lest the foregoing account of competitive pressures in retailing 
should conjure up an unduly rosy picture, it should be recalled from 
the-previous chapter that other aspects of market performance left much 
tobe desired. Rural reformers misconstrued certain economic aspects 
of retailing: the safeguards to consumer welfare implied by large 
numbers of retailers for instance. In the course of their propaganda 
they sometimes exaggerated inadequacies in the system: astriking illustra- 
tion of this being George Russell's assertion in 1912 that "this year 
the Department of Agriculture found that 60% of the seeds sold in Ireland 
were adulterated". 
30 
However, there were important deficiencies in the 
distribution system, and these represented significant targets for re- 
forming zeal. In addition, welfare losses arising from unethical or 
unsatisfactory practices were concentrated on some of the poorest and 
most vulnerable sections of the population -a point frequently made 
by reformers. 
31 
If one takes the normative step of weighting more 
heavily the welfare of such groups then the case for reform measures is 
further strengthened. 
As regards the apparently high levels of traders in the rural 
economy, this is largely explicable, not by reference to excess capacity 
in the distributive sphere, but by reference to the labour intensive 
nature of-trading. A low level of capital inputs, restricted consumer 
mobility, and the wide geographical area to be serviced implied large 
numbers of distributors. This view is supported by a number of modern 
studies, drawing on investigations in such diverse rural settings as 
West. Africa, Uganda, Malaya, Sarawak, and Haiti. These suggest that 
the apparent profusion of middlemen is essential to the functioning of 
the local economies. 
32 
Thus, for example, Mintz argues that the large 
proportion of middlemen successfully interposing itself between 
producer and consumer is in no sense economically redundant. In the 
classic work in this field Bauer concludes that apprehension regarding 
the multiplicity of middlemen in West African trade springs from a 
confusion of technical with economic efficiency: in developing economies 
there is mass substitution of labour, a relatively abundant factor, 
for capital a relatively scarce factor. In a fairly similar vein, Ward 
argues that large numbers of money-lenders in rural communities can be 
justified by reference to the special difficulties of credit provision 
in rural economies, in particular, the need to have an intimate knowledge 
of the position and prospects of a client. The requirement of reliable 
personal information places a limit on the number of clients that can 
be serviced by a particular money-lender, a consideration that also 
applies in the case of credit retailing as in rural Ireland. 
SOME GENERAL IMPLICATIONS 
A final issue has yet to be resolved: the relative increase in 
trader numbers, particularly the noteworthy surge in the closing decades 
of the century. This is best explored in the context of larger patterns 
of change in the rural economy. The troubled character of late nineteenth 
century Irish agriculture requires little elaboration. ' From roughly the 
mid 1870s to the mid 1890s farm product prices slumped, tillage and 
dairying being particularly adversely affected. 
33 
Again if one uses the 
numbers of paupers and of overseas emigrants as indicators of employment 
prospects in rural Ireland, this period emerges in a distinctly pessimistic 
light. 34 An increase in the relative size of groups servicing the 
agricultural community is, on the face of it, an unlikely concomitant 
of rural crisis. Some help with this paradox is afforded by Solow's rough 
calculation that while product prices fell, the burden of rents and the 
general price level fell sufficiently to maintain farm incomes in real 
terms. 35 In addition, emigrants' remittances and earnings from migratory 
labour were important in propping up the especially vulnerable economy 
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of the west of Ireland. 
36 
As regards agricultural labourers, their 
real wages showed an upward tendency. 
37 However, while aggregate purchas- 
ing power held up (with obvious consequences for the demand for retail 
services) employment opportunities continued to contract. The major 
responses to the gloomy employment situation were those of emigration 
and the retention of family labour on the farm. In relation to the latter 
it is likely, as in other peasant settings, that much family labour was 
maintained even when the marginal product of-such labour had fallen 
below the level of the local agricultural wage (taking this as indicating 
the marginal cost of labour). 
38 However, while such reactions undoubtedly 
predominate, it may be tentatively suggested that surplus labour flowing 
off the land also found its way into trading activity. A shift of 
resources - principally human, though some capital'also - out-of farming 
and into retailing is to be expected if the opportunity cost of trading 
in terms of farm work (for sons and daughters on family farms) declined 
in the final quarter of-the nineteenth century. This seems probable 
in the context of changes in Irish agriculture in this period. Tillage 
farming suffered a drop of 35% in. acreage terms between 1871 and 1901; 
dairying another farm activity with a high labour input failed to compen- 
sate for this drift towards labour extensive farming, the national cow 
herd actually showing a slight decline over the same period. 
39 Other 
things being equal, this would imply a diminution in the value of family 
labour services - the family, of course, being the major source of 
labour on most farms. In other words, there is a tendency for the 
average and marginal value of such labour to decline in the late nine- 
teenth'century, thus pointing up the relative attractiveness of off-farm 
occupations such as trading, on a full or part-time basis. 
40 
Close 
links between farming and rural trading have been noted earlier. Very 
probably also the social origins of, rural traders lay to a considerable 
extent in the farming community. 
41 
All this suggests that transfers 
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into trading were facilitated by the socio-economic environment; indeed 
the sons and daughters of farmers held a comparative advantage in making 
such a transition'given the role of kinship in determining patronage. 
In brief, it was a short distance from the farmyard to the other side of 
the shop counter in rural Ireland. 
In this chapter particular changes in one area of the services 
sector of the rural economy have been charted over the main period of 
agricultural depression and onto the eve of the Great War. The issues 
of entry to markets, different market forms, and the large numbers 
performing trading functions have been discussed. The claim, advanced 
by some critics, that distributive margins could be arbitrarily inflated 
to support a heavy tier of largely redundant middlemen is firmly 
rejected. The magnitude and composition of the tertiary sector, as in 
many underdeveloped countries, was one reflection of the scarcity of 
remunerative employment elsewhere in the economy. The services sector 
had increased its size relative to the total occupied population in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Though some of the increase 
was accounted for by professional and other occupations associated with 
economic development, domestic service - by far the largest component - 
registered a very substantial increase. 
42 
The latter development is 
hardly an indication of economic progress, a point confirmed by contrasting 
the relatively industralised north east of Ireland and the strongly 
agricultural remainder of the country. Thus, while in Antrim and Down 
in 1901 6.8% of those with specified occupations were in domestic service, 
in Ireland as a whole the proportion was 9.9%, or close to one and a 
half times the level for the north east. 
43 These features are a bleak 
reminder of the cumulative failure of the Irish economy throughout 
the nineteenth century - the failure to accommodate population increase 
through rapid economic growth, the failure to industralise on a broad front. 
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APPENDIX 
It is necessary to voice an important qualification in relation to 
occupational statistics such as those used in Table 1. As one pushes 
backwards in time the degree of specialisation in the economy normally 
declines. A consequence of this is that such statistical artefacts as 
occupational categories reflect with decreasing accuracy the distribu- 
tion of activity in the economy. (This is particularly so in relation 
to less developed economies. ) The role specialisation implicitly assu- 
med in the occupational classification is violated by an increasing 
incidence of multiple roles. Thus apparent changes through time in the 
occupational structure may be nothing more than statistical illusion. 
I 
Indeed it is to the credit of the compilers of the Irish census of 1871 
that they were alive to the existence of these (and other) difficulties. 
Thus they found "a very considerable number of persons who have inser- 
ted more than one calling", and of the "large and extremely interesting 
variety of combinations" they cite such examples as "farmer, grocer, 
and draper", and "farmer, grocer, draper, and carpenter". Uncritical 
reliance on census data could easily lead to underestimation of the 
total level of activity in particular spheres, in these instances the 
provision of grocery, drapery, and carpentry services. The corollary 
to this is that the level of activity in major areas of the economy such 
as agriculture, is exaggerated. 
Clearly these complications pose problems of interpretation for the 
period 1881-1911 (and even greater problems for earlier periods), although 
an appreciation rather than worship of the difficulties appears in order. 
It may be reasonably claimed that over this period the four trader catego- 
ries selected had crystallised out as independent clusters of occupations 
to quite a considerable extent. Nor is there much evidence of a rapidly 
declining pool of multiple occupations feeding into the overall numbers 
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of traders between the terminal dates. Thus the numbers of occupiers 
of land who were also engaged in other economic pursuits showed slow 
change, falling from 10,382 in 1881 to 9,710 thirty years later. 
2 
it 
would be, misleading though not to acknowledge that some specialisation 
within the retailing sector was taking place. Thus while Table I shows 
a decline in the numbers and density of traders after 1900, the real 
outflow is not as marked as our statistical summary suggests. The 
decline is real enough, but its extent is exaggerated as a result of 
the rigid measure of retailer density used here. It is evident from 
Table I that the greatest decline took place among general shopkeepers. 
Inspection of the census data indicates that the retailing system was 
becoming more diversified in the early twentieth century; thus while 
unspecialised traders such as general shopkeepers suffered a relative 
decline, more specialised retail services tended to develop. The 
latter are not embraced by our four selected categories of retailers. 
Prices and Trader Numbers 
Fairly crude data on prices and numbers of retailers is available 
for some regions in the early 1890's. Information on prices - interest 
rates charged on credit transactions by traders - is derived from 
detailed reports on 84 districts in the west of Ireland. These reports 
were compiled by inspectors of the Congested Districts Board soon after 
its inception in 1891.3 W. L. Micks, who was closely involved with these 
investigations, noted later: "Most, indeed I should say all, of the 
Inspectors had intimate previous experience of the localities, but some 
months had to be spent in local enquiries by each Inspector before he 
made his report on any district. "4 In reporting on interest rates 
charged by traders on credit accounts, the inspectors sometimes give a 
single average charge, though more usually a range of charges is given. 
Thus in the distract of Ballyshannon we are informed that interest rates 
are in the range of 10-15% per annum. 
5 
This, incidentally, means that 
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we have two price observations for such a district: the two ends of the 
range. In calculating an average interest rate (price level) for a dis- 
trict a simple average of the top and bottom values was taken. In the 
inspectors' reports, interest rates were sometimes also expressed as a 
charge on a large item of purchase, such as a bag of meal or flour. 
In the district of Inver (Donegal), for example, "generally speaking 
about is. interest would be charged on a bag of meal for six months, or 
2s. a year on 14s. or £14-5s. -8d. per cent per annum. "6 As meal and 
flour were major elements in the family expenditure pattern these are 
taken as acceptable, if rough bases, on which to calculate rates. On 
a few occasions the C. D. B. inspectors noted that repayment by install- 
ments within the credit period was sometimes practised. The effect of 
this is to increase the effective interest rate. No allowance for this 
could be made here, with the consequence that our calculated rates 
understate somewhat the true situation. 
Ideally one would wish to match these local price levels to trader 
densities in the same districts. This would be a quite straithtforward 
task if occupational statistics were available at district hvel. How- 
ever, the most detailed breakdown of occupations in the Irish census is 
for a considerably larger geographical unit, the poor law union (p. l. u. ). 
To meet this difficulty, the, following crude procedure had to be adopted 
in correlating price and trader density. It was assumed for the purpo- 
ses of the statistical exercise that the density of traders at the level 
of the p. l. u. also applied at the level of any of its constituent dis- 
tricts. Where a C. D. B. district was partly in one p. l. u. and partly in 
another then a simple average of the density of traders in the two unions 
was taken. This drastic dilution of the trader density variable is to 
load heavily the correlation test against revealing any significant 
relationship between the two variables. Despite this a significant 
relationship, of the kind suggested by competitive theory, does emerge; 
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one may presume that the underlying relationship is considerably stronger. 
Price information from 56 districts was used in the test. Prices 
I. 
were available for a few other districts but were discarded on the 
grounds of being ambiguous or defective in some other way. An element 
of judgment necessarily enters here. For example, while an estimate-of 
the average interest rate for the Aran Islands was available, 
7 
this was 
not used. This was because the district of the Aran Islands was con- 
tained within the union of Galway. Clearly to relate price on the island 
markets to the density of traders in an area that not only embraced part 
of the mainland but also incorporated substantial u*an development would 
be both pointless and misleading. Such an extreme example also illustra- 
tes the point on dilution raised earlier. Interest rates were high on 
the Aran Islands - averaging slightly over 20% per annum - but trader 
density for its p. l. u. was also high by western standards, reflecting 
of course the incorporation of the islands within the administrative 
sphere of the Galway union, and ignoring the fragmentation of markets 
through physical barriers and isolation. Similarly, though to a less 
marked extent, variations in trader densities between our 56 districts are 
muted by the assumption that the density of traders at the p. l. u. level 
applies unchanged at the district level. 
Finally, while acknowledging the fragile nature of the price data, 
depending as theydo on the observations and inquiries of the C. D. B. inspec- 
tors, one clear advantage may be noted: because of the rough similarity 
of conditions in the C. D. B. districts - all were at or under an officially 
defined poverty line - the complicating influence of variables other than 
trader density, on local price levels, is reduced. 
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1. P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey, 'Economic Progress and Occupational Dis- 
tribution', Economic Journal, Dec. 1951; P. Deane and W. A. Cole, 
British Economic Growth 1688-1959 (Cambridge, 1969) pp. 136-7,155. 
On the basis of this reasoning it is most probable that Table I con- 
veys a somewhat inflated impression of the increase in trading acti- 
vity in the final two decades of the nineteenth century. 
2. It is also interesting to note, in relation to the overlap between 
farming and retailing functions, that of the 10,592 persons combin- 
ing occupation of land and other pursuits at the turn of the century, 
almost a quarter of these were involved in the shopkeeping or pub 
trade. Census of Ireland: 1901 : General Report, p. 131. 
3. Congested Districts' Board, Inspectors' Local Reports (Base the 
Reports) 1892-8 (Dublin, 1898). 
4. Micks, letter to the Librarian, Trinity College Dublin, 15 Jan. 1927. 
The letter is attached to a copy of the Inspectors' Local Reports in 
the T. C. D. Library. 
5. Inspectors' Local Reports (1898), report number 20 (district of 
Ballyshannon). 
6. Ibid., report no. 18 (district of Inver). 
7. Ibid., report no. 54 (district of the Aran Islands). 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE IRISH " GOMBEENMAN '' 
The gombeenman has come into prominence once again with the 
recent publication of a paper on the topic by Peter Gibbon and 
M. D. Higgins. 
l 
This raises a number of stimulating issues, some 
of which are obviously germane to the present study since agri- 
cultural reformers were keenly interested in the phenomenon. To 
a considerable extent the criticisms by Gibbon and Higgins re- 
echo those of Plunkett, Finlay, Russell and others (though it 
could be argued that the earlier criticisms are more discriminat- 
ing and more sophisticated). The joint authors pursue their prey 
- the gombeenman - across the last century of Irish history while 
2 
the present study is terminated in 1914. Thus only the pre-1914 
4 
elements of their paper are used here, essentially as a focus 
for the wider discussion of the problem of rural indebtedness 
and its implications. 
According to Gibbon and Higgins3: 
The gombeenman of the period 1870-1930. typically 
exercised economic patronage through credit retail- 
ing in combination with moneylending. In order to 
secure a dependent clientele he made cash loans 
and credit freely available to small farmers... 
Having established dependence, he would then charge 
inflated retail prices to his customer in order both 
to secure as much profit as possible and to keep 
the customer falling further into debt. 
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I 
However, at no point are the defining characteristics of the gombeen- 
man made clear,, and at. times the joint authors seem to come close to 
the position of regarding all traders as gombeenmen. 
4 
Not that the 
definitional point is an easy one, as the Select Committee on Money- 
lending (1897)_ long ago discovered. 
5 Admitting to being perplexed 
in this matter, it expressed its difficulty in distinguishing between 
legitimate trading in credit and the activities of professional money- 
p. 
lenders which on the whole the committee considered undesirable. Plun- 
kett, described the gombeenman as the local usurer, but this formula- 
tion presents the obvious difficulty of determining what rate of inte- 
rest on credit transactions in money or goods should be considered 
exorbitant. And this cannot be answered in isolation from such fac- 
tors as the specific level of risk involved, the price and availability 
of alternative credit sources and ultimately the incorporation of nor- 
mative elements into the analysis. In a modern contribution to this 
debate, however, one might expect a more refined notion of what con- 
stitutes usury (or at the very least an appreciation of when the term 
represents little more than a convenient expression of abuse). 
It would be generally accepted, in relation to nineteenth-century 
Ireland, that exploitative relationships existed between some traders 
and some clients, and that the frequency of abuse was probably more pro- 
nounced at earlier rather than later points in time. It is contended 
though, that the scale of the problem has been exaggerated, that the 
complexities of the economic environment have not been fully apprecia- 
ted, and that evidence has been ignored which indicates erosion of the 
structural conditions facilitating abuse, even before the turn of the 
century. 
A useful departure point, from which the discussion can be moved 
backwards in time into the late nineteenth century, is the very com- 
prehensive report on agricultural credit published in, 1914.6 The 
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I 
authors, while accepting that much hardship had been caused in the past 
to smaller farmers (particularly in the west) by the operations of 
specialist moneylenders, came to the firm conclusion that "gombeenism" 
in this form had practically disappeared. 
7 
Moving further back in time, 
another official investigation found that contrary to initial expec- 
tations, the gombeenman had not only failed to flourish as a result of 
the transfer of land to tenant purchasers, but was in fact disappear- 
ing. 8 George Russell (A. E. ) in evidence before the Select Committee 
on Moneylending (1898) stated that the gombeenman specialising in the 
provision of credit had practically vanished because of the pressure 
of the commercial banks and public opinion. 
9 
Another witness P. J. 
Hannon, an agricultural refiner with first-hand experience of condi- 
tions in the west of Ireland, could only provide evidence of three 
districts where such moneylending at high interest rates still per- 
sisted. 
10 
These witnesses, in line with Gibbon and Higgins, would, 
however, claim that the old system of "gombeening" was reappearing 
in new shapes, most notably in the form of credit-retailing. Indeed, 
the authors of the 1914 report on agricultural credit also entertained 
some fears along these lines as their description of a gombeenman 
suggests. 
ll 
Generally speaking, a "gombeen" man may be described as a local 
moneylender, often a shopkeeper, who by advancing money at high 
interest has so got the necessitous farmers into his grasp as to 
cripple them with a growing burden of indebtedness and leave 
them almost helpless victims in his hands. In the cases where 
"gombeenism" is combined with shopkeeping the debtors are often 
unable to transfer their custom to another shop, through fear 
that such a step would be followed by immediate prosecution 
for the amounts due by them. 
The pervasiveness of credit transactions requires little comment, but 
an interpretation of its implications is less straightforward than some 
critics seem to have imagined. 
We have already drawn upon the evidence contained in the Inspectors' 
Local Reports to show that fairly extensive areas of high interest rates 
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were to be found in such counties as Galway, Mayo and Donegal. It is 
evident though that areas of this kind were concentrated in the mid- 
and north-west, but interestingly not in the south-west of the country. 
In other words this experience had a marked regional character. This is 
not to suggest that some instances of high interest rates might not be 
encountered in the south-west. The point is the extent of such prac- 
tices was not noteworthy relative to the dominant pattern of low cre- 
dit charges there. Nor can other regions of the west be considered 
homogeneous in terms of high interest charges. One may take two of 
the previously mentioned counties, Donegal and Galway, to illustrate 
the contention of a wide dispersion of interest rates. Thus in the 
districts of "The Rosses" and Glenties (Donegal) and the Aran Islands 
and Clifden (Galway) charges of 20 per cent or more per annum are 
reported, while in north Inishowen, in the former county, and Levally, 
in the latter, credit charges are less than half that amount. In the 
urban districts in these and other western counties where competitive 
pressures were more severe than in rural areas one would generally 
predict low average interest rates. Overall, of the districts on which 
the CDB inspectors reported, it would seem that roughly a quarter had 
average interest rates of 10% or less while another quarter or so had 
rates that did not exceed 15% per annum. 
12 (The student of comparative 
agrarian studies may find it instructive to contrast the CDB evidence 
with fairly recent data on credit charges in some of today's developing 
countries - parts of Laos 48 - 120 per cent per annum, parts of rural 
Hong Kong 120 per cent per annum, and on a lower interest plane, agri- 
cultural moneylenders in India frequently charging in excess of 18 per 
cent per annum. 
13 
One can only conclude that the supply of credit in 
rural Ireland at the end of the nineteenth century compares more than 
favourably. ) 
It was observed by contemporaries that high interest charges were 
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most pronounced in the poorer districts of Ireland, a category of which 
the CDB areas represent prime examples. If in such extreme cases one 
cannot find uniformly high charges on a general scale, then by infe- 
rence, the existence of high interest rates on a massive scale in the 
less depressed areas is even less plausible. Reflection on structural 
change in the economy lends further support to this claim. One aspect 
of this was the strong advance of the retailing sector of the economy 
in the final two decades of the nineteenth century. Over this period, 
the numbers of various categories of retailers advanced particularly 
rapidly in some poor law unions in the west of Itdand, Oughterard, 
Mount Bellew, Bantry and Dingle for example. 
A further crucial development acted on the level of credit prices. 
This was the extension of the banking system into rural Ireland in the 
post-Famine period. Thus while nationally there was only one banking 
office to every 37,600 persons in 1851, there was one to every 8,200 
persons by 1891.14 A complementary development about the turn of the 
century, the emergence of co-operative credit societies, was important 
for some distressed areas, especially in Connaught. However, despite 
the growth of institutional provision farmers and others (as is the 
case to a lesser extent today) tended to make extensive use of shop 
credit facilities, even where the ingest charges were higher than 
those advertised by the commercial banks. This apparent paradox is 
not too difficult to explain. The real cost of bank borrowing was con- 
siderably higher than the nominal rate implied. Thus both Horace Plun- 
kett and P. J. Hannon in evidence before the Select Committee on Money- 
lending (1898) complained that bank credit was poorly attuned to the 
needs of agriculturalists in that loans had to be renewed every three 
months or so, each renewal involving further expense. 
15 
It was customary 
for borrowers to meet their guarantors' travelling expenses, a duty 
which was not so narrowly defined as to exclude fairly ample alcoholic 
239 
refreshment. In addition, as George Russell pointed out to the Commit- 
tee: 
"There are a great many other things which pile up the 
expenses. When a man goes surety for his friend he 
expects that he will work for him occasionally; he is 
under an obligation to him... " 
By imputing values to these associated costs, Russell calculated that 
the real cost of bank borrowing could on occasion rise to as high as 
40 per cent per annum. A figure of this magnitude is no doubt unrepre- 
sentative of the general experience, but it brings out forcibly some 
less obvious features of bank borrowing. Viewed in this light the 
competitiveness of traders in the supply of credit, in terms of price, 
convenience and flexibility, is obvious. 
16 
Indeed it is only fair to 
recognise that the fall in the cost of borrowing owed much, not only 
to the extension of the banking system, but also to competition between 
traders. 
Banks were of course also indirect suppliers of credit to the rural 
population to the extent that they made credit available to traders who 
in turn transmitted this to clients - frequently to clients who would 
be rejected outright by the banks as uncreditworthy, yet whose credit 
needs were sometimes desperate. The comments of Mr. Walker, C. B., a 
member of the CDB, are apt in this respect: 
17 
The principal man who is financing the people in the West of Ire 
land is getting a very bad name - the grocer - but if you take 
the risks he incurs, I don't think his charges are too high. He 
lends year after year. He is getting a very bad name, but there 
is no bank that would lend money to the people he deals with, 
except at a very high rate of interest. The rate of interest 
depends upon the security, and there is practically nothing in 
the way of security to give... 
Similarly, a labourer from county Waterford, appearing before the 
same inquiry, speaks of the difficulty facing people of his class in 
getting essential credit from any sourceother than from traders. 
18 
This 
reinforces earlier claims by agricultural reformers who stressed the 
very limited credit opportunities available at the base of rural society. 
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And it hardly requires emphasising that in some districts where spora- 
dic potato failure in the 1880s and 1890s still meant near-famine con- 
ditions, consumption goods on credit were the very stuff of survival. 
Credit in a Developing Economy 
A general current of suspicion regarding credit provision some- 
times pervades writings on the subject -a stream of thought in no 
sense specific to Ireland (medieval Europe resounded to the thud of 
debate on the question of usury, in some contemporary developing countries 
discussion is charged with socio-political and racial considerations). It 
may well be that the future historiographer of social studies in Ireland 
will note a certain resurgence of polemical interest in the topic19 
after a previous peak towards the end of the last century. Then the 
most articulate sources of such critical views were agricultural refor- 
mers, such as Horace Plunkett, Fr. Finlay, George Russell, and R. A. 
Anderson. Whatever may be said of the specificaontent of some of their 
views on the supply of credit, 'and there was some variation in ideas 
between the critics, it should be recognised that on the whole they 
appreciated the importance of credit in rural economies. George Russell, 
whose literary hat-fitted more easily than his economist's hat expres- 
sed the basic problem with a typical flourish: 
"But an income which depends largely on the state`of the 
weather yawns with empty gulfs; it has so many cracks, 
gaps and fluctuations... " 20 
It is also clear that agricultural reformers perceived the difficulties 
faced by the cnnventional banking system in servicing the poorer sections 
of the rural community, and so quite naturally were led to propose 
innovations along the lines of co-operative credit societies. What they 
perceived only dimly, if at all, was the local trader's role in lowering 
information and transaction costs (much as did co-operative societies) 
in relation to borrowing, thus constituting a more competitive supplier 
of rural credit than the joint-stock banks in some sectors of the credit 
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market. Quite clearly local traders were much closer in geographical 
and social terms to potential borrowers; they were better placed to 
assess the creditworthiness'of the many customers who had little if 
any security to offer; they appreciated the variability of income 
flows in a precarious rural economy. Also of course they accepted 
clients who would be considered too high a risk by the banks. In con- 
sequence their interest rates must be evaluated in the light of the 
specific level of risk involved. 
The significance of trader credit may be underlined by reference 
to some general economic propositions. Creation of a financial infra- 
structure - money, credit, financial institutions -. is vital to economic 
development, specifically in promoting efficiency in exchange and 
encouraging further specialisation and production for the market. In a 
highly developed capital market a variety of specialised institutions 
and an elaborate price structure co-ordinating the actions of diffe- 
rent categories of borrowers and lenders, are present. In the absence 
of such specialised institutions part-time financial intermediaries, 
such as traders, perform some of these vital economic functions. Thus 
the development of trader credit in nineteenth-century Ireland repre- 
sented, on the whole, a desirable expansion of credit arrangements, and 
one which, in the absence of more formal provision in some areas of the 
country, and of the credit market, gave an impulse to economic activity. 
In drawing attention to the positive features of credit provision 
it is not implied that traders as a group, no more than any other occu- 
pational group, glowed with altruism. In the absence of strong evidence 
to the contrary it seems safest to assume that in general they charged 
at or close to the maximum the market could bear. Exploitative rela- 
tionships (which should be distinguished from the more prevalent market 
deficiencies) certainly existed: but it is contended that their scope 
and incidence cannot have existed on a major scale by the beginning 
of the present century, given th242trudural changes in the economy 
discussed earlier. Increasing state intervention in the market was 
a further, but less important. factor reducing undesirable practices. 
As we advance into the twentieth century the high levels of traders 
performing marketing and distributive functions, and the more complete 
integration of local markets as transport and information costs declined 
undermined the bases for monopolistic practices on any substantial scale. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE IRISH RURAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE : 
ELEMENTS OF STABILITY AND CHANGE 1880-1914 
An introductory note, setting out the scope of this final chap- 
ter, may be helpful. Essentially this is an essay which, while not 
summarising earlier chapters, seeks to use our previous analysis as 
a base from which to develop a number of generalisations about rural 
society. In that it attempts to weave into a coherent pattern some 
of the principal economic, sociological, and political themes that 
have arisen in the course of this study it might be loosely regar- 
ded as constituting a model. However the description "analytical 
essay" is probably more correct (and is preferred by the writer). 
Inevitably there is some overlap with previous chapters. Some- 
times this consists of a summary of earlier arguments; other times 
additional empirical evidence is introduced. In relation to the lat- 
ter, for example, some further instances of conflict between traders 
and co-operators are cited. These supplement earlier information on 
this issue and, while not adding fresh insights, it is felt that the 
inclusion of further illustrative material is worthwhile. As Irish 
historians (but not novelists) have largely neglected the trader 
there seems to be further value in drawing attention to source mate- 
rial that may contribute towards remedying this deficiency in Irish 
historiography. 
The essay may be divided into two parts: the first and longer 
section concentrating on areas of conflict in rural Ireland - con- 
frontations between landlords and tenants, stresses in farmer - 
labourer relations, social discord associated with the spread of 
co-operation - while the second identifies some of the integrative 
mechanisms at work in rural society. In treating the latter there 
is, perhaps, some danger of appearing to lend support to static 
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functionalist analyses of rural societies. This is not my intention 
and I would reject such a theoretical orientation. Rural Ireland - 
at the level of family, community and economy - was subject to con- 
tinuous change of a qualitative nature over broad time periods. This 
was not as a result of social revolutionary convulsions within the 
indigenous social structures, but largely under the impact of the 
gales of modern capitalism that swept this small extremity of the 
international market system. The steady cumulative effect of these 
dynamic, though anonymous processes is best appreciated from later 
vantage points in time. The theme of rural decline has been treated 
by a number of recent writers and requires no special elaboration 
here. l 
Finally, as this chapter seeks to encompass a broad range of 
themes and order them in relation to each other, it will be under- 
stood that such a sketch of the rural social structure is of a 
fairly tentative kind. It may be hoped though that it has some 
value both as a provisional structure and as a source of further 
hypotheses about Irish rural society. 
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While it is misleading to speak of a homogenous society beneath 
the brittle crust of the landed ascendancy, it is important to note 
that two factors in particular simplified its social composition. By 
the turn of the century the rural economy rested largely on agriculture. 
The secular decline of rural crafts and industries throughout the 19th 
century narrowed the base of rural economic activity, in effect promoting 
the agriculturalisation of rural Ireland. It still comes as somewhat 
of a shock in looking back over that century to realise that at its 
inception substantial numbers in the rural labour force derived their 
livelihood, in whole or in part, from non-farming activities. The 
west of Ireland provides an extreme illustration. It was estimated in 
1908 that 90% of the population in congested areas lived on agricultural 
holdings, income being supplemented by secondary sources, in many cases 
migratory labour in Britain Yet early in the previous century the 
domestic textiles industry represented an important source of employment 
in areas of the western counties that now fell within the jurisdiction 
of the Congested Districts Board. Prior to the Great Famine industrial 
decline had been most noteworthy in the textiles industry and even as 
late as 1841, the census of that year records one in four occupied 
persons as connected with textiles. In the post-Famine period the decay 
of domestic industry, scattered widely throughout Ireland, proceeded on 
a wider front. The impact of the decline in textiles had been most 
severely felt in rural Ireland and this was now accentuated by the 
collapse of local enterprises based on agricultural produce - brewing, 
distilling, tanning. Similarly the ranks of independent craftsmen were 
progressively thinned out under intense competition from mass produced 
products. Traditional or new industry, where it succeeded in absorbing 
the shockwaves of British and world competition, tended to concentrate 
in a few favoured growth areas, most particularly the Lagan Valley and 
Dublin. Thus rural Ireland - peripheral in economic and geographical 
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terms to the powercentres of modern industrial capitalism - was swung 
towards specialisation in primary (agricultural) commodities, with 
attendant consequences for occupational and class structure. 
The second powerful factor contributing to a simplification of 
the social composition of rural society was the destruction of the 
large rural proletariat of cottiers and labourers under the impact of the 
Great Famine and its aftermath. The general labour supply fell dramatically 
in the immediate period of famine conditions, and less rapidly but 
However, the main incidence of emigration was persistently thereafter3 
among landless and small-holding groups, so diminishing their numerical 
significance in both absolute and relative terms. Thus the numbers of 
labourers fell from perhaps 700,000 in 1845 to 300,000 in 1910, while 
cottiers (on holdings of less than five acres) suffered an even sharper 
drop from roughly 300,000 to a level less than a quarter of that over 
the same interval. And while the total number of farm holdings declined, 
those above thirty acres in size consolidated their position by showing 
a slight upward tendency in the half century following the Great Famine 
4 
Not all social categories were declining in numerical significance 
throughout the second half of the 19th century. With the expansion of 
the services sector of the economy new or hitherto relatively unimportant 
occupational groups developed. Among these one might mention bank clerks, 
doctors, veterinary surgeons, schoolteachers, post office and railway 
employees, and various administrators. 
5 
More important in the present 
context was the development of the distribution system, particularly the 
expansion of retail outlets in rural Ireland in the periods of 
agricultural prosperity after the mid-century. Moving up to our chosen 
period, one finds that persons performing agricultural marketing and 
retailing functions in rural Ireland continued to increase in relative 
6 
strength over the period 1881-1911. Another, and an especially noteworthy 
change in the occupational structure was the long term trend for the 
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Roman Catholic (R. C. ) clergy to expand in both relative and absolute 
terms. From a base of about 5,000 priests, monks and nuns in 1850 
clerical numbers increased steadily to over 14,000 in 1900, despite a 
heavy fall in the lay R. C. population 
7 
It is clear from this summary account of occupational trends in the 
second half of the nineteenth century that occupiers of land were coming 
to dominate even further the ranks of an ever dwindling rural population. 
The numbers of rural labourers were progressively depleted, while non- 
farming but strategically significant groups in rural Ireland - traders 
and the R. C. clergy - represented rising social forces. However an 
analysis developed solely in terms of a restructuring of the labour force, 
while having the merit of being amenable to quantification, tends to 
miss underlying dynamic processes. In itself it gives little indication 
of how various social groupings relate to each other; what forms of 
social conflict are present; what factors govern collective behaviour; 
and how communities maintain stability in the face of pressures towards 
change. This essay, using the structural data as a set of preliminary 
guidelines, addresses itself to the problems posed by these interrelated 
themes. 
The basic strategy adopted is one of observing the social structure 
over a period of time when it was subjected to new and unconventional 
forms of stress. This approach - following in the wake of some socially 
disruptive thrust - should be instrumental in revealing some of the 
internal workings of rural society. And conveniently from the point of 
view of analysis, one radically new force in the quarter century before 
the Great War was the rise of the agricultural co-operative movement. 
From a feeble presence of a few dozen dairy co-operatives in the early 
1890s it had developed by 1914 to embrace a membership of over 100,000 
persons (mainly farmers with a sprinkling of labourers) organised in 
roughly a thousand dairy, agricultural, credit and miscellaneous societies. 
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Aspects of land agitations and attempts at organisation by farm 
labourers are also incorporated into the present essay, but the special 
value of co-operation in furnishing a window on rural society is the 
unique character of the alliances and tensions it engendered. For this 
reason it throws an unusual light across rural Ireland, one in which 
social relationships and group orientations emerge in stronger relief. 
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Early Response to the Formation of Co-operatives 
The early co-operative pioneers, Horace Plunkett, R. A. Anderson, 
Lord Monteagle had to contend with much apathy and indifference from the 
farmers and labourers they sought to involve in co-operative stores, 
creameries and credit societies. Plunkett claims that over 50 meetings 
were held before a single co-operative society was formed! The response 
of some rural traders - suppliers of agricultural inputs and various 
consumer goods, and buyers of agricultural outputs - was more specific, 
and probably more determined. The first co-operative society formed at 
Doneraile, near Old Court, induced a hostile reaction from local traders 
and the new society was subjected to boycotting -a form of control 
mechanism that had been perfected over the previous decade in agrarian 
agitations? Some Mallow traders, banded together as the Mallow Traders' 
Protection Association resolved. 
That we, the traders of Mallow, enter our most solemn 
protest against the establishment of co-operative stores 
at Lombardstown and Mourneabbey in opposition to the 
legitimate traders of the town, and condemn the gross 
ingratitude of the farmers who have joined hands with 
their enemies and their country against their tried and 
trusted friends. We pledge by every means in our power 
to help one another to fight the unjust alliance ... 
which tried to destroy our trade and will eventually 
bring ruin to the farmers themselves. 
This resolution has wider significance in that it embraces the main 
points used by traders and sympathetic newspaper editors in attacking 
co-operation. It may, therefore, be instructive to isolate and make 
explicit the main strands of the argument. First: the adoption of 
marketing and distributive functions by groups of farmers or labourers 
was at variance with the prevailing value system. Second: co-operation* 
was unpatriotic and involved collusion with traditional enemies - landlords 
and unionists. Thus co-operation was interpreted as a deep laid scheme 
to push up rents or deflect nationalists from the pursuit of Home Rule. 
Third: co-operative endeavours were narrowly self-interested, and 
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treacherous to the extent that traders' past services in agrarian 
.. ý,. . eý ', ýý. ý. _, i 
struggle and the provision of credit were being forgotten. Finally 
:iýý" 
and most importantly, co-operative enterprise would involve considerable 
economic losses for traders, and ultimately for agriculturalists 
themselves. 
Passing motions is not the most effective form of struggle. 
Faced with the threat of a co-operative store Longford town traders 
insisted that the rule which prohibited them from holding positions on 
the management committee should be rescinded. One disputant demanded 
that traders be given a majority on the committee to ensure the co- 
12 
operative society did not enter controversial lines of business. 
After considerable discussion the offending rule was deleted and traders 
admitted. The chief co-operative organiser, R. A. Anderson, later 
claimed that in most instances where traders were admitted as share- 
holders they dominated policy making: "Henceforth, except for dairying, 
13 
co-operation was ruled out in that area". 
In mid-Tipperary the formation of co-operative stores provoked the 
14 
organisation of a Thurles Traders' Protection Association while farther 
north in that county the traders of Nenagh and surrounding villages were 
15 
distinctly uneasy. Just over a decade later traders in Donegal were 
organising, unsuccessfully, to crush the embryonic co-operative development 
In County Waterford the Waterford Pig Dealers' in Templecrone16 
Association brought pressure to bear on local M. P. and leader of the 
Parnellite wing of the Irish nationalists, John Redmond, urging him to 
dissociate himself from attempts to establish bacon curing stores of a 
17 
co-operative type. As late as 1911 Plunkett feared that the future of 
the co-operative movement was being threatened by its "premature invasion 
of the groceryman's preserves", 
while 
a year later an official co- 
operative publication speaks of the deep split which "threatens to 
divide the farmers and traders of the country into two opposite camps" 
19 
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Overall then, while there is some variation in the response to 
co-operation - purely dairy processing or credit provision being 
more acceptable than forms which embodied retailing activities - 
a substantial degree of uniformity in the structure of co-operator 
and trader relationships is apparent at different points in time 
and space. 
20 
An interesting facet of some of the attacks on co-operation 
is the overlap of political and trader objections (in itself sug- 
gestive of the political influence of traders). Thus while there 
is a comparative decline in the number of reported instances of 
trader-farmer conflict in the early years of the new century, with 
the fall of the Unionist administration in 1905 and the subsequent 
ejection of Plunkett from the powerful position of vice-president 
of the Dept. of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, political 
and trader opposition to co-operation is articulated with a new 
vigour. It is unnecessary to summarise the ongoing public debate 
here, but a few major strands may be recalled. Towards the end 
of 1906 the central organising body of the co-operative movement, 
the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, finding itself under 
increasing attack in the Freeman's Journal and other major nationa- 
list newspapers, felt it necessary to appeal to its constituent 
societies for testimony regarding its non-political character. 
The societies responded by affirming the non-political nature of 
the co-operative movement as well as endorsing the value of the work 
undertaken by the I. A. O. S. 
21 Such gestures however did little to 
placate the opponents of the movement who persisted in regarding it 
variously as an anti-nationalist front, "a butress of the toppling 
institution of landlordism", and a "cruel attack on traders". Unfor- 
tunately for co-operators, prominent among their critics was the 
new vice-president of D. A. T. I. 
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T. W. Russell M. P. Having received a delegation of traders protesting 
against D. A. T. I. 's policy of subsidisingco-operative; organ is at ion, 
Russell quickly proceeded. to phaseout-over a period of three years his 
department's grant to the I. A. O. S22_, (In fact the grant, was ended 
abruptly in 1908 following, a sharp press controversy centering on 
allegations by-the writer and, co-operator T. W., Rollestonýthat the Irish 
parliamentary party was dominated by country traders who, it was 
claimed, used. political power to stunt co-operative growth) 
?3 Rather 
than-subsiding, such controversies, frequently combining elements of 
political and trader opposition, rolledIon until the outbreak of the 
Great War, and even beyond., 
The response. of another social-groups,,, theR. C. clergy to the co- 
operative movement, has been dealt with, in some: detail. in., an 
earlier chapter,.. _ 
The reaction may be briefly summarised: in the 
early days of co-operative propagation; manyv. of_the R. C., clergy held 
aloof from the movement,: and. in, someiinstances actually opposed its 
diffusion, sometimes-, it would appear in conjunction with traders. As 
the movement developed there is evidence of increasing clerical 
participation. Indeed where. co-operative; societies were successfully 
organised there was almost, inevitably_a clerical presence. 
While the numbers of R. C. clergy present°at co-operative meetings in 
the early 1890s may not have been, particularly great, their relative 
absence at meetings of labourers'-, associations is far more remarkable. 
Studying newspapers and other, contemporary accounts in the closing decades 
of the century one cannot, avoid noticing the prominence of priests on 
public platforms relating to either tenant demonstrations or nationalist 
meetings. One report may be taken as pretty representative24 Under 
the sub-headings "Nationalist Demonstration at New Pallas" and "A 
Vigorous Protest from Priests and People" the paper reports: "At the 
head of each contingent walked their parish priest, and previous to the 
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meeting the march past of each body was a sight not easily to be 
forgotten ....... According to Rev. Fr. O'Dwyer P. P.: "They were 
there as one man, priest and people, foot to foot and breast to breast, 
prepared to strike a fresh and telling blow in the sacred cause of 
Irish Nationality". This is all quite unexceptional. 
However, out of step with this flowing martial scene and professed 
solidarity one finds priests very poorly represented or largely absent 
at public meetings of labourers' associations. At a "monster meeting" 
of the representatives of the trades and labourers of Skibbereen in 
1894 only one priest is reported as being present. 
25 
He in fact was 
asked to preside, and he mentions perhaps significantly that he was 
there "with the sanction and authority of his Bishop". A Fr.. M'Swiney 
presided over meetings of the Enniskean (Co. Cork) branch of the Democratic 
Labour Federation. It is worth noting that in reference to Fr. M'Swiney 
the president of the Bandon branch of the federation claimed he was "the 
only priest in Ireland who had come forward to champion the cause of 
the workingman" 
26 
This is undoubtedly an exaggeration but it strongly 
suggests a general tendency. 
Occasionally the absence or poor turn-out of clergy is explicitly 
noted, as in a report of a labour meeting (addressed by Michael Davitt) 
carried by the unionist Cork Constitution 22 Jan. 1890. No clergy are 
reported as present at a public meeting organised by Limerick Trades 
27 
Council in 1894, nor in the case of 7 meetings of the Bandon branch of 
the I. D. L. F. as reported in the Eagle and County Cork Advertiser during 
that year. A similar absence may be noted in the case of reports in the 
Eagle of a labour conference at Limerick Junction (18 Aug. '94) and a 
labourers' meeting at Kanturk (22 Sept. '94). At a meeting of the Land 
and Labour Association in New Tiperary a few years later letters of 
apology from two clergymen who are unable to attend constitute the 
28 
only reference to the clergy. 
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How does one explain such differential participation on the part 
of the clergy as between tenant and nationalist agitations on the one 
hand, and labourer meetings on the other? This behavioural feature is 
probably explicable by reference to two broad considerations, each in 
its own way quite suggestive on the structure of rural society. These 
are the system of social stratification and the nature of the socio- 
political demands being articulated. In relation to the first of these, 
the priest a prestigious, well-heeled, powerful figure was elevated 
through his office to a social plane far above that of the struggling 
labourer. Secular as well as spiritual power emanated from the dark 
cassock; priestly authority was confirmed in a traditional milieu in 
which sentiments of deference, affection, and sometimes fear commingled29 
While kinship ties tend to reduce social distance it is inconceivable 
(given a society that practised endogamy within narrow income ranges) 
that such links between the clerical elite and the labourers were nearly 
so dense as with other rural social groups such as the tenant farmers for 
instance3° "For, let the clergy say what they will about their being the 
poor man's friends, as they are; they do not spring from the labouring 
class, nor do they sympathise with labourers so much as with farmers 
and other employers of labour. " 
31 
These factors suggest that a spontaneous 
identification with the position of the labourer is not immediately 
probable. 
More significant in determining clerical reaction, one suspects, 
were the implications of some of the labourers' demands, particularly 
when these are viewed in the context of a general presumption against 
32 
social radicalism within Catholic Ireland. Dissatisfaction with conditions 
of employment, requests for larger allotments, or calls for division of 
large farms tended to draw labourers into conflict with farmers, thus 
threatening the stability of local communities. (In this respect, that 
257 
is, in terms of their disruptive-content there are some similarities 
between the impact of'co-operative organisation' and. that, of labourers' 
organisations. ) At labourers '. meetings. one, finds that the spokesmen 
33 
are sometimes very critical-of farmers' treatment of men-of their class. 
Certainly a strong sense of, class distinction . 
separated-labourers from 
other social strata, even the humblest tenant farmers. - Anderson recalls 
that farmers and labourers were "often, -unhappily antagonistic", while 
an official enquiry into agricultural credit noted in, passing the social 
gulf separating the two. Other contemporary observers-commented on this 
phenomenon, while the-Royal-Commission on Labour (1893-4) found 
considerable regional, -variation' in the warmth of farmer-labourer 
relations. 
35-"> 
However, like other'movements of this period, 'those of the labourer 
were not free from the weight of. 'Irish history; the. problems of ordering 
economic and political priorities and of satisfactorily relating the 
economic to the political dimension were ever present. In the case of 
largely tenant agitations this dual aspect could be a source of strength, 
"the question of independence joined to, the land question would be like a 
36 
railway carriage coupled to an engine".. For the landless man, also 
occupying a seat on the national train, it is not so clear that the 
same destination was necessarily the most suitable. The problems of 
political life in the third class compartment are illustrated by the 
proceedings at a labourers' meeting in Nenagh in 189437 One of the 
principal speakers makes the double claim that (a) the labourers have a 
"right to be rooted in the Irish soil", and (b) that the labourers "were 
as patriotic as any other class in the country" and "would stand by the 
National cause come weal or woe". Another speaker advised that the 
"cause of the labourers would not be finally settled until the cause of 
Ireland was settled and legislation for the labourers as well as for 
every other class would come, not from an alien Parliament, but from a 
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native Government in College Green". This is, a classic reminder of 
the type of confusion of, economic and- political- strategies that impeded 
the development of :a strong class consciousness, and, also incidentally 
the work of rural reformers. - 
Essentially it illustrates the latent 
38 
function of Irish nationalism in obscuring class antagonisms. 
From these various observations, it'is evident that labourers 
constituted the bottom-layer of the rural social pyramid, disadvantaged 
according to the three classic indices of inequality, -economic status, 
prestige, and power. Above these were'; the'tenant farmers beginning 
to enjoy increasing prosperity with the recovery of agricultural prices 
in the 1890s, and further fortified'by favourable adjustments to the 
system of land tenure. . And deeply significant'-for the prestige system 
of rural society, the tenant farmer. was-in possession of the primary 
means of production, -the land,. thus.. further marking him off from the 
landless class. 
Whether one presumes, to treat, the town and village based traders 
as part of a separate-class"or'not there is some evidence to suggest 
that at least the stronger traders enjoyed-a'position of considerable 
status and in some instances economic pre-eminence within rural 
communities 
9 Certainly. this is=the impression conveyed in Paddy Gallagher's 
description of social conditions, in the Rosses, "Co. Donegal. Other 
works previously cited, such-as those'by R. A. Anderson and Smith-Gordon 
and Staples express a similar'point of view. ''The more detached 
observations of officials of the'-Congested Districts Board also suggest 
that this interpretation is valid for some districts in the west of 
40 
Ireland. It is remarkable that at a later period (early 1930s) 
Arensberg noted the dowry claimed by shopkeepers was roughly double that 
41 
claimed by farmers in his west Clare study area. As one of the purposes 
of the dowry was to iron out inequalities of an economic or prestige 
nature, the inference of a superior status 
for traders-is afforded some 
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support. However-these-observations are concentrated almost wholly 
in certain counties 'in the, west, of Ireland, -indicating 
their regional 
rather than national significance. . 
They would appear to apply with most 
strength to the north west region, with diminished, strength in other 
depressed areas, and very-. probably not at all, in. the. commercial farming 
areas where a more. differentiated economic structure threw up both 
farming and trading businesses. of'varying sizes. 
However the strategic position of traders in, rural life must not 
be played down.. In addition to forming nodal points in the economic 
network that linked local, communities- to -theoutside world, there 
is 
fairly strong evidence pointing to a. disproportionate accretion of 
political influence on the. part of trading interests from at least 
the late. nineteenth century: onwards42,, (The two spheres of activity are 
probably connected: trading links,, in-. so far as. they required involvement 
in a chain of contacts which extended upwards-out: of the local setting 
facilitated a consciousness of wider issues and opportunities that is 
likely to have exceeded--that, of-farmers. and labourers. ) Of more than 
tangential relevance here is, Clark's.. quantitative'analysis of the 
43 
social composition of. the National Land League in the early 1880s. 
He finds shopkeepers, innkeepers and publicans involved in this mass 
agrarian movement to a greater extent, than: their relative numbers in 
the population would. initially suggest Clark goes further and ascribes 
a crucial leadership role to-various btraders, journalists, and 
other non-farming groups in politicising. the rural masses and shaping 
the final confrontation with: Irish landlordism. 
The foregoing suggests that traders were differentiated according to 
a number of characteristics from other social groups in rural Ireland. 
In objective terms, they bore a particular relationship to the production 
process which was both strategic and distinctive. A subjective correlate 
of this appears to be a heightened political awareness<(relative to the 
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tenant masses), and a_ greater, ability to mobilise in defence of, their 
interests as, exemplified by., their defensive reaction to agricultural co- 
operation. In terms of a conflict model of society, it might be said 
that in the aggregate traders' interests diverged from those. of other 
groups. The historical evidence is conclusive in indicating that a 
considerable section. of traders saw themselves in a conflict relationship 
with the Anglo-Irish ascendancy class and occasionally (although on a 
much smaller scale) with farmers. t In, other words, groups engaged in 
broadly retailing and marketing activities - those we have labelled 
traders - formed part of a social, -class distinct from that, of the 
peasantry and, labourers. However such<a tidy-categorisation presents 
difficulties. Later when we come, to consider the integrative' forces 
at work in rural communities it emerges: that the'fit between the 
empirical data and the analytical concept of social-class is not as 
close . as. one might wish. And, 
it may be added,, viewing the "mass 
,:, of. -, tenant-farmers through the prism of social 
class is `also problematic. 
'We have looked at the, response of traders and Röman Catholic clergy 
to co-operation, and in the process referred briefly to the position of 
the agricultural labourer. It remains-to examine the reaction of a 
particularly. interesting stratum"of society, that composed of landlords, 
land agents andothers broadly, identified -with the ascendancy class. 
However rural Ireland, to, invert Tawney's observation on neighbouring 
England, lacked "the sentimental aroma of an aristocratic legend' that 
might soften perceptions of the major class division. Yet despite a 
background of agrarian turmoil - boycotts, shootings, rent strikes - the 
initial impulse towards co-operation came almost exclusively from 
Protestant and unionist reformers. And while the bulk of unionists were 
probably indifferent to the new social movement, it is nonetheless clear 
that such elements were disproportionately represented on the I. A. O. S., the 
co-ordinating body of the movement. Even more important perhaps, to the 
extent-that the-I. A. O. S. was privately. financed these funds came mainly 
from the pocket of peer rather than peasant. 
Patterns of Social Conflict 
Having identified the varying responses to agricultural co- 
operation it may be helpful at this stage to'summarise the various 
strands of information`in a form which highlights the structured nature 
of interaction between the major social groups. Reference to figure I 
provides an overview, necessarily somewhat simplified of the general 
orientations of the principal social groups vis-a-vis each other at the 
point of introduction of-co-operatives into rural society. The essential 
simplicity of the pattern is noteworthy., With the exception of the 
agricultural labourers who are represented as being less well integrated 
into community life, and an increasingly anachronistic element the 
landlord class, the other main categories overlap. These overlapping 
sets indicate common kinship, -'political'and religious affiliations. 
Economic relationships are-perceived as essentially symbiotic within the 
rural community; opposition to the alien institutions of landlordism and 
the' civil authorities reinforcing this perception, of mutual'inter-' 
dependence. The exception once again is the agricultural labourer who 
intermittently perceived his economic relationship in n-a less harmonious 
light. 
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Figure 1. Traditional Patterns of Group'Conflict-and Solidarity. 
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Figure II indicates, again in somewhat, crude form, an interesting 
transitional stage when time-worn patterns of solidarity and conflict 
are being'pressurised by the operation of new forces. We have chosen 
to focus on that aspect of the historical process which relates to 
stresses induced by agricultural co-operation though, to anticipate 
slightly, other forces with potentially similar implications for the 
cohesion of the-traditional social structure were also at work. 
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Figure 2. Complex Patterns of alliances. 'and conflicts under the impact 
of an exogenous factor - agricultural co-operation. 
Divisions within the major social groups are evident. Thus, for 
example, within the R. C. clergy some favoured the co-operative movement; 
others might discourage all, or more likely parts of its programme. 
Similarly for other groups. No attempt is made here to represent the 
relative proportions within'a group showing positive or negative 
reactions. A further interesting feature of the pattern shown in figure 
II is ties tending to cross-cut increasingly dominant group loyalties. 
Incidentally rural labourers have been omitted from the figure, a 
simplification which seems justified in view of their peripheral 
significance in relation to the issue of co-operation. 
Agricultural co-operation exposed certain latent conflicts in rural 
. society, contributed 
to some partial re-alignment between largely 
antagonistic groupings, and in the process opened up some new lines of 
conflict. This represents a far more complex historical sequence with 
divisions. apparent within formerly fairly monolithic structures. These 
developments should be superimposed on the broader historical context: 
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stretched over the last decade of the nineteenth and the early years 
of the twentieth. century is a web, of initiatives - formation of the 
Congested: Districts Board, and the Department of Agriculture and 
Technical Instruction, democratisation of local government, the 
Dunraven land conference,. the Wyndham Land Act. These reform measures 
were variously blessed as instances of 'constructive unionism" or 
cursed as ploys designed to compromise Mother, Ireland in her quest for 
Home Rule" The, co-operative movement was, ' in part, a manifestation. of 
the spirit of conciliatory unionism, (though the, enlisting of landlords, 
landagents, and, other substantial unionists in the cause of co-operation 
was less narrowly motivated than some of the above measures and partook 
more of commitment to a rural philosophy than of, policy improvisation). 
A fuller treatment of ameliorative unionism and the various endeavours 
of rural reformers, both nationalist and unionist, lies outside the 
scope of this-, essay but'it is necessary at the very least to stress 
the transient character of. these developments in terms of their political` 
and constitutional impact. A new era entailing a radical break with set 
historical positions did not dawn, for if the foregoing is to be seen in 
true perspective then, the ultimate failure to bridge the deep-seated 
46 
division of Irish society must be recognised. A'possible corollary of 
this, is that threatened divisions within this predominantly, rural 
society did not achieve a permanence and an intensity which might have 
culminated in the emergence of antagonistic class formations. - Why this 
was unlikely to happen is important to an understanding of the underlying 
dynamics of rural society., 
Certainly in some villages, small towns, and-their associated 
hinterlands a legacy of distrust and ill-feeling between some traders 
and some co-operators persisted long into the. present"century. 
7 
This in 
itself is an indication of the considerable significance of the early 
struggles. However it would be quite misleading to suggest, despite 
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the. intensity of some local disputes and the sporadic ideological 
promptings of the I. A. O. S., that a generalised belief emerged which 
re-defined the relationship between traders and farmers-as essentially 
exploitative. Certainly no new socio-political institutions emerged 
which might reflect such, a consciousness. ', Localised grievance or alleged 
grievance was never success fully'subsumed-under a social programme 
that might have induced radical, changes, in the representation of farming 
interests and the articulation of their demands. While the claim was 
sometimes made by leading co-operators, that; the interests of agricultura- 
lists were neglected by-nationalist politicians and that independent 
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organised action was necessary, it is, clear that most agriculturalists 
were unreceptive to the charge and its implications. 
PROBLEMS OF PEASANT POLITICAL ACTION 
-'This brings us directly to consideration within the Irish context 
of an issue which has perplexed a number of social analysts from Marx 
onwards49 Do the peasantry constitute a class? The position taken here 
is that adopted by Shanin50 No neat classification of universal validity 
can be enforced; the extent to which a peasantry may be viewed as a 
class can only be established by'reference to a specific historical 
context. Thus while the intermittent character of Irish agrarian 
, upsurges must 
be recognised, it does seem reasonable to regard the Irish 
peasantry as behaving as a class like entity during the period of the Land 
League and related agitations. The conflict relationship with the land- 
lord class and its representatives intensified. and a widespread pattern of 
struggle developed. A nationwide organisational structure and a national 
leadership shaped the course of this struggle, drawing together the 
geographically isolated peasant elements. Why were these farmers 
exhibiting pronounced class characteristics over this period but not 
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at laterý points in time? 
While: ameliorative measures from Westminster, and gradual recovery 
in the rural-economy carry-the heaviest explanatory weight, a further 
factor maybe relevant. Crucial-to socio-political- action on behalf 
of Irish-tenant farmers was the participation not only of'laboürers, 
but also of non-farming'groups-such as clergymen, traders, journalists 
and others5, Thus'while it has been remarked with some justification that 
with the. Land League-the Irish-masses came onstage for the first time 
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it might also be added that'the main speaking parts were reserved for 
others. -., Further the land agitation successfully fused political and 
economic objectives thus locating itself in'the mainstream of the 
historic struggle between nationalism and unionism (this being also true 
of the United Irish League 'agitation at the end of'the'nineteenth century 
which marked the final phase of militant peasant action on a mass scale). 
Divorced from this-context, - denied-the, supportive action of non-farming 
elements independent class'action of an overt'kind was highly improbable. 
Thus in the aftermath of the agrarian struggles there is a rapid decline 
of class like characteristics'on; the part of the Irish peasantry. 
ýýA momentary look beyond Ireland may be helpful. Reflecting on a 
range of peasant societies in different'parts of"the world, Wolfe 
comments on certain socio-political weaknesses associated with the 
peasantry - problems of leadership, mobilisation, -ideologyr54 The Irish 
experience is compatible with-these broad generalisations, 'provided one 
restricts the frame of reference to open agrarian struggles conducted on 
a , regional or national scale. The strength of the Irish peasantry in 
regulating landlord-tenant relationships through the mechanism of semi- 
spontaneous, localised violence must also be firmly recognised. 
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It, is not altogether surprising then that the, efforts of co- 
operative propagandiststo. forge a new, cconsciousness.. based on a presumed 
conflict of interest between farmers and certain, commercial -interests 
failed.. This is not meant to convey the impression, that a central 
concern. of such co-operators was the promotion. of social, conflict. 
Rather=ittwas incidental-to the main objective of_maximising the welfare 
of, agriculturalists i. e. farmers and rural labourers. It sprang from two 
premises, first a negative evaluation of the, performance of traders 
in servicing rural, communities; 
5and 
second, a realisation well attested 
to in practice that co-operatives in seeking to displace certain 
established forms of trading would inevitably, induce a hostile reaction 
from affected interests.; Leading co-operators were especially incensed 
by the ability'of these interests to mobilise political forces on their 
behalf, and some, most notably Anderson relished the'prospect of a head- 
on clash with traders56The, view that prevailed though was one more 
sensitive to the social constraints on co-operative development? Pr. 
Finlay,, vice-president of the. I. A. O. S. -from its. inaugurationAn 1894 
through the whole period of the present study, -emphasises 
the, mollowness 
of--the co-operative vision: ', 'The idea of 'a war of, classes is wholly 
alien_to our movement, which, of its nature, makes'for'social and economic 
peace"58 However Fr. Finlay was not averse to breaking a few heads along 
the way to the social millennium,; as, his references to=trading interests 
inxthe early issues of the. Irish Homestead testify. -So, what are the 
most-appropriate terms in which, to conceptualise the social discord 
accompanying the progress of co-operation? If-it is not primarily an 
expression of class conflict, then-what? And what kind of restructuring 
of. the social and political framework-were the reformers seeking to effect? 
An immanent feature of the Irish. co-operative philosophy was the 
notion that, because of their disorganised-, state, agricultural interests 
were insufficiently safeguarded. . 
This, of course, was ,a ready extension 
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of the'belief that non-farming, sometimes hostile: groups -were over- 
represented in the political system. Finlay speaks, of the need for 
farmers to represent other farmers in public life; George Russell and, 
R. A. Anderson both advocate'a form of farmers' -trade union; 
Plunkett 
urges on agriculturalists the necessity to organise to defend themselves 
against groups 
_antagonistic 
to their interests59 A, contemporary observer 
predicted: 
0 
"We can see, too, 'that the spread of co-operation in 
an agricultural country such as Ireland will tend to 
produce. a division of parties along new lines. -. There 
will be a party of farmers - an agrarian party - 
seeking to-enable the agricultural interest to: buy 
and sell directly; and there will be a party of 
-traders or'middlemen, seeking to protect . the. trading interest against the competition of co-operative 
agricultural societies.., This, it. has been prophesied, 
will be the line of division in the Irish Parliament 
-of the future. 
" 
But the-co-operative pioneers did not advocate a farmer-or peasant 
party61 'Theco-operative movement was determinedly not party political; 
it took the existing party formations as-given. , Even when'under sevore 
attack from politicians and others,. a proposal by, one exasperated co- 
operator that the 100,000 odd farmers, in-co-operative societies should' 
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set up a new political grouping was quickly withdrawn. ; What'the`founders 
of the movement did propose though was a strong national organisation 
representing the 'interests of agriculturalists qua agriculturalists, and 
acting as a watchdog in relation to public policy impinging on 
agriculture. Of the many expressions of this view one may note in 
particular a motion carried'unanimously. at the annual general meeting of 
the I. A. O. S. in 1910. This proposed that parliamentary candidates for 
rural constituencies be required to "recognise and support the claim of 
the I. A. O. S., the central Union of the organised farmers of Ireland, to 
be consulted as to the making and administration of any laws which may 
affect the business of the 95,000. farmers, included`in the societies 
which it has founded. "63In the same year Plunkett urged the formation of 
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an agricultural lobby in parliament open to members of all parties.. 
{ 
This-proposal also had the complete backing of the I. A. O. S. What we are 
seeing then - at the. level of the movement as a whole, and in particular 
in relation to its organisational. and ideological core, the I. A. O. S. - is 
an attempt to ease the frozen postures of Irish political life and create 
space for interest group politics 
5 
-As a mode of expressing agrarian 
grievances this represents the first serious development of such 
mechanisms in the history of Irish agriculture. Even more remarkable 
this occurs little over a decade after the impassioned national and class 
confrontations of the Land League period and within the temporal context 
of further land agitations. Transmutation of these crude patterns into 
the form of specialist pressure group activities may be viewed as part 
of the political modernisation process. But. having acknowledged these 
incipient developments it must be stressed that, apart from some limited 
successes, interest group politics failed to flourish in the shadow of 
(Nor was the the struggling giants of unionism and nationalism6 
situation transformed with the advent of political independence; the 
two largest farmers' unions to emerge, the National Farmers Association 
and the Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association were post-World War II 
developments. ) 
Prior to independence, two major retarding factors may be identified. 
The first relates to the monolithic structure of the Irish political 
system prior to 1918. In a perceptive editorial in the Irish Homestead 
soon after the first General Election of 1910, George Russell laments 
the difficulty experienced by the "submerged Irish causes" - Gaelic 
League, co-operative movement, Sinn Fein, Labour League - in bringing 
pressure to bear on members of parliament67 Outside of Ulster few 
constituencies were seriously contested. These monopolistic conditions 
implied that nationalist politicians did not have to compete actively for 
particular blocs of votes unless the local nationalist organisations 
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fissured under internal strains as was sometimes, though not generally 
the case. The second and related factor is of course the ideological 
dominance of nationalist thought. As we have noted briefly in relation 
to labourersl movements, the overarching structures of Irish nationalism 
successfully contained the-claims of sectional groupings. Public 
attention was primarily directed towards Home Rule, the sacred cauldron 
in which all grievances would be mysteriously dissolved. 
THE FORCES OF STABILISATION 
By concentrating on the varying responses to co-operative develop- 
ments and identifying their social bases some interesting relationships 
and interdependencies in the social structure are suggested. These 
observations are supplemented and clarified by reference to other 
historical features, in particular national, agrarian, and labour 
issues. It is evident that the rural social structure was such as to 
permit the emergence of co-operative creameries on a major scale, there 
being 350 such creameries in 1914. That co-operative development was 
constrained in particular directions is also clear. Sometimes this took 
the form of a filtering action such as we have described in relation to 
a proposed society in Longford town, but as Anderson points out, the 
experience is more general. Where co-operatives uncompromisingly 
succeeded in extending their posts into hostile territory it follows, 
ipso facto, that adjustments were made to some existing social and 
economic patterns. It is significant though that retail societies 
for farmers and labourers, the most controversial form of co-operation 
and the type first advocated by Plunkett and Anderson, made very little 
progress between 1890 and 1914. George Russell estimated there were only 
about a dozen farmers' retail societies in Ireland in 1910 out of a total 
of almost a thousand societies 
69 
Fears of the social repercussions of 
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this kind of co-operation, in the context of the local community, may 
be illustrated. "Generally co-operative stores clash with other 
industries, creates (sic) friction, cause bad blood, and too violent 
an upheaval in the harmonious economic conditions existing. '70 In 
similar vein a parish priest, in the course of attacking the idea of 
co-operative stores and commending the existing retailing system, 
concluded that-"good social relations are worth paying something for'71 
Credit societies were usually . acceptable to 
the main social groups, 
while agricultural societies (supplying farm inputs such as seeds and 
fertilisers) failed to assume dangerously competitive dimensions. The 
comparative weakness of the latter is indicated by its share of total co- 
operative turnover in'1914 - less than 10% of the total. 
In a very real sense then the dominant theme must be one of 
stability rather than change. Indeed the accommodation of agricultural 
co-operation and the selective incorporation of aspects of a much broader 
programme of rural'reform serves to underline the basic stability and 
cohesion of rural society. Even in areas where social conflict was 
sharp a new equilibrium was established over time. Such conflicts had 
a strong localised flavour; as perceived by the typical farmer they did 
not gel together to suggest the necessity of new political alignments. 
Nor, despite the efforts of the I. A. O. S., did crystallisation of a 
nationally powerful agricultural interest group occur. In a sense the 
existence of further stress points in Irish society such as those 
indicated by the labourers' demands or the call for land redistribution 
by the western peasantry serve to underline the strength of the 
integrative forces at work. 
In relation to this theme of social stability it is interesting to 
recall that Marx predicting the downfall of landlordism, first in Ireland 
and then in England had been "convinced from the first that the social 
revolution must begin seriously from the bottom, that is from landowner- 
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ship" 
72 In the event the agrarian revolution solidified private 
property rights, albeit of, a restructured kind, the postulated chain 
reaction failing to materialise in Ireland not to mention its inability 
to leap the Irish Sea. - Similarly 
George Russell's claim that "the co- 
operative movement is an organisation of the rural interests to enable 
it to meet the organisation of the urban interests" described a 
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potential rather than an actual situation. For reasons of a historical 
and sociological nature, some of which are now drawn together, Irish 
society is particularly unreceptive to the agressive forms of agrarianism 
which have typified areas of-rural Europe and still exercise some 
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residual force in parts of the U. S. A. Also the violent, often brutal 
confrontations between landholders and landless labourers, particularly 
associated with the latifundia system of agriculture in Latin America 
never found a place in the rural Ireland of the peasant proprietor. 
The internal stability of rural society is a feature of central 
significance. What factors underpinned it? Participation in agrarian 
and political struggles, as we have noted, had helped forge a considerable 
degree of solidarity between tenant farmers, traders and labourers. 
Probably a more potent cohesive force binding traders and farmers 
together was the elaborate kinship network in which farmers and traders 
were enmeshed. The evidence of a Fr. Clancy, parish priest near Ennis, 
is worth citing. 
5 
His testimony incidentally represents a remarkable 
anticipation of some of the later findings of the anthropologist C. M. 
Arensberg on farmer-trader and town and country ties in rural Ireland. 
Q. 8460 In your part of the country, is combining farming and shopkeeping 
legitimate? 
Yes. Nearly all the shopkeepers in country districts have land as 
well. 
Q. 8461 And in all country towns the shopkeepers and their sons are 
married to farmers' daughters, and so have a bit of land? 
In some cases the farmer's son who gets his portion from his father, 
comes into the town and opens a shop. 
273 
And, he adds later (Q. -8476) the observation 
that in a town like Ennis 
"the population is recruited from the country regularly - if not they 
die out. "76The authors of the report on agricultural credit make the 
general comment that many shopkeepers in Ireland are married to the 
daughters of farmers or are themselves part-time farmers so that the 
distinction between the two occupational categories is often weak. 
Plunkett also noted that the interests of the country traders were 
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"closely interwoven with those of their kinsmen upon the land". Thus 
by social origin and by intermarriage, traders were frequently connected 
in an intimate way to the farming community, and as trade followed kinship 
lines the harshness of market exchange was mollified through incorporation 
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into a broader pattern of social exchange. 
In the course of earlier discussion of social stratification we 
adduced evidence to suggest that rural traders might be held to constitute 
part of a class separate from that of farmers. Such a formulation, 
unless heavily qualified, easily distorts the nature of rural social 
relations. It is misleading to view traders as petty capitalists who- 
had seeped through the peasant mass and now formed a layer detached from 
other strata - the cash nexus representing the only or the main connecting 
tissue. Nor is it sufficient to speak of ties at the class boundaries, 
a blurring at the edges of adjacent categories. Rather it appears to 
be the case that farmer ranks were permeated by traders on a broad 
scale, kinship and other social links tending to knit together these two 
important social groupings. Renewal of these ties through time limited 
the possibilities of polarisation between the two; retail markets were 
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not arenas of class warfare. 
Such integrative mechanisms hardly operated in the case of labourers. 
Our knowledge of Irish peasant society, its social structure, its high 
valuation of property bearing the family name, its finely calculated 
marriage alliances suggest that intermarriage between labourers and other 
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social groups was slight. As against this, the personalised economic 
ties between labourers, and farmers, and labourers and local traders, 
sometimes reinforced by, indebtedness, militated against broad based 
economic conflict. Moreover by the 1900s the numerical weakness of 
the rural labourers 
0 
the safety valve of emigration, and the problems 
specific to organisation of a widely dispersed, poorly; educated work- 
force acted against any major class-based threat to communal stability. 
The stabilising functions performed by the, R. C. clergy, should not 
be overlooked. Reference to various' instances of social 
disturbance 
within rural society'suggests that conflict management and the 
associated activity of 'mediation were important' clerical functions 
though mediation is a rather weak expression for' interventions which 
sometimes carried the iron ring of authority 
l 
By virtue of his social 
origins and his national and"class sympathies the position of the priest 
was firmly secured; because of his role and status 
in the community 
he was especially well placed to harmonise wayward strands 
in the social 
tapestry. But the R. C. 'clergy not'only helped regulate relationships 
within the local community; they were also instrumental in regulating 
vertical relationships, those between different levels of the society. 
These separate roles were not complementary. (It is interesting to 
contrast the role of, the clergyman in some rural societies as a mediator 
of both horizontal and vertical relationships with that of the Irish R. C. 
clergyman as a centre of resistance for constitutional agitation. 
) 
Because of the fundamental cleavage in Irish society - lines of 
difference 
in religion, national outlook, and economic status running close together - 
the R. C. clergy were not identified with civil institutions and concen- 
trations of wealth and privilege, as in many European countries. This 
helps explain why the clergy, particularly at parish level, could adopt 
an aggressive role rather than an apologetic or mediating one when their 
co-religionists made radical political or economic demands on the 
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traditional enemy. However, this should not be taken as an indication 
of social radicalism; the subsequent performance of the Irish clergy on 
occasions such as the 1913 lock-out in Dublin and their position on 
social legislation in the Free State reeked of the conservatism of 
the now dominant social forces in Irish society. 
In addition a fundamental set of factors operating in the ideo- 
logical domain, worked to solidify the social structure. These are 
the forces of piety and patriotism, the mutually reinforcing bonds of 
nationalism and Roman Catholicism. Nationalism, as we have seen, 
spanned divides within the Irish Catholic nation and tended to act as a 
solvent on social clusterings developing along class or certain interest 
group lines. An interesting illustration of this may be added: the 
radical demand for land redistribution among the impoverished western 
peasantry was superseded in the United Irish League programme (the U. I. L. 
having emerged from this particular land agitation) by the demand for 
Home Rule. Similarly the institutions of Roman Catholicism - churches, 
schools, seminaries - projected a social doctrine and a social practice 
which inhibited the development of class based frictions within Irish 
society. One may conclude therefore that these complementary belief 
systems - fusing historical, political and religious perspectives, and 
the associated action tendencies - made rural society highly resistant 
to forces of a socially disruptive kind. 
Finally, a methodological and historiographical implication, at 
least in relation to the study of this period of Irish history may be 
noted. While class stratification is obviously important it is also 
clearly the case that a crude class analysis has poor explanatory or 
predictive power when brought to bear on the intricate patterns of social 
conflict and social stability that are historically present here. The 
problems of absorbing the peasantry into a satisfactory theoretical 
framework have long been recognised, but the complexity of the relationship 
276 
between Irish traders and their host agricultural communities is an 
intriguing and equally awkward issue. Concentration on but one form of 
stratification, that of class, while illuminating some aspects of rural 
society would tend to obscure other important social relationships. A 
more complex theoretical orientation conceiving social stratification 
as proceeding along a number of other important dimensions - national, 
religious, kinship (and by extension ethnic) - as well as that of class, 
82 
is necessary to embrace the rich empirical data. These various group 
affiliations are key variables in determining the historical processes 
we have outlined. A multi-dimensional concept of stratification has 
further utility in directing attention to the interplay of economic 
and non-economic forces, neither set being omnipotent in shaping such 
historical sequences as the land agitations, the labourers' struggles, 
or the course of agricultural co-operation. 
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